Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society

ANDREA JAVORSKÁ – KLEMENT MITTERPACH – RICHARD SŤAHEL
(eds.)

NITRA 2014
CONTENTS

Editors’ Word ..........................................................................................................................5

Ľubomír Dunaj:  
To Deficits of Democratic Thinking in Slovakia .........................................................7

Tomáš Hauer:  
On the Relationship of Technical Images with Their Outside  
(The Comments on Vilém Flusser’s Philosophy of Image) .................................21

Ladislav Hohoš:  
A New Civilization Paradigm:  
Transformation as an Alternative to Revolution .............................................35

Marek Hrubec:  
Interstate Recognition and Its Global Overcoming ............................................51

Andrea Javorská:  
Historicality of Dasein by Martin Heidegger .........................................................83

Klement Mitterpach:  
Changing the Concepts of the Debate.  
Žižek Helping Heidegger Fail Better ...........................................................................95

Jozef Sivák:  
The Citizen by Husserl and the Postmodern Citizenship .........................123

Richard Šťahel:  
Reciprocal Conditionality of Economical and Environmental Crises Tendencies of Global Industrial Civilization ........................................143
Dear readers,

the current, up to this day 14th, issue of Philosophica represents the second English contribution of The Department of Philosophy (Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra) to the philosophy which focuses on contemporary issues and the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of their representation as well as those theoretical tools which help us interpret the ways the phenomena to be discussed are discursively presented both inside and outside academia.

Philosophy has generally more or less explicitly analysed such connections, or, at least, responded to the need to render them visible. However, in our days, most of all marked by excessive ignorance as well as interest in changes of all kinds, it is philosophy that perhaps self-declaringly pursues not only theoretically strict inquiry, but most importantly, a study which displays the inscription of the changes on its own body and thus renders the social change in respect to one of its special, though exemplary cases – on philosophy itself as the possibility not only to reflect on the society in change, but also to reflect on the conceptual and thematic tendencies in rendering the change in contrast to those misperceived or excluded ones, and, last but not least, as the opportunity to render its own conceptual delusions which represent a background of our common reductive schemata of change we unconsciously tend to share.

The preoccupation by change today is specific, for it has become an issue of emergency primarily on the level of society, and secondly, because no matter how complex, it is evident, that regardless of its marginalization, philosophical analysis has become indispensable in formulating reasons and ways of differentiating the ways we perceive, relate to or engage ourselves in the changing reality or its simulacra.

Each of the contributions by authors, most of whom are resident in other institutions, demonstrates not only different aspects of the change in society and philosophy, but also focuses on different aspect of change as well as represents various philosophical affiliations, although they could be outlined by Critical theory and its followers or phenomenology or phenomenologically inspired inquiries.

The neglect of social-philosophical topics is viewed as resulting in Honnethian social pathology, by Ľubomír Dunaj, who identifies it as the cause of deterioration of democratic institutions, as the type of
pathological change exemplified among others also by Slovakia. Tomáš Hauer introduces Flusser’s cognitive metaphor of technical images, which shows how society renders itself in its products and the practice which is no longer narrative and historical and, therefore, after the age of texts, forms a new social culture. Ladislav Hohoš focuses on globalization and its effect on civilizational transformation, which, though unavoidable, might occur in a way of “silent” transformations the capitalism is going through. Marek Hrubec analyses Honneth’s concept of interstate recognition to show its limits in condition of globalization and testifies them on the idea of global state. Andrea Javorská moves within Heideggerian discourse to show one paradigmatic case of the shift between our commonsensical ideas of historical time and time which emerges as an ontological foundational structure of the articulation of change. Klement Mitterpach, however, points to Heideggerian idea of understanding, which, following Žižek’s idea of the contemporary philosophy, one must learn to make effectively fail in order to change the concepts of the debate upon contemporary social philosophical issues. Jozef Sivák addresses the problem of citizenship in postmodern, globalized world, and proposes to recapture its meaning by following Husserl’s idea of overcoming state, although, unlike in the violent manner of globalization, by advancing towards humanity in the process of enculturation. Richard St’ahel, following Habermas, reminds us that the antagonism of imperatives of growth and sustainability outlines the multi-level crisis which culminates in the environmental barrier that threatens all the institutional and cultural support of civilization. All these in a way indicate phenomena which can be neither eluded nor avoided once we decide to figure out connection of society and philosophy today.

We believe that the ideas promoted, analysed and applied by the authors render the urgency of philosophical articulation of contemporary issues even more significant and significance of the phenomena constitutive of the vital society even more distinct.

Editors
TO DEFICITS OF DEMOCRATIC THINKING IN SLOVAKIA

Ľubomír Dunaj

This paper focuses on three topics. First, it describes Axel Honneth’s version of social theory, accepts his distinction between social and political philosophy and discusses concerns about the term social pathology. The main conclusion of the paper will be to claim, on the basis of Honneth’s theory, that social pathological phenomena are capable of destroying a society’s democratic institutions. Secondly, the critical theory of society will be defended as an adequate way of thinking about present western societies, because it can solve the antagonism between liberalism and communitarianism, and integrates the concepts of community (‘Gemeinschaft’) and the concept of public reason (‘Vernunft’) in a unified theory. Finally, this theory will be applied to expose deficits of the Slovakian democratic transformation after November 1989, which can be in many cases understood as pathological.

Key words: social philosophy – social pathology – democracy – Slovakia – transformations

November 2014 will mark the 25th anniversary of the Velvet or Gentle Revolution, which is the description for the non-violent transition of power in Czechoslovakia in 1989. This period of twenty five years, which is a period of an entire generation, is long enough in order to reflect upon whether the expectations of the people, which wanted to transform the Czech and Slovak society at the end of the year 1989, have been fulfilled. The attention in this paper will not be focused on detailed analyses of the concrete historical or economical facts, but rather will point out some deficits of democratic thinking in Slovakia from the perspective of current research in social and political philosophy.
Social versus political philosophy?

Axel Honneth, one of the most important contemporary social theorists suggests a non-conventional interpretation of social philosophy. Because he makes a clear distinction between social and political philosophy, thereby understanding them as autonomous disciplines, he departs from the Anglo-Saxon tradition, which understands social philosophy only as a subdiscipline of political philosophy (Honneth 2007, 3-4).

According to the definition of the traditional and the current tasks of social philosophy based on the notion, its tasks aim at the assessment and the explanation of such trends in the social processes, which “can be viewed as misdevelopments (Fehlentwicklungen), disorders or ‘social pathologies’” (Honneth 2007, 4).

The neglect of social-philosophical topics in public discourse can generate harm or even fail to establish such qualities of individuals, which support their abilities to master different vital challenges and demands. Many of them then suffer from various pathological phenomena such as consumerism, commercialism, reification or alienation. Such phenomena subsequently also undermine the ability of individuals to adequately participate in public life, and thereby contribute to the reproduction of democratic institutions. On the one hand, it disturbs the establishing of the individual as an autonomous entity. On the other hand it blocks the integration of individuals into the society – very often for instance because of an inadequate understanding of their rights. As a result, the adoption of norms and expectations becomes insecure, which requires a democratic relation between the state and its citizens.

From this approximation to classical political theory it is becoming clear, that the strict distinction between social and political philosophy for considerations about democracy has largely just a “working” character. If we consider the key concepts of the single discipline, i.e. justice (political philosophy) and good life (social philosophy), it is not difficult to show that the necessary conditions for their implementation overlap in many spheres of social life. It means that after the overstepping of a certain degree of pathological phenomena in society, the frameworks considered by political philosophy are also destroyed. The reason is, that there are too few citizens, capable of preserving a successful democracy. By contrast, the right to fulfil various individual aims and the generous ideal of
freedom is empty, when it is defined only as a negative one (I. Berlin). It is often overlooked that in society there are many institutional or “structural” obstacles, which make self-realization impossible.

So, for a well-functioning democracy both social and political theory and their mutual interactions are important, but we must not neglect topics of social philosophy. For the society of the Slovak republic it has a special importance, because we are very often confronted with a “catastrophical” assessments of democracy in Slovakia. In fact, this kind of political regime demonstrates a high degree of stability and legitimacy, despite noticeable inequality and various deficits by state administration and jurisdiction.

Considering what belongs to the main issues of Slovakian public discourse, it is the fact that there are too many critical citizens and even some influential thinkers who present almost “pathological” critique (in contrast to constructive critique). This tendency very often either leads to a pessimistic “writing-off” of our democracy, or to a utopian transfiguration of the overall structure of society, instead, for example, of observing and considering existing legislation and cultivating a “democratic morality (or democratic Sittlichkeit)”. Honneth’s interpretation of critical theory of society and his theory of recognition offer in my opinion the possibility for adequate grasping the character of social processes and, therefore, provide guidance for the successful implementation of requisite social changes.

**Critical theory as social philosophy**

By explaining the tradition and actualisation of social philosophy, Axel Honneth states, that Thomas Hobbes was as the first in the middle of the 17th century, who used the notion of “social philosophy”, when he “sought the legal conditions under which the absolutist state could gain the stability and authority necessary for pacifying religious wars” (Honneth 2007, 5). As Honneth further explains, this notion was not, in a strict sense, put into practice until a century later by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who, in contrast to Hobbes, was “less interested in the conditions under which civil society could be preserved than he was in the causes leading to its degeneration”, because “in the hundred years that transpired
between these two works, the process of capitalist modernization had made so much progress that a sphere of private autonomy was able to emerge in the shadow of the absolutist state” (Honneth 2007, 5). In the nascent bourgeois public sphere Rousseau could study those kind of actions, which later free up the space for, on the one hand, democratic institutions and, on the other hand, for capitalist commodity exchange. This in turn gave rise to a form of social life that would have been unrecognizable to Hobbes. Under the increasing pressure of economic and social competition, practices and orientations arose that came to be founded increasingly upon deception, dissembling and jealousy”. Rousseau focused his attention on this form of life, and he was interested in “whether this form of life still retained the practical conditions under which humans could lead a good and well-lived life”. Thus he disclosed the matter of social philosophy, which, unlike political philosophy, is no longer a search for the conditions of a correct or just social order, “but instead would attempt to ascertain the limitations that this new form of life imposed on humans’ self-realization” (All quotations in this paragraph: Honneth 2007, 5).

Such definition of the subject of social philosophy contributed to Honneth’s new interpretation of the legacy of critical theory. The description of social pathologies of reason plays the most important role, since “not only the members of the inner circle but also those on the periphery of the Institute for Social Research perceive the societal situation on which they want to have an effect as being in a state of social negativity. Moreover, there is a widespread agreement that the concept of negativity should not be restricted in a narrow way to offences committed against principles of social justice but, rather, should be extended more broadly to violations of the conditions for a good or successful life” (Honneth 2009, 22).

The thinking about this issue ties into Hegel’s philosophy, and accepts the explanation, that the genesis of social pathologies should be understood as a result of a lack of social rationality (Honneth 2009, 24). Honneth deals with this interpretation further and states: “When this view is detached from the particular context in which it is embedded in Hegel,
it amounts to the general thesis, that each successful form of society is possible only through the maintenance of its most highly developed standard of rationality”. And this connection is according to Hegel “justified on the basis of the ethical premise that it is only each instance of the rational universal that can provide the members of society with the orientation according to which they can meaningfully direct their lives” (Honneth 2009, 24).

**Why Critical Theory of Society?**

It is not controversial that “prevalent today is a liberal conception of justice that uses criteria for the normative identification of social injustice without the desire to further explicate the institutional framework of injustice by embedding it within a particular type of society” (Honneth 2009, 20). We can say that in confrontation with the two main conceptions of contemporary social and political philosophy, i.e. beside liberalism and communitarianism critical theory of society is exactly this kind of school of thought (especially when it intersects some elements of Dewey’s pragmatism), which is able to offer a way of diagnosing and subsequently eliminating social pathologies.

The Hegelian idea of the *rationality of cooperative self-actualisation*, which all members of critical theory share and which is critical to liberalism and communitarianism, is significant for a critical theory of society. All concepts of a rational practice, which are applied by critical theory, are suitable for the procedure, whose achievement demands a higher degree of the intersubjective agreement than is acceptable for liberalism: “to be able to cooperate on an equal basis, to interact aesthetically, and to reach agreements in a noncoerced manner, a shared conviction is required that each of these activities is of an importance that justifies, if necessary, the neglect of individual interests” (Honneth 2009, 27).

By creating the “rational universal” the tradition of critical theory fills the important place of the conception of *public sphere*, which was inspired

---

2 For better understanding of Honneth’s interpretation of *rationality* see (Deranty 2009, 206).
Nancy Fraser, another important current exponent of this school of thought provides two different understandings of the concept of public sphere:

1. “The civic republican model stresses a view of politics as people reasoning together to promote a common good that transcends the mere sum of individual preferences” (Fraser 1997, 86).
2. “In contrast, the liberal-individualist model stresses a view of politics as the aggregation of self-interested, individual preferences” (Fraser 1997, 97).

Nancy Fraser emphasises that political discourse in the latter notion of public sphere “consists in registering of individual preferences and in bargaining, looking for formulas that satisfy as many private interests as possible. It is assumed that there is no such thing as the common good over and above the sum of all various individual goods, and so private interests are the legitimate stuff of political discourse” (Fraser 1997, 97 – 98).

This means that, for example ecology, generally available health care, public school system, long term sustainable consumption, care for public open spaces etc., are not important but rather only private preferences. Here it is possible to see Marx’s influence namely, that we have to distinguish between “self-regard (own) interests” and “selfish interests” and it is important to emphasise Marx’s claim that the rights of people should not be understood as the rights of the egoistic individual (Chan 1999, 220).

So we are approaching the identification of the one of the main pathologies of Slovak history after November 1989, but we have to mention, that this kind of pathology is typical for many western countries too. It is the pathology of Legal Freedom (A. Honneth), which implies juridification (Verrechtlichung) in almost all areas of life. In our concrete reality, it means that many things, which were once regulated by informal human activity, must now be regulated „in a formal way“.4

---

3 See (Habermas 1991).
4 Milan Kundera clearly grasped this fact in the novel Immortality, where he criticises unreasonable and unlimited view on human rights. He points out, that as a result of
This statement does not mean an utter questioning of law as a key regulator of social life in modern societies. Moreover, if we would analyse this problematic from a global perspective (not just from Western or more concrete Slovakian perspective), it is clear that human rights standards must be improved in many parts of world. At the end of this paper, I will emphasize this point by way of a small illustration. My critique is oriented principally towards Slovakian affairs, in which we are confronted, after 25 years of very turbulent transformation, with violations of the moral dimension of life. Of course, in many ways we have copied the affairs of others Western societies. But some of them have been able to deal better with this difficulty than others, and it seems plausible that these kinds of societies, which have been able to create a high level of democratic Sittlichkeit are much less susceptible to economic problems.

At the end of this part of the paper, I would like to provide the distinction between critical theory and communitarianism. According to Honneth “no critical theorist has ever abandoned the Hegelian idea that cooperative practice, along with the values attendant to it, must possess a rational character” (Honneth 2009, 28). A transition to liberating practises of cooperation should not result from an affective bond, or from a feeling of affiliation or approval, but from rational perspective. So, “the tradition of Critical Theory thus differs from both liberalism and communitarianism by virtue of a particular kind of ethical perfectionism. To be sure, unlike the liberal tradition, Critical Theory holds that the normative aim of society should consist in reciprocally making self-actualization possible. At the same time, it understands its recommendation of this aim to be the well-grounded result of a certain analysis of the human process of increasing popularity of human rights, they have lost all content, and now it has become a common attitude, everyone towards everything: “…people in the West are not threatened by concentration camps and are free to say and write what they want, the more the fight for human rights gains in popularity the more it loses any concrete content, becoming a kind of universal stance of everyone towards everything, a kind of energy that turns all human desires into rights. The world has become man’s right and everything in it has become a right: the desire for love the right to love, the desire for rest the right to rest, the desire for friendship the right to friendship the desire to exceed the speed limit the right to exceed the speed limit, the desire for happiness the right to happiness, the desire to publish a book the right to publish a book, the desire to shout in the street in the middle of the night the right to shout in the street” (Kundera 1991, 153).

5 Cp. (Taylor 1978).
Developments in the last decades

In the book *Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundation of Democratic Life* Axel Honneth proposes his own interpretation of social pathology. According to Honneth we can speak about social pathology, when we are confronted with a development in society, which leads to undermining of rational abilities of members of society to participate in determining and deciding upon forms of social cooperation: “Unlike social injustice, which consists in an unnecessary exclusion from or restriction on opportunities to participate in social processes of cooperation, social pathologies are found at a higher stage of social reproduction and impact subjects’ reflexive access to primary systems of actions and norms” (Honneth 2013, 86). We can speak of ‘social pathologies’ if some or all members of society, in pursuance of social reasons, are no longer able to adequately understand the meaning of these practice and standards.

I consider as a one of the characteristic features of the situation in Slovakia after November 1989 the fact that a big part of the population is not able to identify itself with the existing political system, although its standards embody many ideals of European modernity, ideals that have been the object of struggle for many centuries. Many people in Slovakia are not able to understand the democratic political system and so they are not able to positively contribute to democratic processes and institutions.

This could lead, even in the short-term, to dramatic consequences, like social tremors and turbulences. In this sense, I consider the resignation of a large part of the inhabitants of Slovakia to bring into effect the legal standards, which have been already codified in our constitution, pathological. There are many reasons for this and I will attempt to outline some of them.

The first reason has to do with “exaggerated” expectations, which people had in the year 1989. The Western liberal-capitalistic societies repre-

---

6 At this point we can find some similar features between critical theory and Confucianism, although in Confucianism, especially in its classical form, is the gregarious character stronger. Confucianism can be classified as another school of thought of contemporary social philosophy. Compare for instance cp. (Bai 2012) and (Bell 2008).
sented for most Slovaks the examples of perfect societies, although the historical truth is that many of them have and still struggle with many social, political, and economic problems. Especially, if observed after the economic crises from 2008, which showed how fragile the capitalist economic system is.

From our current perspective, we can say that this “fascination” by the West was above all connected to expectations of the kind of surplus of consumption enjoyed in the West. After certain “disillusionment” in recent years, it has become clear for many today, that such a final condition of history, where all is perfectly “good” and “ideal” does not exist. Moreover, various deficiencies can be found in the most developed societies, which are related to many factors, for instance the Breivik’s massacre in Norway.

As a result, I believe that for Slovak society, it is necessary to overcome this deficient “black or white” worldview, i.e. capitalism good vs. socialism bad (or the reverse) and soberly admit that human society is too complex, that on the one hand, there will be still “something to do”, and on the other hand, the shortcuts and “all-embracing” solutions, like the installation of the flat tax in 2004, can do society more harm than good.

The second reason probably has to do with an over-reliance upon the law and the conviction, that it would be possible to regulate all social interactions by legal means. It seems plausible to claim that many people in Slovakia accepted such position, as it were the real “end of history” (in teleological sense) and that legal normative principles based on our social-liberal constitution by themselves (an sich) guarantee a just society without our personal contribution, engagement, virtues etc. Of course, the opposite is true. This fact pushes us to claim a banality, viz. that the concrete quality of any society or political system rises and falls on the “quality” of its people in the widest sense and especially in a democratic one.

The final factor of pathological resignation, which I would like to mention, is the experience with the establishment of new elites in the 1990’s, which brought with it a lack of transparency and justification.\(^7\)

\(^7\) The great story of these processes is Peter Pištánek’s novel Rivers of Babylon (Pišťánek 2007). Many of these processes were of course very similar also in other countries in
Indeed, the privatization of national and public property, goods and resources, practices of mafia, intimidation, and still today the flowering corruption, an insufficient enforcement of law, etc. have been inscribed deep into the social memory of Slovaks.

Unfortunately my personal experience confirms the huge resignation to overcoming these negative aspects of our society. My job as a teacher at grammar school or at university brought me to the sad realization that many young people in Slovakia, which maybe should be full of “progressive ideals”, no longer care for public affairs. They are “normalised” very quickly and instrumentalise their behaviour very early – especially with respect to their future possibilities of consumption. Many of them do not believe in democratic institutions, do not believe, that these institutions work as it is described in the school books of civics and historical science, which deal with the standard theory of representative democracy and socially oriented market economy, as well as the historical reconstruction of our path to democracy.

It is really difficult to persuade people in Slovakia to the contrary, because in fact, many institutions do not work adequately. However, the pathological dimension of this situation is that instead of the vehemently demanding to fulfil our constitutional guarantees, not only civil and political rights, but also social rights – the majority of population, as well as in the time of normalisation, secludes itself in “private spaces”. Instead of making the effort to lead their lives in a transparent way, many people look for their own “path” to ensure their needs.

Much more dangerous than various forms of corruption is another fact: a tendency toward extremism – right or left oriented – for those citizens, which are not able to find some “path” for saturating their needs. In my opinion, it is not important to analyse theoretically the right-wing extremism in detail, because it is very easy to disqualify every kind of extremism by arguments. 

Central and East Europa after 1989.

8 In the history of Czechoslovakia, normalization is the name commonly given to the period 1969–87, which was by sequel established after the military intervention of Warsaw Pact armies in August 1968. This period is generally known, as the “time of opportunism”.

9 But we should not underestimate it, all the more – because of the persistence of economic crises and with it a related increase of nationalistic or even fascist movements and parties (like JOBBIK in Hungary).
More complicated are theoretical solutions for left-wing oriented extremism. It is important to say, that a simplistic critique of capitalism (Jaeggi 2013), without sufficient heed to the complexity of economic processes as well as other social processes can have a negative impact on the claim to contribute to human emancipation and freedom.

Conclusion

A headline of a German newspaper points out that on the 19. November\textsuperscript{10} 2013 an enormous sanitarian catastrophe: 2.5 billion of people in the world do not have any access to toilets. It has a dramatic impact on their health as well as on the environment.

The harmfulness of terrible sanitarian conditions is possible to quantify. Alexander Köcher, the author of the article \textit{Toiletten sind ein Menschenrecht} (Toilets belong to human rights) mentions, that according to data by World Health Organization (WHO) one gram of faeces comprises 10 million of viruses, 1 million of bacteria, 1000 of parasites and hundreds of worm eggs. The most frequent consequences of that are diarrheal diseases, from which 1, 4 million of children under 5 years die every year – more than by malaria, measles and HIV/Aids together. Although diarrhea is not always fatal, it causes many other problems. Körcher points out some examples. Because of it children miss 400 million school days, which means, that the chances of education and ways out of poverty are limited for millions of children. Other health consequences are malnutrition, anaemia and growth disorders, which mean to a certain extent a long-life disability.

It is very interesting that women suffer especially from the deficiency of toilets. The danger, for instance, comprises of sexual harassment or even assault, because the places, which substitute the toilets, are very often located far from their domiciles. In remoter spots they are often in danger because of wild animals and snakes. Another problem is the absence of cultural acceptance. As a result, women and girls usually go to spots “designated” for toilets after twilight. During the day they

intentionally eat and drink less in order not to have to visit a “toilet” before twilight yet. During puberty the girls have another problem. Since the schools in these countries do not have toilets with enough of equipment (or they are even without toilets), many girls stay home during the period of menstruation. Those periodically missed school lessons are often not tolerated by teachers, so girls are often no longer allowed to attend school. Another disadvantaged group, continues Köcher, are the poor, but wider parts of population are also affected. The World Bank calculated the economic damages for the countries, which suffer from poor sanitary care. In India this aggregate comes to 54 billion of US dollars every year, that is, as much as the GDP of Croatia. The subcontinent loses also 38,5 billion per year because of medical costs (Körcher 2013, 20 – 21).

Of course we could continue by dealing with many other consequences of this problem. And of course for many countries it is impossible to apply the Western sanitary solution. But my aim is different. I want to use this example to show that often just a “small” shift, like a provision of hygienic toilets, can from a long-term perspective bring significant transformative change, which touches large segments of society.

To conclude, I would like to make two suggestions, which could bring about such transformation in Slovakia. The first is a serious increase of salaries for teachers and professors and the second is the implementation of participatory democracy in some areas of political and economic life. The first suggestion will contribute to development of creative and moral abilities of society, which could support the progress of a “democratic Sittlichkeit”.

The second suggestion will enable to use its creativity, for instance, to control the power components of society.

It is clear, that for a social critique, which follows a more radical Marxist tradition, could argue, that difficulties faced by current democracies and the huge increase of social injustice are associated with negative aspects of globalisation and of global capitalism. I do not have a problem with sharing this statement. But if we, on the other hand, would accept the complexity of human societies and of the variety of human action, behaviour and preferences, it is not easy to find all-encompassing

---

11 This may result into seemingly irrelevant issues. We can find thousands of them, as for example less aggressive driving, stop at pedestrian crossing, no littering at the public spaces, fairness in elementary human interaction, etc.
solutions for all problems. Therefore, the concept of silent transformations, which have been influenced by François Jullien’s interpretations of Chinese philosophy (Jullien 2011), would be in my view the “best medicine” for many pathological features of Slovak, and maybe even for other societies, today.

References


Ľubomír Dunaj, Ph.D.
University of Prešov
Center of Competencies and Longlive learning
Ul. 17. novembra 15
080 01 Prešov
Slovak Republic
lubomir.dunaj@unipo.sk
ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF TECHNICAL IMAGES WITH THEIR OUTSIDE
(THE COMMENTS ON VILÉM FLUSßer’S PHILOSOPHY OF IMAGE)

Tomáš Hauer

The term technical image (according to the media theorist Vilém Flusser, its first form was photography, and the last form by now have been images projected in all possible forms on screens, monitors and displays, including holograms) can be understood as a term referring to the beginning of a new age, which is coming after the age of linear writing. Historically as well as ontologically, compared to the previous tradition, these technical images mean a rupture, a breakthrough. The creating of technical images was a necessary consequence of the link connecting texts to sensuously perceptible reality, from which texts used to be abstracted earlier. Technical images have been an issue of philosophers’ interest since the time when W. Benjamin, a German cultural critic published the essay Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit (The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, 1936), which has become commonly known by now. Unlike W. Benjamin, who focused on the issue of social and aesthetic theory of the original work and its copy in the age of serial reproducibility, Flusser concentrated on the technology of reproducibility of any work in the environment of so called new media which were just emerging then. Just as Benjamin, Flusser recognized the first technically reproducible work in photography, however, unlike him (or the photography theorists such as A. Bazin. S. Sontag, or S. Kračauer), he used his analysis as a tool of prediction of the future society development. Vilém Flusser, a native of Prague and a media theorist, in his three key texts Für eine Philosophie der Fotografie (1983), has been translated as (Towards a Philosophy of Photography), Ins Universum der technischen Bilder (Into the Universe of Technical Images, 1985) and Die Schrift: Hat Schreiben Zukunft? (Script: Does Writing Have a Future?, 1987) states that technical images have become a dominant cognitive metaphor of the
contemporary society and that a new social culture is being formed in connection with their creation, distribution, transfer and consumption, where people are no longer grouping around specific problems but around technical images. The new social structure needs new criteria of analysis, requires a new interpretive beginning. Flusser does not wonder how a medium is possible as such, but he deals with the consequences of the effect of one type of abstraction, namely technical images, on the contemporary society. The following text briefly analyses the dominant cognitive metaphor of Flusser’s theory – the term technical image.

Keywords: speed – technical images – apparatus – linear texts – calculation and computation

I. Ontology of a photographic image

What is reality, the truth, good, the future, justice, man, etc. – we have been learning this from texts for a historically long period of time. Together with writing and linear alphabet, a new ability which could be called “conceptual thinking” has become part of our life. Therefore, deciphering texts means nothing else than revealing images denoted by these texts. Traditionally, learning meant to be able to read in the book of the world, i.e. to learn to code the world in the texts first by using linear writing and then to learn to decipher the texts applied to reality. The metaphor of the world as a book is an old Christian-Jewish metaphor and until recently a highly prosperous one also in science, which has accepted and adopted the idea. Human effort to capture an image of reality mechanically dates back up to the 11th century, when Arabic astronomers tried to create camera obscura, however, photography was not recognized as a new technical invention until the introduction of the technology of daguerrotypy on 3 June 1839. The invention of a photographic image and its successors announced by the Parliament of Paris, which bought Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre’s patent and made it available for free use in 1839, provoked a fiery response from the theorists as well as from ordinary users. Paul Delaroche’s declaration that painting had died due to the invention of photography went down in history. However, Delaroche did not regard the invention of photography itself as a tragedy; what he considered to be dead was probably just the technical aspect, because painting could not stand a comparison with the perfection of a
photographic image. Since the time the photography emerged, many theorists have tried to define its complicated nature. *Photography as the first form of a technical image* has many faces. In the course of its existence it has been caught in the midst of a continual conflict. On one hand, it is supposed to be understood as objective – index presentation of reality, the photographic image having become a confirmation of reference to reality. On the other hand, there are efforts to create photographs as authorial works, and their effect should, in way similar to painting, consist in expressing the author's subjective relation to reality. Photographic communication therefore claims a dual purpose: to embody a subjective or an objective image. Thus, it is only natural for the philosophy of photography to be based on this dichotomy.

In his outstanding study *The Ontology of the Photographic Image* from 1945, André Bazin, a French film theorist (1918 – 1958) expressed his conviction that the primary purpose of art was the human effort to overcome death. Therefore the man began to create imitations of living beings which reminded him of them. According to Bazin, the oldest works of art are mummies, however, people later used also statues and paintings to resist the merciless time (Bazin 1967, 9 – 10). He states that the first scientific and mechanical system of capturing reality emerged in the Renaissance. It was a perspective whose rules are based on optics and which made it possible to capture reality in a similar way as we perceive it by the sight. According to him, although modern man no longer believes in the identity of a model and of a portrait, the true image will enable him to remember it, thus resist the time again.

The history of imaging technology is interpreted as an evolitional, logical and constant development, chaining invention and events in heading to fulfil the human desire for a perfect *capturing/replicating* of the reality. Each technological innovation – from photography to movement, sound and colour – represents a more advanced developmental stage with respect to capturing the reality. A. Bazin elaborates the theory in his essay *The Myth of Total Cinema*. In the essay, he characterizes film as a neutral technology, mechanism, which records only in a passive way, and with respect to evolution it develops so that it can replicate the experience of human perception of reality. André Bazin considers the development of film to be linear chaining of events and invention, each of which is only an enhanced form of the previous one. Innovation is only a
formal change closely referring to the previous development. Thus, the
myth of the total film is presented as independent driving force controlling
the development of film regardless the social, political or economic
contexts. The very centre of Bazin’s interest is photography due to its
ability – to adjust the shortcomings of the eye – to erase the mediator and
experience the reality. Thus, in his theory of image, André Bazin asserts
objectivity as the main quality of mechanical reproduction and its relation
to its outside. Therefore, Bazin viewed film technology as a means of
widening the potential of creators of images, means to visualize reality
itself more accurately and reliably. “If the origins of an art reveal
something of its nature, then one may legitimately consider the silent and
the sound film as stages of a technical development that little by little
made a reality out of the original ‘myth’. It is understandable from this
point of view that it would be absurd to take the silent film as a state of
primal perfection which has gradually been forsaken by the realism of
sound and color. The primacy of the image is both historically and
technically accidental. The nostalgia that some still feel for the silent
screen does not go far enough back into the childhood of the seventh art.
The real primitives of the cinema, existing only in the imaginations of a
few men of the nineteenth century, are in complete imitation of nature.
Every new development added to the cinema must, paradoxically, take it
nearer and nearer to its origins. In short, cinema has not yet been
invented!” (Bazin 1967, 21).

André Bazin shows how an image of the outside world is formed
automatically in photography for the first time, without human creative
intervention, in the spirit of strict determinism. All sorts of art are based
on the presence of man, only in photography we are granted his absence.
It gives us the impression of a “natural” phenomenon, like a flower or a
snowflake whose vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable part of its
beauty. This automatic birth has completely reversed the psychology of an
image. The objectivity of photography gives it such credibility that cannot
be found in any work of art. Despite any objections of our spirit, we have
to believe in the existence of the represented object, which is actually
made present in time and space. For Bazin, the determinative nature of
photography represents a proof of its objective relationship to reality.
“Originality in photography as distinct from originality in painting lies in
the essentially objective character of photography. For the first time,
between the originating object and its reproduction there intervenes only
the instrumentality of a nonliving agent. For the first time, an image of the
world is formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man.
The personality of the photographer enters into the proceedings only in his
selection of the object to be photographed and by way of the purpose he
has in mind. Although the final result may reflect something of his
personality, this does not play the same role as is played by that of the
painter. All the arts are based on the presence of man, only photography
derives an advantage from his absence. Photography affects us like a
phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snowflake whose vegetable or
earthly origins are an inseparable part of their beauty“(Bazin 1967, 13 –
10). Therefore, in general, we expect from photography that in a way it is
related to reality. However, what about the contemporary form of
technical images and their relationship to their outside?

II. Technical image and its relationship to its outside

At the beginning of Flusser’s philosophy of technical images, we
encounter a cultural-sociological model where the author indicates in five
stages the changes in relationship between man and the world, depending
on the kind of the medium dominant in the particular historical epoch. The
model is that of a ladder with five rungs. The mankind has climbed this
ladder step by step – from the concrete to higher and higher abstractions.
It is a model of cultural history and the alienation of man from the
concrete experience of reality, a model in which man puts agents/tools –
an image, text, technical image – between himself and the world.
• First rung: Animals and “primitive” people are immersed in an animate
world, a four-dimensional space-time continuum of animals and primitive
peoples. It is the level of concrete experience.
• Second rung: The kinds of human beings that preceded us
(approximately two million to forty thousand years ago) stood as subjects
facing an objective situation, a three-dimensional situation comprising
graspable objects. This is the level of grasping and shaping, characterized
by objects such as stone blades and carved figures.
• Third rung: Homo sapiens sapiens slipped into an imaginary, two-
dimensional mediation zone between itself and its environment. This is
the level of observation and imagining characterized by traditional pictures such as cave paintings.

• Fourth rung: About four thousand years ago, another mediation zone, that of linear texts, was introduced between human beings and their images, a zone to which human beings henceforth owe most of their insights. This is the level of understanding and explanation, the historical level. Linear texts, such as Homer and the Bible, are at this level.

• Fifth rung: Texts have recently shown themselves to be inaccessible. They don’t permit any further pictorial mediation. They have become unclear. They collapse into particles that must be gathered up. This is the level of calculation and computation, the level of technical images (Flusser 2011a, 6 – 7).

Linear texts thus occupied a dominant position as carriers of vital information only for about four thousand years. It is the only time we can speak of “history” in the strict sense. In the existence of mankind, linear texts played only a transitional role, in this sense, “history” was only an interlude, an episode. “The difference between traditional and technical images, then, would be this: the first are observations of objects, the second computations of concepts. The first arise through depiction, the second through a peculiar hallucinatory power that has lost its faith in rules. This essay will discuss that hallucinatory power. First, however, imagination must be excluded from the discussion to avoid any confusion between traditional and technical images“ (Flusser 2011a, 10). Flusser’s model then describes a line—an image, text, technical image, while a traditional and technical image quantitatively differ. In the following part of the text, we will show this principal dissimilarity. Traditional images (such as cave paintings in Lascaux) are abstractions of the first order, if they abstract from the concrete world, while technical images are abstractions of the third order, they abstract from texts which abstract from traditional images which abstract from the concrete world. The last part of this sentence is important, because it suggests that in the case of technical images (from a photograph to a computer image), we deal with abstractions of the third order, not with images in the usual sense. Technical images make it possible to handle phenomena the way they can be perceived according to the apparatus programme or intention of the apparatus user. Neither texts nor traditional images “can” do this. The new possibility to provide virtual, fundamentally cybernetic environment for
our everydayness has become a reality. This is what Flusser conveys us in his philosophy of technical images with the urgency of his own. Technical images furnish the space of our everydayness in a similar way as an architect furnishes a room with new furniture. Technical images work by supplying a reality where it is needed. A neutral pile of points, a calculable pile, which must “be put together so that the world could be grasped, imagined, understood again and the consciousness could become consciousness of itself again”, is the subject of formation into technical images.

“Producers of technical images, those who envision (photographers, cameramen, video makers), are literally at the end of history. And in the future, everyone will envision. Everyone will be able to use keys that will permit them, together with everyone else, to synthesize images on the computer screen. They will all be, strictly speaking, at the end of history. The world in which they find themselves can no longer be counted and explained: it has disintegrated into particles—photons, quanta, electromagnetic particles. It has become intangible, inconceivable, incomprehensible, a mass that can be calculated. Even their own consciousness, their thoughts, desires, and values, have disintegrated into particles, into bits of information, a mass that can be calculated. This mass must be computed to make the world tangible, conceivable, comprehensible again, and to make consciousness aware of itself once more. That is to say, the whirring particles around us and in us must be gathered onto surfaces; they must be envisioned” (Flusser 2011a, 31).

And this is what technical images are used for – putting reality together again. Our new arrangement of the world, new after the end of the age of linear writing, depends on two things – on apparatuses and on their programmes.

Technical image as an abstraction of the third order shows two qualities which differentiate it from abstractions of the first order (images) as well as from abstractions of the second order (texts). The technical image is an image produced by apparatuses.

“The technical image is an image produced by apparatuses. As
apparatuses themselves are the products of applied scientific texts, in
the case of technical images one is dealing with the indirect products of
scientific texts. This gives them, historically and ontologically, a
position that is different from that of traditional images. Historically,
traditional images precede texts by millennia and technical ones follow
on after very advanced texts. Ontologically, traditional images are
abstractions of the first order insofar as they abstract from the concrete
world while technical images are abstractions of the third order: They
abstract from texts which abstract from traditional images which
themselves abstract from the concrete world. Historically, traditional
images are prehistoric and technical ones 'post-historic' (in the sense of
the previous essay). Ontologically, traditional images signify
phenomena whereas technical images signify concepts. Decoding
technical images consequently means to read off their actual status
from them” (Flusser 2000, 14).

The affirmation that the technical image is, after all, created by man, is
defensible only in this context. Man creates it, but only to the extent
enabled by the apparatus programme. It is about two things: the apparatus
and the apparatus programme. Both the apparatus and the programme are
established in texts – scientific texts. The apparatus can only be produced
according to scientific texts and the same is true about the apparatus
programme. Scientific texts are basically complex concepts. And therein
lies the key difference between traditional and technical images. “The
difference between traditional and technical images, then, would be this:
the first are observations of objects, the second computations of concepts”
(Flusser 2011a, 10). Simply speaking, the technical image is, in fact, a
visualized concept. A camera as well as a photograph are the results of a
complicated scientific institution. A computer, a monitor, a display, etc.
are the results of a very complicated instruction conveyed by scientific
concepts. Apparatuses, like the means for creating technical images, need
functionaries – creators of fictions. This reverses the original relation
“man/apparatus” where man works as a function of apparatuses. He orders
apparatuses what the apparatuses themselves ordered him. “Around these
transmission points sit functionaries who press the keys of apparatuses,
especially those that compute images. For these images model the
behavior, perception, and experience of all other functionaries. The
functionaries instruct the images about how the images should instruct the receivers. The apparatuses instruct the functionaries how they are to instruct the images. And other apparatuses instruct these apparatuses about how the functionaries are to instruct” (Flusser 2011a, 75).

Creating technical images was the necessary consequence of linking the texts to sensuously perceptible reality from which texts were abstracted. The development of science in the twentieth century drew an abstract concept from an illustrative idea in an unexpected way. However, if two texts become incomprehensible, there is nothing more to explain. And right during this big crisis of texts, technical images were invented in order to make texts comprehensible again. “During this crisis of texts, technical images were invented: in order to make texts comprehensible again, to put them under a magic spell – to overcome the crisis of history” (Flusser 2000, 13).

The order in the contemporary society is created by technical images which work in a different way than the traditional images and require a new way of acquiring and handling. What is an image for Flusser? For Flusser, images are surfaces with a meaning. They refer to something in space-time continuum “outside over there”, something they are supposed to make comprehensible for us as abstractions (as abbreviations of four dimensions of space-time continuum into two dimensions of a surface). Flusser uses the term imagination for this specific ability to abstract surfaces from space-time continuum and to project them into space-time continuum again. Therefore, images work by mediating the relationship between the world and man. Man “exists”, it means that the world is not immediately accessible to him, therefore, the function of images is to mediate the world for man. However, whenever they do this, they put themselves “between” the world and man. Images were supposed to be maps, but they became obstacles. Instead of presenting the world, they obscure it and man finally begins to live in the function of images he himself created. He stops decoding images and he projects them undecoded to the world “outside over there”. The principal consequence of this is the fact that the world suddenly appears to be a complex of images, factual configurations. Flusser calls this reversing of the function of an image “idolatry” (idiolatry) and describes how it takes place. “The technical images currently all around us are in the process of magically restructuring our ‘reality’ and turning it into a ‘global image scenario’.”
Essentially this is a question of ‘amnesia’. Human beings forget they created the images in order to orientate themselves in the world. Since they are no longer able to decode them, their lives become a function of their own images: Imagination has turned into hallucination” (Flusser 2000, 10).

What do technical images mean, if they are not pictures in the usual sense? They are models. “They are models that give form to a world and a consciousness that has disintegrated; they are meant to ‘inform’ that world. Their vector of signification is therefore the reverse of that of earlier images: they don’t receive their meaning from outside but rather project meaning outward. They lend meaning to the absurd” (Flusser 2011a, 170). Some technical images fulfil the vision, according to which reality could be fundamentally taken apart into points and then assign a concept to each point. “Apparatuses incorporate the 1-0 structure because they simulate the structure of our nervous system. There, too, we are dealing with a mechanical (and chemical) turning on and off of streams of electrons between the nerve synapses. From this standpoint, digital codes are a method – the first since human beings began to codify – of giving meaning to quantum leaps in the brain from the outside. We are faced with a self-concealing loop. The brain is an apparatus that lends meaning to the quantum leaps that occur in it, and now it is about to turn this meaning-giving function over to apparatuses of its own accord, then to reabsorb what they project. So the new codes are digital basically because they are using simulated brains to simulate the meaning-giving function of the brain” (Flusser 2011b, 145). As traditional images show reality, technical images produce, form reality. Traditional images are mirrors of reality; reality is, on the other hand, a “mirror” of a technical image or scientific concept or scientific text. The image shows one fact; technical images produce so many facts as the apparatus programme allows them. Our presence therefore differs from the age of linear writing (the age of text), and among other things by the fact that is characterized by the “inflation of reality” produced by technical images and technical devices. This has significant cognitive consequences, because technical images do not represent or show anything of the world (although they pretend that they do so), but project something on it.

What is described by technical images is something thrown from inside to outside. Here we come to the essence of the problem.
“What does a technical image mean is an incorrectly formulated question. Although they appear to do so, technical images don’t depict anything; they project something. The signified of a technical image, whether it be a photograph of a house or a computer image of a virtual airplane, is something drawn from the inside toward the outside. And it is not out there until it has been drawn out. Therefore technical images must be decoded not from the signifier but from the signified, not from what they show but from what they show for. And the question appropriate to them is, to what end do technical images mean? To decode a technical image is not to decode what it shows but to read how it is programmed” (Flusser 2011a, 48).

Therefore, a technical image is a tool whose function is – as with any intermediary tools or machines – to change reality. But what is reality? Material tools (a power plant or a car) change material reality. A technical image changes symbolic reality, it changes meanings, but as reality becomes reality only after meanings are assigned to it, a technical picture changes reality itself. Reality ceases to be a text for man and becomes an image for image. The world and things “visualized” by a technical image are things created by human intellect, not visualized by it. Technical paintings thus put us into a situation in which our traditional efforts – to represent reality adequately – do not make sense. Reality is a “surplus”, it is produced by apparatuses and the creators of fiction. Since the beginning of every process of discovering reality is perception, a technical image is able to change the field of perception and force each individual to a particular way of perceiving reality; it allows to handle events the way they are perceived according to the apparatus programme or the intent of the person who uses the apparatus. Neither texts nor images “can” do this. Disputes about the importance of reality thus move from the level of abstraction of the second order (texts) to the level of abstraction of the first order (pictures) and abstractions of the third order (technical images) are the means to it. In practice, this “transcript”, transfer of line of reasoning from the level of text to the level of a technical image takes place wherever the electronic networks reach. Today, we argue, we recognize we make decisions, assess, etc. not “through” text but “through” images.

Consciousness that corresponds to technical images is above history.
For technical images, history is only food they live on. Simultaneous operation between an image and man leads to the loss of historical consciousness on the side of the recipient of images and as a consequence, the loss of any historical action that might follow the adoption of an image. Man’s needs, wishes, feelings and knowledge must be explained on the basis of a technical image as its source. “What we call “history” is the way in which conditions can be recognized through linear texts. Texts produce history by projecting their own linear structure onto the particular situation. By imposing texts on a cultural object, one produces cultural history, and by imposing texts on natural objects (which happened relatively recently), one produces natural history. Such historicizing of conditions affects people’s perspectives. Because nothing need repeat itself in a linear structure, each element has a unique position with respect to the whole” (Flusser 2011a, 58). Technical images again and again translate historical events into repeated screenings. The relationship between a technical image and a man, the operation between them, is therefore a central problem for any future cultural criticism and all the other issues must be addressed from here. This is the substance of Flusser’s message.

“We must neither anthropomorphize nor objectify apparatus. We must grasp them in their cretinous concreteness, in their programmed and absurd functionality, in order to be able to comprehend them and thus insert them into meta-programs. The paradox is that such meta-programs are equally absurd games. In sum: what we must learn is to accept the absurd, if we wish to emancipate ourselves from functionalism. Freedom is conceivable only as an absurd game with apparatus, as a game with programs. It is conceivable only after we have accepted politics and human existence in general to be an absurd game. Whether we continue to be ‘men’ or become robots depends on how fast we learn to play: we can become players of the game or pieces in it” (Flusser 2013, 26).

Is there any future for the very “gesture of writing” then? How to “write” in the age of domination of technical images with their perfect
creation of reality? According to Vilém Flusser, our option is as follows: “Writing is an important gesture, because it both articulates and produces that state of mind which is called “historical consciousness”. History began with the invention of writing, not for the banal reason often advanced that written texts permit us to reconstruct the past, but for the more pertinent reason that the world is not perceived as a process, “historically”, unless one signifies it by successive symbols, by writing. The difference between prehistory and history is not that we have written documents that permit us to read the latter, but that during history there are literate men who experience, understand, and evaluate the world as a “becoming”, whereas in prehistory no such existential attitude is possible. If the art of writing were to fall into oblivion, or if it were to become subservient to picture making (as in the “scriptwriting” in films), history in the strict sense of that term would be over!” (Flusser 2002, 63).

References


doc. Mgr. Tomáš Hauer, Ph.D.
VŠB – Technical University of Ostrava
Department of Social Sciences
tř. 17. Listopadu 15/2172
70833, Ostrava-Poruba
Czech Republic
tomas.hauer@vsb.cz
thauer777@gmail.com
A NEW CIVILIZATION PARADIGM: TRANSFORMATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO REVOLUTION

Ladislav Hohoš

In its substance globalization does not really represent a natural catastrophe similar to the biblical flood as it is sometimes presented by the mass media, but its negative impacts could, under some circumstances, be of the same fatal consequences. The author suggests five possible scenarios of globalization dealing with the range of possibilities of civilizational transformation. Benjamin’s famous definition of revolution as the emergency brake indicates that the pulling of this emergency brake remains the only option, unless we manage to pull up and shunt the train: this is the dilemma of revolution or reform; however, not as an antinomy but as a dichotomy. The future is open to several alternatives. One can imagine global governance on the basis of international law, which builds on the reality of a multipolar world, or an intercultural dialogue as a means of shaping a single cosmopolitan earthly “civilization” instead of a war over hegemony. The transformation of capitalism will take place one way or another; bets are being laid on the costs.

Keywords: globalization – transformation – revolution – capitalism – possible scenarios

The present civilization crisis is a consequence of the victory of liberalism which originated from of the European philosophical thinking of the 17th – 18th century as a sign of leaving the past times. The civilization paradigm of the new times played a positive role, especially by the postulate of uniqueness of human individuality and hence derived negative freedoms, which signified hegemony of anthropocentrism. The Enlightenment represented a cult of reason and only until recently the successes of the Euro-American civilization were confirming the triumph of rationality or
progress which used to be perceived as a linear advancement. The above-mentioned also resulted in the total uniqueness of human being who was given the right to control and manipulate. The Pythagorean harmony with nature, an example of perfection as well as submission represented by the religion, has disappeared. Theocracy failed in the medieval times; today we can feel a dramatic impact of secularization. The request to build heaven on earth here and now has not been more successful and as far as intensity of violence is concerned it has been even worse.

The individual of the classical social agreement is atomized and non-historical; in the latest patterns from the point of view of utility, he is the incarnation of a rational egoist. These patterns do not solve the problem of responsibility to community and the future generations, also because until the 1970s they had not expected the possibility of the depletion of natural resources to be exclaimed then by the Club of Rome. The mankind noticed the possibility of social devastation of human resources only after the economic crisis in the first third of the 20th century but the dominance of the concept of technocracy prevailed until the 1960s and maybe has prevailed as an ulterior motive till nowadays. The discussion today is at the level of communitarianism, especially concerning the perspective of the role of the state in relation to individual choice of quality of life. In my opinion, it seems to be necessary to amend radical individualism to some extent, because the individual and the community are mutually dependent entities. On the other hand, we have had the opportunity to see the failures of the attempts to substitute some universal values at the cost of undervaluation of individual rights (e.g. the socialist collectivism). I prefer the moderate position which approves of the moral value of individual rights as well as obligations in relation to community.

We can imagine a scenario with an elite cosmopolitan minority profiting from globalization which feels no responsibility for the majority of society that is left to its own fate. The majority will accentuate its unique cultural identities („the rebellion of minorities“) because it has nothing else to command against the successful economic globalization. Moreover, and this is crucial, it can reject the ideology of economic growth by not accepting profit and competitive strength as primary goals in the name of its own values (happiness), even at the cost of a certain decline in consumption and/or in the standard of living (the revolt against meritocracy); this leads to a situation where the political consensus ceases
to function or even fails. Another warning scenario is based on the fragile ephemerality of the well-being achieved in the so-called advanced countries during the post-war boom in the second half of the twentieth century: this welfare has been the basis of the unique integration of Europe. The crucial problem for the post-capitalist globalized society is how to ensure the right to minimum human dignity and a meaningful life for the ostracized, who find themselves outside the compulsory employment enforced by autarchy: or should they not have been born at all?

Egon Bondy points out that intensification of labour is a belief that was enforced on people only a few generations ago; even if labour was alienated in traditional societies, the relationship between people and their own production was not based on inadequate toil. “The owners of the means of production counted on the workers wearing themselves out to death, while another ten people were to be found starving nearby who could have taken over part of the work and earned their living. This manifests the economic reality based on a belief that production must continually grow and be even greater otherwise civilization would collapse” (Bondy 2005, 114). This scenario, envisioned by Bondy, is based on the exclusivity of profit motivation that leads to a situation where in the end there remains only one monopoly owner, who in fact no longer needs profit or power, because he can only maximize his own prestige. Since the system that models the structure of the society is a legal one, the elite indispensable for the global actors (“symbolic analysts” – Robert Reich) might be able to work out legislative schemes which would observe the takeover of power from within and thus enable the overthrowing of supranational oligarchies. Legal science ought to formulate certain legal norms, fixed to such an extent that it would be very difficult to violate them; moreover, the norms should become natural or customary for the rest of the inhabitants of the planet (Bondy 2005, 96 – 99).

Bondy’s vision may seem utopian. However, great responsibility lies with the global power elite: if they are going to use their influence to establish such rules for the functioning of the global system that will deepen the existing inequalities, and if the future global system is going to be as blatantly unjust as it is today, the crisis is virtually inevitable. David Rothkopf (2008, 320), analyst of the new global financial oligarchy,
attributes to the elites “the impulse to overreach” which has caused them dearly over the years. If they realize that it is in their own interest to do away with practices that now give everything to the rich and powerful while leaving the poor with only promises of the distant future, they can dodge the fate of the previous elites, “which were brought down due to their greed, insensitivity, and short-sightedness” (Rothkopf 2008, 321 – 322). Thus, it is the problem of how to make a highly sophisticated economy operate on a different basis than global capitalism based on total marketization; this is fundamental to all major transformation efforts, whether evolutionary or revolutionary. J. Keller’s scenario is derived from a situation where a number of people are redundant because the market does not need them for abstract labour. Therefore, those who are not able to face the risks at their own costs became clients, meaning that they are not capable of equipping themselves. The result of the second phase of globalization might, according to Keller, mean a return to pre-modern conditions, to a form of unorganized barbarism, which he termed “postmodern refeudalization” (Keller 2007, 176). The common denominator of the above-mentioned scenarios by Bondy and Keller is their consideration of the new elite – the winners of globalization who fulfil their own interests and, since they are successful, launch the self-destructive mechanism of the social order which they themselves established. This evokes Marx’s idea that capitalism will collapse only when it fulfils its historical mission and thus becomes a bearer for hidden immanent self-destructive mechanisms.

Perceiving the crisis, intellectual reflection of the value and the moral vacuum are not new, mainly in the European cultural environment. In principle since the 19th century resentiments have been part of the diagnosis of Western civilization. Value relativism of recent postmodernism reflects the historical tectonics in which shocks are the signals of starting global transformation. As for the period of crisis, the analogy of the thirties of the 20th century is not correct because it is not only the economic crisis or within partial aspects the financial crisis. However, the mankind is confronted with a systemic civilization crisis of transformation. Under the pressure of medial reality and ideology of neoliberalism the term reality and fiction are often interchanged, the partial is considered as substantial, the prosperous is considered as permanent. Reality of fiction is reflected as a financial crisis which was caused by the
toxic assets, i.e. mortgages in the USA. The crisis has been appearing in the form of different shocks and instability of the monetary system since the seventies and it was partly shifted in time after removal of the iron curtain at the end of the eighties, which made partial temporary expansion of capital to the new markets possible, but did not prevent the currency crisis in the nineties. Fiction of reality is gased on misinformation that after inflow of money of taxpayers in the financial system, a gradual transfer to consolidation comes (more precisely a temporary moderation of the symptoms) which is said to start another stability and possible growth, so all will be the same as before.

In its substance globalization does not really represent a natural catastrophe similar to the biblical flood, as it is sometimes presented by the mass media, but its negative impacts could, under some circumstances, be of the same fatal consequences. Promotion of old-fashioned ideological schemes supported by the media, which disguise the substance of the present conflict processes generated by the class of global capitalists, also has an anti-productive effect. I suggest five possible scenarios of globalization (the range of possibilities includes five alternatives):

- a worst-case scenario anticipates destruction, e.g. atomic war or total collapse of environment; the alternative of total destruction of mankind is, in the „better case“, destruction of the reached level of civilization or return to the barbarian manners;
- a partly optimistic scenario can lead to success of temporary consolidation, so that transnational globalization would continue for some time on the basis of normative liberalism until the unsolved need of qualitative changes caused another crisis;
- an unfavorable change could provoke the start of a new form of proto-fascism (renewal of the authority based on right-wing extremism) and thus of dictatorship with the possible ecological-ideological cover; new technologies would enable total control over individual, thus solving the problem of controlling excessive population growth at the global level;
- in an explorative, i.e. optimistic scenario, there would be some regulations of economy and mainly of financial markets, founding new wealth creating institutions – which, however, could thrive
only at the transnational level; a cartel of elites may emerge with the purpose of saving capitalism from itself;

- a scenario distant in time: a target (normative) vision of society and civilization of a new quality at the level of human society (a higher level of socialization) and in terms of human species (the problem of trans-humanism).

There are also other systemic alternatives which are offering solutions towards the nearest future. There is an enormous asymmetry between the demand of democratic participation at the political level and the total absence of democracy in the posts or labour relations. According to D. Schweickart’s analyses the system of Economic Democracy is a market economy but it makes ecological sustainability possible. Capitalism requires economic growth as a condition of stability, while a company must generate profit for owners. But the aim of company of Economic Democracy is to prevent the loss of its market share and therefore it can choose a less aggressive strategy than a capitalist company because the system expects social control of investment without dictation by financial markets (Schweickart 2002, 156 – 158).

The problem which should be discussed within the whole community and by the whole planet lies in the question, how to realize (in a democratic way?) the switch to the strategy of the permanently sustainable life as the time we have at our disposal is strictly limited. Solution of the transformational crisis lies in seeking such an alternative of globalization which would meet the parameters of permanently sustainable terrestrial civilization in the widest sense of the word. In the present it is not possible to foresee how deep the transformational crisis will be: whether it will be possible to manage it at the level of structural changes with a temporary stabilization at the systemic level or whether, in case it enforces some changes at the systemic level, their running will be to some extent emergent. Both alternatives are wide-opened. The attribute of temporariness in relation to systemic stabilization is a relevant parameter because the economic system of capitalism, based on permanent extreme waste, is, in any case, permanently unsustainable in its present form. As far as the waste of the wealth creation of the relevant civilization is concerned, there is a law of fall of marginal profits: from the specific point, every further unit invested in the input is bringing smaller production growth (performance) at the output than the previous ones, so
from the specific moment, even with the sufficient amount of units at the input the gains at the output are falling. This law can explain the extinction of the civilizations (e.g. the Roman Empire) when they could no longer keep the level of complexity they had reached, the falling marginal profits enforced the economic process, i.e. a collapse, by which we understand a return to the normal or lower complexity (“barbarian manners”).

On the grounds of his experience of the First World War and the defeat of the left in Germany in 1923, W. Benjamin expressed his pessimism regarding the Enlightenment idea of continual social progress: “This storm is what we call progress” (Benjamin 1968, 258). Yet this very storm accumulates disasters. The hope of emancipation, epitomized by the revolution in Russia and followed by the formation of the Left in Germany, was part of the post-war euphoria. However, the cards of history were dealt differently. “The crisis of freedom begins not with a Bolshevik revolution but with the moment when the Socialist workers of Germany burned their own red banners in front of Kaiser Wilhelm's palace and joined in his war effort” (Bondy 2013, 283). Preventing the war in 1914 would mean thwarting armament plans, and this goal could only be achieved through revolution, which would have been suppressed in any country with unparalleled cruelty. The ruling elites now follow the same pattern as before the World War I – naturally, at a more sophisticated level and using increasingly efficient repressive techniques.

Benjamin’s famous definition of revolution as the emergency brake indicates that pulling the emergency brake remains the only option, unless we manage to pull up and shunt the train: this is the dilemma of revolution or reform; however, not as an antinomy but as a dichotomy. As the use of the emergency brake always causes a giant shock wave with inevitable casualties, what seems to be a better option for humanity is to move on to the other track, to use the double track to redirect the train. The issue of global civilizational crisis is associated with the dynamics of social change and transformation. Former conflicts between followers of socialism concerning the dichotomy between revolution and reform have become obsolescent. It is problematic to distinguish revolution from transformation, for instance in Latin America. The consequences of transformation can be more radical than those of political revolution. Traditionally, revolution seems rapid and violent compared with
transformation which occurs gradually and unforced. Both elites and those marginalized, as well as the excluded, ought to attempt to avoid the revolution in favour of “the revolutionary transformation” dealing with partial piecemeal changes (Dinuš – Hohoš – Hrubeš 2014).

Reforms, originally aimed at rescuing the system from itself, can gradually grow into a transformation of the entire system, even if the very reform elites do not wish it themselves. The problem with these elites is that partial measures do not resolve the situation, only allow temporary respite: the point is to stop the train before the abyss. A system based on commodification, which presupposes the accumulation of profit, is unsustainable economically, ecologically, socially, politically or morally. The fears of violent revolution are much more legitimate now than in the first half of the 20th century when Prague-born Karl Kautsky expressed his concerns regarding the instruments of violence and coercion that the politicians now have fully available. Kautsky had expected that the socialist revolution of the proletariat would have had a completely different form than the bourgeois revolution, and that, unlike the “philistine revolution”, it could have been fought by peaceful means – economic, legislative and moral, rather than by physical force, and this wherever democracy had taken root. Yet the interrelatedness between capitalism and democracy, used as a weighty argument in the context of the Cold War back in the 1970s, can no longer be relied upon. As reported by Robert Reich, former Secretary of Labour under President Clinton, the “democratic aspects of capitalism have declined. Corporations now have little choice but to relentlessly pursue profit. In this way, the triumph of capitalism and the decline of democracy have been connected” (Reich 2008, 50).

Francois Furet stated that, unlike the French Revolution, the Russian revolution had left us empty-handed, without any principles or laws or institutions, even without history. The October Revolution ended by liquidating all that it had created and framed by what it had sought to destroy (Furet 1999, VIII, 2). Furet was obviously wrong with regard to his reference to history; it was a clash of civilizations, as pointed out by J. Patočka: Lenin’s commitment and his theory of imperialism waged Russia to turn against the domination of the West by an attempt to establish a kind of “radical Over-civilisation” (Patočka 1996, 270). The Bolshevik faction of the Russian revolutionaries was really fundamentally different
from the Third Estate – the hegemonic leader of the French Revolution, although the two revolutions were characterized by applying the principle of class dictatorship and revolutionary terror. The Russian Bolsheviks, including Lenin, were inspired by the Jacobean period. This is why historian Michal Reiman nicknamed the Russian Revolution “The Plebeian Revolution” (Reiman 1991, 277 – 278). Historical legacy of the Paris Commune and of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917 has remained up today: the concept of the self-governance of society, a participatory democracy. Both revolutions had a common goal – the fundamental transformation of society, not only in France or in Russia, but worldwide. The October Revolution was carried out by the forces that in the February Revolution represented the most radical element of the plebeian camp, which is to be understood as the impoverished and radicalized element comprised of those who experienced the most adverse social consequences of the war and the revolution. The Plebeian revolution advocated a radical break with the past, which was dismantled not only in the material but also in the physical sense. The Bolsheviks were incapable of ruling; they had no education or experience, they could maintain power only by military means and repressive terror, which resulted in the systematic elimination of the wealthy and educated classes. For example, in 1920 the Soviet government put forward “propositions to reinforce the system of war communism”: in addition to electrification, these propositions included militarization of the economy – labour obligation had already been introduced – as well as full suppression of the market and the abolition of money and money management. This, however, failed to materialize; the reality enforced a change in the form of Lenin’s New Economic Policy, even though Lenin himself, distrusting the free market, considered those measures only temporary. The elements of war communism in a modified arrangement lingered on, becoming a legacy of the power elites. While there were significant differences between the Stalinist period and the post-Stalinist “actually existing socialism”, the principles of war communism expressed in the denial of market incentives and persistent distrust of intelligence became entrenched. The last Plebeian generation was the Brezhnev retinue, which vacated their positions to more cultured and more educated technocrats only through the natural dying off of the Politburo members. Industrialization in the 1930s and the subsequent collectivization of
agriculture initiated by Stalin were enforced by repressive terror, including periodic purges, which could be viewed as an instrument of “acceleration strategy”. I recall this term, introduced by M. Gorbachev as he assumed power, to the more widely known term “perestroika”. The strategy of acceleration was abandoned, being absolutely unrealistic; what is more, there was even no attempt at directed change through economic reforms so the economic instruments necessary for the transition from stagnation to acceleration were not created. Disproportions that developed in the former USSR in the 1930s have remained to this day. Despite its wealth, Russia represents a typical Third World country reliant on oil and gas prices in the world market. It has cutting edge weapons but is lacking material-technical base for high-end technologies.

According to Arnold Toynbee, in order to gain majority, the creative minorities use a primitive and universal ability – mimesis: the uncreative majority passes a drill by imitating inspiring role models; in this way even commercial exploiters or political demagogues can assert themselves. The risk of disaster in using the art of mimesis lies in its mechanization, which is a kind of social drill, a machinelike response to the external request, to the demands of the leaders (Toynbee 1964, 315 – 318). Both the concept of revolution as of a belated or possibly retarded mimesis and the concept of revolution as a manifestation of the plebeian “vox populi” confirm the relevance of Benjamin's reflection on the revolution as an “emergency brake”: it becomes the ultimate emergency measure when the opportunity to flip the switch has been wasted. Repeated disasters, feared by Benjamin, can trigger social upheavals and disrupt political stability, even call the legitimacy of governments and political elites into question. The interrelation between social and ecological disasters raises the question of anti-capitalist alternatives, since meaningful discussion presupposes pluralism in a theoretical plane.

The end of the Cold War allows one to see the world as it is, without the pervasive ideological mimicry based on an artificial construct of two “camps” divided by the Iron Curtain. The current world system is so severely thrown out of balance that it is no longer sustainable. There is a global civilizational transformation, which is, like any transformation, largely emergent and thus with an unpredictable outcome. If we consider a transformation strategy, the key issue that comes into foreground is the extent of destruction that accompanies every fundamental qualitative
transformation. Our current situation shows typical symptoms of the declining ancient civilizations that perished as a result of their own success, which brought about the depletion of indispensable available resources. The question arises at what price the humanity will survive the current civilization’s rupture. In terms of alternative scenarios, therefore, the main concern is how to handle the transformation with the least barbarity. We do not know whether the new system will be better or worse than the existing one; the preservation of the current living standards in the more developed parts of the world is problematic (water-food bubble, climate changes, etc.) The outcome will be decided through political struggle, more or less violent.

The shift from manufacturing to financing shows that investors avoid the risks associated with the production of goods, where Marx's law of falling profit rates operates in a modified form, and refocus on new financial products, commodifying the risk. This, coupled with the introduction of new high-tech technologies, leads to the loss of dominance of organized labour, substituted by precarious work. Since the 1970s, the U.S. has become a country of rentiers, losing control over their currency and economy, with the emergence of a global-scale patrimonial capitalism. Thomas Piketty distinguishes between two kinds of increasingly unequal society which coexist: the rentier society and the top manager society; both parts are often played by the same person. The inherited wealth grows faster than the output and the income. The concentration of wealth is now much higher in the U.S. than in Europe, which is the very result of the interconnection between the rentiers and the managers. In the years ahead, this combination may create a new world of inequality, more extreme than ever before. Patrimonial capitalism, not unlike that during the La Belle Époque (1890 – 1914), is thriving; the crisis of 2008 was its first but certainly not its last crisis. Piketty warns that whenever economic growth slows down and the return on the capital increases, as is the case now, major political upheavals follow (Piketty 2014, 173, 237).

The new type of economic rationality is based on decommodification, on the promotion of the utility value instead of exchange value, on the recognition that non-market values deserve special attention, particularly with regard to public or social goods. I understand the concept of decommodification in a broader sense, as a removal of the dominant
position of the exchange value in the world of commodities in favour of utility values. This presupposes the abolition of profit. Money will probably not disappear entirely, but one can imagine introduction of measures such as a progressive global tax on capital (Piketty 2014, 515) or amnesty on international and consumer debt (Graeber 2011, 391 – 392). If we manage to push through a compromise between the World Economic Forum and the World Social Forum in the form of a “global redistributive project”, productive capital could once again assert itself at the expense of financial capital. Alternative to underlying compromise, according to W. Robinson, is the rise of global fascism (Robinson 2004, 173). Such a compromise would attribute historical truth to Kautsky and his concept of “ultramperialism”, that is, the possibility of a pacifist cartel of the world's financial capital.

In his Philosophy of History, W. Benjamin introduced an objectification of the historical process through the inclusion of the historically aggrieved as an interaction among partners of our current experience within a moral community (Honneth 2013, 107, 110). The American-German historian Fritz Stern described the First World War as the first disaster of the twentieth century, the scourge that gave birth to all the other disasters such as the Russian Revolution and World War II. The manner in which the First World War was waged as the first industrially-waged war in history brought down all inhibitions; this was what subsequently allowed concentration camps, holocaust, carpet bombing and the use of the atomic bomb. What is more, World War I demonstrated the failure of the elites, which is looming on the horizon, given the current unstable situation and uncertainty regarding the rules of the world order. The crisis factors, which resemble the situation from a hundred years ago, include the extremely deepening inequality. Christopher Clark, historian of Prussia, concludes: “The protagonists of 1914 were sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world” (Clark 2013, 562). Fortunately, we are not consigned to historical necessity or repetition of the past; moreover, I hope that even the followers of neo-Marxism no longer believe in the “iron necessity”. Similar doubts concern frequent references of political analysts to “geopolitical necessity”. These are the same petrified schemes based on the repetition of the past.

F. Jullien argues that our failure to notice the effect of cumulative
changes over time is due to the grounding of Western thought in Greek philosophy of being. In contrast, Chinese thought provides a more flexible way of understanding the “silent transformations”: Revolutions “radicalize action and carry it to its highest intensity... silent transformations deflect step by step without warning, without announcement – to the point of causing everything to topple over into its opposite without anyone having noticed” (Jullien 2011). Revolution forces the situation to its extreme point, intending to break forcefully with the established order; it fights, or rather struggles, in a space of forces which have been declared and become rivals; every revolution is followed by restorations which take more or less time to arrive. The silent transformation does not use force, it does not fight, but makes its way, infiltrates, spreads, branches out and becomes pervasive; this is also why it is silent because it does not give rise to any resistance to it. “It is these silent transformations, more than the force of the rebellious Masses, the ultimate utopian representation of the Agent, which overturn and will overturn all the Ancient Regimes through progressive erosion of everything that supports them, in relation to which actions and revolutions are perhaps less catalyzers than simply indicators” (Jullien 2011, 65 – 68).

The process of globalization as an emergence of the silent transformation especially in its forced neoliberal version has not found a point of acceptance which would allow its integration into historical context. History would not be over because it had been forever pacified: terrorism is the manifestation of the negative in history, which is today no longer allowed to be aimed outside because it belonged to another camp or another class as in the time of the Cold War (Jullien 2011, 66; 120).

The future is open to several alternatives. One can imagine global governance on the basis of international law, which builds on the reality of a multipolar world, or an intercultural dialogue as a means of shaping a single cosmopolitan earthly “civilization” instead of a war over hegemony. The transformation of capitalism will take place one way or another; bets are being laid on the costs. The hopes are pinned on taking a moral stance: hecatombs of victims cannot be redressed by hollow gestures; empathy with them could help us in our effort to change the value priorities of the sorely-tried classes of Western civilization.
References


Doc. PhDr. Ladislav Hohoš, CSc.
Department of Philosophy and of History of Philosophy
Faculty of Philosophy
Comenius University in Bratislava
Gondova 2, P.O.BOX 32
814 99 Bratislava
Slovak Republic
ladislav.hohos@gmail.com
INTERSTATE RECOGNITION
AND ITS GLOBAL OVERCOMING

Marek Hrubec

The article focuses on philosophy of recognition among states and on its relation to recognition on the transnational and global levels. Specifically, it analyses positive aspects and limits of a concept of interstate recognition developed by Axel Honneth within his Critical theory of recognition, and shows the process of articulation of transnational and global recognition. The first part of the article touches on the metatheoretical plane of Honneth’s conception of moral realism, and specifies it with regard to the issue of the legitimacy of states. Then, it focuses on the fundamentals of Honneth’s concept of recognition between states, and dwells on the necessity of recognition for each state. The second part formulates the dilemmas and limits of the concept of interstate recognition, especially in view of the globalization processes and in relation to a concept of the individual in relations of mutual recognition in a community. Then, it discusses Heins’ and Pogge’s problematic transposition of the patterns of social relations from the national plane to the international plane. The third part focuses on developmental tendencies of international and global recognition, and deals with an important transitory concept of extra-territorial recognition. The fourth part analyses possibilities and ambivalences of global state, following especially Alexander Wendt a William Scheuerman. In the end, it sketches possibilities of further examination of a theory of recognition at the transnational and global levels.

Keywords: recognition – states – Critical theory – globalization – legitimacy

“Global social and economic processes bring individuals and institutions into ongoing structural connection with one another across national jurisdictions. Adopting a conception of responsibility that recognizes this connection is an important element in developing a theory of global justice.”

Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Justice

The theme of social, economic, political and legal aspects of an arrangement beyond boundaries of nation state has become important
especially in the last decades of the intensified global interactions, mainly after the fall of the bipolar world. In this paper, I will focus on philosophy of recognition among states and on its relation to recognition on the transnational and global levels. Specifically, I will analyse positive aspects and limits of a concept of interstate recognition, mainly developed by Axel Honneth within his ground-breaking Critical theory of recognition, and show the process of articulation of global alternatives of this interstate concept.¹

Axel Honneth articulates developmental trends that are detectable in the moral grammar of social conflicts based on struggle for recognition in the West in the timeframe of the past few centuries. The concept of the polemical relationships of mis/recognition between states is one of the specifications of this concept of social conflicts.² Although Honneth’s analysis of the order beyond nation-states has not been fully developed yet, it has opened many very relevant and provocative questions. In general, it is possible to say that, compared to analyses of local and national levels of recognition, analyses of recognition beyond the borders of a jurisdiction of state are not yet sufficiently detailed and require other research.

Analyses of the struggle for recognition among states need further conceptual distinction between the different relations crossing state borders. If we divide these topics into classic international issues and current transnational and global issues, Honneth’s analyses are based primarily on the category of international order.³ He refers to the main focus of his position as an analysis of recognition between states. We might talk of the concept of international order, as he himself uses the term “international” as a synonym for “interstate”.⁴

¹ One of my main sources in the writing of this paper comprised discussions at a conference held at the university PUCRS in Porto Alegre, which was dedicated to the Critical theory of Axel Honneth. I would like to thank especially Nythamar de Oliveira, Giovani Saavedra and Emil Sobottka from that university for the invitation, and particularly Axel Honneth for the discussions. In this paper, I use and develop my analyses worked out in: (Hrubec 2011).
² Particularly: (Honneth 2012, 137 – 152).
³ Honneth makes a classic differentiation into individual states, and examines particularly with states in the international context. He does not deal with relations between peoples, as performed by Rawls, for example. (Rawls 1999).
⁴ (Honneth 2012).
That is not to say, however, that Honneth wishes to attribute normative priority to states and the relations of recognition between them, and examine his position simply within the theory of national and international relations. His general social theory analyses also a surplus of normative validity which is expected to correspond to the developmental tendencies of the patterns of recognition. Thus, his theory should include also the trends of transnational and global development. Of course, this raises considerable attention and questions among many scholars who continue to build on or develop the concept of international order, or proceed beyond it to the macro-regional and global levels. However, because Honneth has not focused on interstate relations in the explicit way in many papers so far, it is necessary to explore not only his texts which are dedicated directly to that theme but also to his specific theses in the texts which have the main subject of study different.

I will address these issues in the following order. In the first part of my paper, on the metatheoretical plane, I will touch Honneth’s conception of moral realism, and specify it with regard to the issue of the legitimacy of states. Then, I will focus on the fundamentals of Honneth’s concept of recognition between states, and dwell on the necessity of recognition for each state, including an issue of the relationship between the state and political and cultural recognition. In the second part, I will formulate the dilemmas and limits of the concept of interstate recognition, especially in view of the globalization processes and in relation to a concept of the individual in relations of mutual recognition in a community. Then, I will discuss Heins’s and Pogge’s inadequate transposition of the patterns of social relations from the national plane to the international and global plane. In the third part, I will focus on developmental tendencies of international and global recognition, and recall a part of my own theory which is focused on an important transitory concept of extra-territorial recognition. In the fourth part, I will analyse possibilities and ambivalences of global state, following especially Alexander Wendt a

---

5 The principal analyses should focus primarily on the already mentioned text: (Honneth 2012); See also his paper on philosophical bases of the international covenants, specifically on human rights: (Honneth 1997). In German: (Honneth 2000a).

6 (Honneth 1996). In: German orig.: (Honneth 1992); (Fraser – Honneth 2003a). In German: (Fraser – Honneth 2003b); (Honneth 2014). In German orig.: (Honneth 2011). See also some analyses of Honneth’s team in the book he edited: (Honneth 2002).
William Scheuerman. In the end, I will conclude by stressing the concept of extra-territorial recognition, and showing possibilities of further examination of a theory of recognition at the transnational and global levels.

1. Interstate Recognition

Before addressing the proper issue of recognition between states, it is important to deal at least briefly with a metatheoretical concept of realism, and distinguish Honneth’s concept from other ones, especially from Rawls’s one which is discussed in this context as well and mentioned also by Honneth. There seems to be the certain similarity between Honneth and Rawls because the both share a kind of realism, although more detailed specifications show that the two concepts of realism differ. While Rawls gave up a connection of normative theoretical and empirical kinds of research and focused only on normative constructivism, he accedes at least formally to one version of a concept of realistic utopia, which, on the one hand, transcends reality with the certain normative vision, and, on the other hand, limits normativity by the realistic applicability of its design. (Rawls 1999, pp. 4, 5 – 6, 16 – 17) His concept is designed for “reconciliation” with the social world, which for Rawls means that it is proven that there is a real possibility of the certain kind of society and politics, even if it is not based on the struggles for justice in the reality but only on Rawls’s individual vision.

Although Rawls keeps to this formulation of a realistic utopia, in the background of his reasoning lurks another idea, which, while not directly included in his definition of a realistic utopia, is an integral component of his political theory. At play here is not merely a pragmatic consideration of feasibility trying to avoid more demanding requirements of the people and to establish a compromise solution in the real politics. His version of realistic utopia includes the element of civil legitimacy as well. This element is also close to Honneth’s concept of moral realism at first sight. However, unlike of Rawls, Honneth does not concentrate only on the practical application of normativity into the framework of problematic legitimacy of momentary time cut but he views it systematically within
the framework of his concept of moral realism\(^7\) which enables his theory to draw on the long-term social struggles and their normative demands for legitimacy in general. He develops not only a conception of the synchronic spheres of recognition but also and mainly a conception of the diachronic, historical development of patterns of recognition. From this point of view, Honneth’s concept of realism can extend beyond a description of the situation between states in the momentary time cut and target a normative articulation of long-term tendencies of struggles against misrecognition between states.

As for the longer conceptual history, Honneth follows Hegel in many respects,\(^8\) as is well known, but he takes a different path in recognition between states\(^9\) because Hegel associates recognition only with the claims of nations as yet unrecognized, i.e. nations which do not yet feature as actors in international relations (Hegel 1991). However, Honneth is aware that, while the pursuit of recognition is a common part of the vocabulary of individual governments or states, consideration of this vocabulary urges a more cautious approach to the use of the concept of recognition in international relations. Moreover, while purposefully rational arguments about relationships between states prevail in theoretical considerations dealing with international relations, the term recognition is used in a different sense in the sphere of theory in international law than that intuitively perceived and implemented in philosophical tradition associated especially with existentialist connotations. It is important that the definition of the state, in international-law discourse, whether theoretical or practical, usually requires not only people (a population), territory, and a government but also the ability to enter into relations with other states, which implies one or the other kind of external recognition by other states.\(^{10}\) The struggle for recognition here goes beyond the scope of

---

7 Honneth elaborates on his arguments regarding moral realism in this sub-chapter, for example: Critical Social Theory and Immanent Transcendence. In: (Fraser – Honneth 2003a, 238 – 247).
8 (Honneth 2000b). The German version: (Honneth 2001). See also (Honneth 2014).
9 (Honneth 2012); (Honneth 1997).
10 Cf. analysis recognizing the legitimacy that a state receives from other states on the basis of fulfilling certain criteria of justice: (Buchanan 1999). Disputation with this approach is offered, for example, by justification recognizing legitimacy from a pragmatic point of view: (Naticchia 1999).
psychological interpretation which concentrates on the relations between human individuals or smaller groups of persons.

To specify the kinds of recognition between states, it is relevant to see Honneth’s polemic with Hans Kelsen when Honneth questions his reduction of recognition to descriptive registration of the fact of the existence of one state by another state.\textsuperscript{11} Although Kelsen grasps legal recognition as a reciprocal act between two or more entities, he perceives recognition in a relatively narrow sense of cognition, i.e. only as an act of a government acknowledging the existence of another state. This is not an active volitional relationship with another, but only confirmation of a fact. However, as recognition requires a real possibility of a decision and not just a confirmation of the status quo, according to Kelsen this is not recognition but mere (one-off) cognition.

While this Kelsen’s interpretation is considered unconvincing by Honneth, he finds an adequate interpretation in one of Kelsen’s distinctions – the distinction between legal and political recognition (Kelsen 1941). While legal recognition as mere cognition is effectively no recognition for Kelsen, he considers “political” acts of recognition, through which governments positively or negatively relate to the governments and citizens of other countries, to be understandable and real. He takes the term political recognition to mean roughly what Honneth calls recognition in general.

More specifically, political recognition can be grasped as part of Honneth’s broader concept of recognition which includes also legal recognition.\textsuperscript{12} Although political recognition can also be viewed as specific, it is also a more fundamental concept than legal recognition as, in a more detailed interpretation, it becomes evident that a legal relationship to other states is not possible without constantly assuming political recognition in the sense of obtaining affirming responses to efforts at official recognition of the collective identity of the state. Individual states need not only the legitimacy of their citizens, but also the legitimacy of the outside world beyond their borders. States receive neither of these types of legitimacy entirely automatically and permanently. In this regard, states, even those already recognized, are struggling for their recognition.

\textsuperscript{11} (Honneth 2012); Honneth analyses particularly the text: (Kelsen 1941).
\textsuperscript{12} See the analyses of Honneth’s earlier texts: (Thompson 2006). Cf. with the later one: (Honneth 2014).
all of the time. This argument also applies to authoritarian states where the people have no real opportunity to participate in the running of the state. These states, too, if they do not wish to rely only on violence in the internal and external contexts, must strive for the certain legitimacy among their citizens and other countries. Furthermore, given that absolute violence is both unsustainable and pragmatically inefficient, each state works with legitimacy to a greater or lesser extent. In this sense, however, it would be more accurate to speak of the recognition of the legitimacy than, generally, of political recognition, which may include a wider range of recognition. However, as I have noted above, states also need long-term recognition, not only current legitimacy.

Honneth touches yet another form of recognition sought by states, such being unofficial recognition (as opposed to the above-mentioned more official recognition) on both cultural and diplomatic planes. He refers to this as the symbolic space of meaning which creates the context of official political recognition. This kind of symbolic recognition is often implicit but no less significant. In fact, it is more fundamental. It is not purely purposefully rational action aimed at the pursuit of power and certain goods but a symbolic act that contains normative requirements which are based on the specific expectations. Therefore, it is impossible here to make a clean cut between strategic action and social action of a symbolic nature. This interconnection is not a haphazard and auxiliary explanation but corresponds with the above concept of interlinking the descriptive and normative aspects of recognition. This is also evident from military recognition, which, by contrast, is strongly linked with power and which may be symbolically manifested in conflict situations only by tacit recognition, i.e. tolerance in the form of the absence of military intervention.

Thus, the struggle for recognition between states may be perceived as long-term efforts aimed at respect developed from the perspective of members of the community of the state or, indirectly, their political and cultural representatives home and abroad. According to Honneth, such efforts struggle for recognition of a particular group of persons which, thus, takes on a specific bond of reciprocity both within the group and with external entities providing recognition. These relations are not unidirectional since recognition is a reciprocal relationship, even if the
parties can assume asymmetrical positions.\textsuperscript{13}

2. The Dilemmas of Transcending Interstate Recognition

I will focus on dilemmas contained in Honneth’s concept of relations between states, the dilemmas that are characteristic problems of similar concepts of other authors as well. At the same time, I will point out the potential which Honneth’s theory of recognition offers for the redefinition of the concept of interstate recognition and, more generally, international relations and global interactions. Despite the fact that Honneth has yet to develop his concept of recognition in this direction, he presents strong arguments underpinning such development. I will pay attention to the difference between international and cosmopolitan theories, as well as to the conservativist reasons preventing theorists of international relations from advancing from an international theory to the direction of a cosmopolitan theory. The progressivist perspective does not mean a resignation on international issues but an inclusion of international relations into the broader global context which is very important especially for the global development of the last decades.

Honneth is prevented from developing a more adequate theory by the fact that he underestimates the negative impacts of economic globalization. A concept of international relations is limited here because it is not able to cross relations between states and address the important problems of global capitalism. Many authors point out the influences on national social, economic, political and cultural phenomena in society caused by various problematic global, especially economic and financial, interventions that can substantially and rapidly worsen nation-states circumstances, such as standard of living, and can significantly

\textsuperscript{13}Honneth’s position is illuminated by seeing the conflict between the constitutive theory of statehood, which is based on the recognition of a state by other states, and declaratory theory is not critical in this case because even declaratory theories eventually assume some, though not perhaps political, recognition by other states. This is evident in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, where the explicit political existence of the state, in one sentence, is regarded as independent of recognition by other states but, in other sentences, certain forms of recognition are assumed, for example, in the matter of conserving peace by “recognized pacific methods”. Cf. (Wallace-Bruce 1994).
compromise national and international justice.\textsuperscript{14} As I will explain, a social theory, which would include analyses of the developmental transition from the theory of international interactions to global interactions, is more compelling than the traditional concept of international relations, which underestimates, or even ignores, the globalization-based economic and other pressures and opposing struggles for global justice.

However, even if Honneth’s theory shares these shortcomings with the mainstream international theory, he offers a basis for overcoming them. While the mainstream theories of international justice, i.e. liberal ones (be they formulated by John Rawls or other theorists), suffers from deeper social philosophical deficits, Honneth presents a way to transcend them by his theory of recognition. It can be illuminated by the problem of justice. The guaranteeing of justice and rights, including justice within international law, requires a certain political responsibility and solidarity, and therefore also identification with the political community. The key to identification with the community is basic good in the form of relations of mutual recognition.\textsuperscript{15} Honneth observes: “… Hegel, in contrast to Rawls, does not assume that this ‘basic good’ is a good in the narrow sense, something which ought to be divided and distributed according to a just standard; rather, it seems that Hegel wants to advocate the idea that modern societies can be just only to the extent of their ability to enable all subjects to participate in this ‘basic good’ equally” (Honneth 2000b, 27 – 28).\textsuperscript{16} According to Honneth, although Rawls rightly opens an issue of the good in distributive social justice, he does not understand its foundation in the basic good of relation of social recognition, which is a prerequisite for any other goods and also justice in general.

Honneth is right when he stresses that if individuals were more rooted in the mentioned basic good, i.e. if they were involved in relationships of mutual recognition with others in the local community, they could be better integrated into relations within the national community relations and could demonstrate solidarity therein. Then, it is possible to add, they could smoothly go beyond this framework and, in solidarity, align

\textsuperscript{14} So far, see, for example: (Robinson 2004); (Linklater 2007; (Linklater 1998); (Forst 2002); (Delanty 2009); (Fraser 2010).
\textsuperscript{15} (Honneth 2000b).
\textsuperscript{16} See also cf. (Honneth 1996); (Taylor 1985); (Taylor 1995).
themselves with the macro-regional or continental intercultural community on the higher level and the largest cosmopolitan community on the highest level as well. This version of cosmopolitan theory develops half-forgotten elements of Hegelian philosophy establishing universalist characteristics of community. Although Honneth builds on Hegel’s concept of recognition and community, he follows the more traditional version of his concept of international interactions and does not envisage a kind of a neo-Hegelian concept that would transcend the boundaries of international politics and analyse various transnational and global issues, as some other contemporary authors do.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore, the considerable potential offered by Honneth’s general theory to a theory of global justice has not been used by him yet.

The main problem I find with Honneth’s concept is the underestimation of transnational and global interactions, and consequently a certain reification of the nation state. This approach prevents him from grasping major evolutionary dynamics taking place above the plane of nation states especially during the last decades, because transnationalization and globalization significantly de-statize economic, political, legal, social and other national orders. And if Honneth disregards this aspect, he cannot sufficiently develop his thoughts on criticism of global social pathologies and social injustice, and address the position of West in the global framework of agonic intercultural relations.\textsuperscript{18} Despite these problems, Honneth’s establishment of an analysis of the order beyond the nation state in his theory of recognition provides an excellent starting point, but he has not used it yet.

The line of reasoning with this cosmopolitan intimation is followed by Volker Heins, who recently tried to apply it to three of Honneth’s types of
recognition. In his study, he tries to extend Honneth’s theory in the cosmopolitan way but while his main intention is good, the realization is not successful. Based on Honneth’s three-dimensional theory of recognition, he inferred arguments for the transition from recognition within a national framework to cosmopolitan recognition, and he incoherently draws on certain elements of international theory at the same time. It is more or less the mechanical transmission of Honneth’s ideas from a national level to a global plane, regardless of the different basis of the theory and the context. Looking at Honneth’s theory, which belongs to the sphere of nation states and his analyses of international relations, we can ask if there is a parallel between the kinds of recognition at national and international level. We can explore whether and how such identification beyond the nation state is possible in the unchanged form of Honneth’s three kinds of recognition: love and friendship, equal respect and rights, esteem and performance. While Honneth himself does not undertake such an analysis, Heins attempts to do so by transposing these three differentiated spheres into international and global relations.

Just as Thomas Pogge redefined John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice* by the transnational extension of the national principles of justice, Heins makes a transnational extension of Honneth’s patterns of recognition formulated in his book *The Struggle for Recognition*. As is clear from the title of Heins’s article (“Realizing Honneth”), this parallel with Pogge (“Realizing Rawls”) is intentional and acknowledged. Heins, like Pogge, shares the main ideas with the author of the original theory he is developing, and elaborates on them in an area beyond the framework of the nation state.

However, there are serious limits to this parallel resulting from the different bases of Rawls’s and Honneth’s theories. Liberal theory and Critical theory have, of course, different starting points and bases. It can be said that, although Honneth and Heins agree with Rawls and Pogge on

---

19 (Heins 2008a) I would like to thank Volker Heins for discussions on our international and transnational analyses of Honneth’s theory of recognition.

20 Heins’s intention is to “‘globalize’ Honneth in the same way as Thomas Pogge was able to globalize Rawls”. (Heins 2008a, 3); (Pogge 1990); (Pogge 2002). Cf. the investigation of Honneth’s three spheres of recognition beyond the state with an intension global theory of justice as recognition but without a necessary global transposition of Honneth’s spheres: (Thompson 2013).
the idea of the need for distributive justice, Honneth and Heinz criticize the mainstream theory of distributive justice, including the Rawlsian theory, for deforming the social relations among human beings, which occurs as a result of ignoring the patterns of mutual recognition. However, when it comes to issues of transnational or global justice, this parallel is apt. Heins’s efforts are aimed at the global transfer of Honneth’s recognition patterns that would determine the moral expectations of individuals in mutual relations of love, rights and esteem in a transnational environment. He does it even if he is aware that the institutional framework that would provide a backdrop for the mechanic application of Honneth’s three principles of recognition in the international arena is very weak and specific.

The kind type of recognition – in the form of love and friendship – seems to be in first sight scale-neutral in relation to the territorial extent. This is borne out by the various forms of love carried across borders, whether formally unregistered long-distance relationships, marriage between partners from different countries, and so on. However, the automatic transmission of patterns of recognition from a national to an international and transnational level, as proposed by Heins, is not possible. For example, the child sponsorship he refers to does not fit into the category of recognition in the form of love, which in Honneth’s analyses at national level relates to intimate and emotional relationships between a small number of people. Although this kind of adoption resembles the traditional parent-child relationship, it is primarily a relationship of charity or solidarity with people living in a state of insecurity, particularly in the developing countries, and not a relationship of family love. We have to see that a child sponsorship is a borderline category relationship on the boundary of Honneth’s first and third type of recognition. Thus, it requires a specific articulation which would formulate the new important transnational and global patterns of recognition, and the mechanical transposition of the patterns of recognition is not possible. I would like to stress other problematic relationships, specifically transnational care practices, which, in the form of immigrant nannies and domestic workers, cause mothers from less developed countries to leave their children and seek work in richer households in developed countries. This is the transnational exploitative deformation of interpersonal relationships which, in a significant, but
more parentally detached manner, benefits only one party, i.e. the employer, and does not constitute the development of transnational love. In connection with the motto “the personal is political”, it could also be said that “the personal is global”, but as a problem rather than part of an articulated sphere of recognition. These complications are also evident in other examples of Heins’s transposition. The inclusion of these examples in Honneth’s theory, if it were theoretically possible, would require substantial reformulation. However, Heins does not undertake this. He also disregards the fact that other forms of recognition on the first plane, such as friendship, are already realized at international and transnational level to some extent and are compatible with Honneth’s theory. Friendship may, but need not, take the form of traditional friendship based on personal contact, and it may also be a virtual friendship in various forms of the widespread social media.

The second level of recognition – legal recognition – is regarded by Heins as territorially highly specific. While he does not consider the institutional anchoring of the first level of recognition to be problematic territorially, legal recognition is institutionally closely related to the territory of the nation state, in particular because of the enforcement of individual rights by the government institutions. Although he also considers human rights, he points to the possibility of their limited application due to a lack of institutional support.

If human rights do not become part of the constitutions of nation states, they must be regarded more as manifestation rights only, the strength of which lies primarily in

---

21 (Ehrenreich – Hochschild 2003); (Hondagneu-Sotelo – Avila 2006); (Parrenas 2001).
22 (Hochschild 2005).
23 Honneth’s redefinition of his own original interpretation of recognition in the form of love in the sense of the possibility of the further normative development of this form of recognition facilitates the development of considerations in this transnational direction. See his sub-chapter The Capitalist Recognition Order and Conflicts over Distribution. In: (Fraser – Honneth 2003a, 135ff).
24 These interactions can be realized in various ambivalent forms, from e-mail exchanges to daily interaction in social networks such as Facebook, MySpace, etc.
25 The more detailed elaboration of an analysis of the legal sphere of recognition is performed by Heins primarily on the examples of children’s global rights, human rights and intellectual property, but his articles also offer more general arguments about the global order: (Heins 2008a, 15 – 16); (Heins 2008b).
26 Cf. alternative point of view: (Pogge 2002).
their political and diplomatic significance. The promotion of human rights in international relations can at least draw attention to problems and demand solutions in the spirit of the internationally accepted Declaration and the related international agreements. According to Heins, delineating this sphere of influence determines the limits of human rights.

The end of the Cold War and the political opportunities that this opened up led Honneth to promote the need for the moralization of world politics. He argued in favour of strengthening the importance of human rights and the possibility of the legal enforcement thereof which he later – in his paper on recognition between states – specifies mainly by developing arguments in favour of pre-legal presuppositions of the legal arrangement. As Honneth attaches importance to this kind of recognition on the international scale, his focus on human rights issues is the relevant topic in an analysis of his theory. Heins’s point of view is limited in that human rights are bound only to states, and international institutions extending beyond states with their international, macroregional and global activities are underestimated. As I will show, transnational and global elements in the application of human rights, especially extraterritorial recognition, should be added to the overlaps in the inter-national framework, not only by macroregional and global institutions, but also through nation states. In this respect, Heins underestimates legal recognition in international and global relations.

According to Heins, the third type of recognition, which includes forms of esteem and solidarity, is deficient at international and transnational level because, beyond the nation state, it does not have an adequate parallel; specifically, there are insufficiently developed global values to form a basis for this third type of recognition. The greatly unequal financial valuation of work on a transnational scale disrespects people who make a claim to the meritocratic valuation of work. There are only exceptions in particular sectors, such as some services, which promote certain transnational standards, but tend to introduce unfavourable working conditions. As a result of comparisons of work remuneration, in recent times there has been a greater push aimed at demanding higher wages for workers, at least in some sectors, such as agri-

---

27 (Honneth 1997).
28 (Heins 2008a, 16ff). In the area of non-governmental organizations, however, he does elaborate well on his analysis: (Heins 2008c).
culture, or in the struggle for gender equality. One might ask, however, whether it would be fruitful to focus more on criticism of the current conditions and on an interpretation of normative transnational and global expectations currently manifested and promoted in these struggles for recognition.

To sum up Heins’s mechanical transposition of patterns of recognition from a national level to international and transnational levels, we can say that he regards the different levels of recognition as transposable: the first kind of recognition (love and friendship) smoothly, the second kind of recognition (legal recognition) partially, and the third kind of recognition (esteem) in the uneasy way. All the three types of recognition specific for a national level in Honneth’s theory, however, according to Heins’s opinion, occur to a greater or lesser extent in internationally and transnationally institutionalized patterns of recognition.

3. From International to Global: Extra-territorial Recognition

Now I will move on from the problematic attempts to transcend the concept of national and international recognition to the articulation of a more appropriate approach that is able to realize this transcendence. I have thus far focused my objections to Heins’s transposition only on particular issues within each type of recognition. However, I think that his main problem is deeper. The fundamental problem is his ahistorical approach to the patterns of recognition. As Heins copies Pogge’s transposition of Rawls’s theory, he also gratuitously follows his ahistorical approach to the principles of justice. While an ahistorical approach is typical for liberal theory, it is entirely inadequate for Critical theory, especially in Honneth’s version. Honneth explicitly conducts a detailed analysis of both the synchronous and diachronic (historical) dimensions of the patterns of recognition. Furthermore, for him, the analysis of the historical aspect is not just an accessory, but a highly important and fundamental part of his methodology and significant for Critical theory in general. And since Heins’s static transmission of the patterns of recognition from the national level to the international plane does not reflect the historical developments in institutional structures of recognition at international level, it is unable to provide an interpretation of the structure of patterns of recognition at
international and transnational levels. Therefore, Heins’s transposition is not in fact an elaboration of Honneth’s theory of recognition but contradicts it methodologically and, thereby, also in the content in the end.

Honneth is aware of the difficulties of such a transposition, and does not even attempt this. Therefore, whereas he considers three levels of recognition in the local and national communities, he does not accede to this on the plane of international relations because he sees there is no support for it. He knows that they are similarities between the national and international levels but there is a specific development of specific spheres of recognition beyond the boundaries of nation states. What is more, in the different conditions of international relations, he takes the view that it is not currently possible to rely on the necessary social institutions.\(^{29}\) At the international level, therefore, Honneth concentrates on the general recognition of states and specifically on the recognition of the personality of states. From this perspective, his analysis of recognition between states can be considered an inspiring but underdeveloped contribution to the analysis of the contemporary recognition beyond the borders of nation states.

While Honneth’s analysis offers mainly a model of three patterns of recognition in the Western context, Heins attempts to transpose this model, in a Western-centric way, into the global arena without analysing the formation of patterns of recognition in other (non-Western) cultures and their intercultural interactions. This absence of the cross-cultural aspect is another serious deficiency in Heins’s analysis.

Despite the overall problematic approach which he prefers, his analysis keeps in some aspects with Honneth\(^{30}\) when he shows that legal recognition offers a (quasi-)universal hope for global recognition even if he more or less reproduces Honneth’s basic structure of legal recognition from the national level. However, there is in fact the real international and global potential of legal recognition because the gradual establishment of the international legal structures already represents the certain good institutionalized values and structures shared by individual states and other actors. Nevertheless, the articulation of this form of recognition

\(^{29}\) A similar argument, again on a metatheoretical plane, is developed by Honneth in his response to Nancy Fraser’s chapter “Concluding Conjunctural Reflections: Post-Fordism, Postcommunism, and Globalization” in their joint work (Fraser – Honneth 2003a).

\(^{30}\) (Honneth 1997).
needs to be subjected to further critical analysis and the patterns of recognition beyond the borders of the nation state need to be identified more finely than Heins has done.

Honneth is aware of that. In his only paper focused on the one specific kind of recognition beyond nation state, he explains the importance of human rights and their legal connotations in the international context. Efforts to develop and reformulate Honneth’s analyses of recognition beyond states require the mapping of the historical developmental trends which are articulated primarily through the ambivalent contemporary international legal order which is based on national legal orders. Although Honneth has yet to analyse global issues directly, the focus of his writings shows that he is inclined to think that legal relations on an international level, especially human rights, are more developed compared to the other two spheres of recognition, i.e. the sphere of personal relationships and the sphere of esteem and performance. More precisely, it can mean that, according to his opinion, the remaining two spheres are currently developed much less in international and transnational space, and therefore, in terms of moral and social realism, they provide a weaker basis for important normative connotations, even though they have already started to come more to the fore in the struggle for recognition.

Nevertheless, the third and the second sphere of recognition are not entirely separate from one another in this context. At international level, legal and cultural recognition is interdependent because legal relations are not completely separated from the cultural status of nation states. Legal relations retain certain cultural connotations of a politics of difference and characteristics of recognition, which is typical for this area, including the use of the term recognition in both the traditional (hierarchical) and the post-traditional (equitable) senses. For example, recognition of the sovereign status of a new state by existing states is a legal act, the intercultural component of which is reflected in the acceptance of another, in the acceptance of the different entity by states from other cultural or civilizational circles.

As I already mentioned, Honneth’s analysis of interstate recognition may be viewed only as a partly developed contribution to the study of recognition beyond the borders of nation states. His neglect of other,

31 (Honneth 1997).
Marek Hrubec

specific forms of recognition on international and transnational planes is
difficult to defend. The articulation of forms of recognition on new levels
requires an analysis of the developmental tendencies mainly in the last
decades, and international, transnational, and global patterns of
recognition need to be identified more finely than Heins has done.

I presented such a developmental approach in my analyses of social,
economic, legal, and cultural dimensions of recognition. Now I would
like to remind only one of my analyses of global society and politics
where I showed that the development of recognition is rooted also in
social struggles for the reactualization of some aspects of the current
international legal system, which, despite not being free of negative
aspects, also incorporates various progressive features, i.e. a surplus of
normative validity, that can be developed and thus contribute to the
formation of a global legal system. One of these features now gaining in
importance is a key concept of extraterritorial recognition, especially as
for social and economic rights. The concept of extraterritorial recognition
is able to illuminate the historical developmental dynamics of the
contemporary social struggles of the exploited, the marginalized and the
poor in the international, transnational and global contexts. I would like to
stress it as both a relevant theoretical concept and a useful, even if still
very marginalized, term of legal international practice.

There is a big difference in the definition and practical usage of ex-
traterritorial recognition concerning social human rights, on the one side, and
civil human rights, on the other. In civil and political rights, the
international law states’ obligations focus on actors living in their territory
and falling under their jurisdiction. However, for economic, social and
cultural rights, with due regard to the contemporary international law,
extraterritorial recognition may also be required as there is no limit on the scope of action of the law. Therefore, the enforcement of social rights
extends beyond the territory of a nation state in the current international
law.

In the Westphalian system of international relations, the concept of
extraterritorial recognition was used in only a small number of cases that
had little effect on either the broader population or the system of
international relations. However, because economic and financial

32 (Hrubec 2010). See specifically, for example: (Hrubec 2013).
33 (Hrubec 2013).
activities of capitalism are increasingly transnational and global and they bring out the serious negative consequences on the lives of people, the degree to which the recognition of various rights of individuals and groups in other states needs to be secured is highly rising. In other words, the need to recognise rights beyond national borders in the post-Westphalian world of global capitalism is very intensifying. The requirement of extraterritorial recognition of various transboundary rights encapsulates efforts by critical social and political actors in practice to force states to take responsibility for their actions, for the actions of their citizens, and especially for the activities of economic entities.

The states can and should at least regulate transnational and global economic and financial actors extraterritorially by applying legal means to assert their influence on the activities of “their” transnational corporations in other states. A legal relationship should be in place between economic and financial actors, on the one hand, and their home states, bound by the said international law, on the other, based on which they shoulder legal responsibility for their transnational activities. This means that, as things stand, there is room for the extraterritorial usage of international standards of social justice to be developed. This approach helps to create a global network of recognition which helps to safeguard the most important bases of social recognition on the local and national levels, and to strengthen regulation on all the levels that contributes to social justice, especially to extreme poverty eradication on the global level. These processes are distinguished by the promising fragments of an emerging global legal order in distributive regulation, namely the extraterritorial recognition of individuals and social groups in the developing countries (especially the global poor) harmed by the activities of transnational and global economic and financial actors.

Nevertheless, the analysis of current international legal structures in relation to transnational and global economic forces and financial institutions also indicates that there are limits to the legal influence that nation states can expect to wield beyond their borders. The inability of individual states to regulate the activities of their transnational corporations and wield influence in the international financial institutions in whose operations they are involved motivates misrecognized persons

34 Ibid; cf. (Craven 2007).
and groups of persons to form requirements for the establishment of transnational regulatory mechanisms safeguarding social justice macroregionally and globally. The contemporary influence brandished by transnational and global economic and financial actors triggers different reactions among those who are misrecognised and unrecognised, such as the everyday resistance of the exploited, the marginalized and the poor and in the developing countries. In fact, dynamics in the historical development of recognition appear to be moving in precisely this direction: from non-recognition and misrecognition, that has not been eliminated nationally or internationally, to transnational and global recognition on macro-regional and global scales.

Of course, extraterritorial recognition does not draw exhaustively on the developmental crystallisation of all forms of recognition of the legal form of recognition but it also contains various forms of social recognition. It reveals articulation of the diachronic aspect of this form of recognition on international, transnational and global planes that are more far-reaching than Honneth’s analysis of interstate recognition, which moves beyond the current international order only in the modest way. However, at the same time, unlike Heins, who also seeks this more extensive articulation of recognition on an international level, there is a historical dimension to the analysis of the formation of recognition. Other features of the legal sphere of recognition and selected elements of the first and third spheres of recognition would need to be formulated in this developmental way, although that is a matter beyond the scope of this article. I have discussed the separate theoretical articulation of patterns of recognition internationally, transnationally and globally elsewhere, both from the social and economic and intercultural perspectives. Here I concentrate more directly on the line of Honneth’s arguments. I can only stress that struggles for global justice concerning the extraterritorial recognition are closely linked to some aspects of Honneth’s concept of recognition which are present also on the global level, especially those aspects which are related to the partly globalized disputes for salaries of the exploited workers and marginalized groups of people in the

35 (Hrubec 2013). Cf., for example: (Sklair 2002); (Sklair 2000); (Robinson 2004); (Beck 1999); (Wei 2010); (El-Ojeili – Hayden 2006).
36 (Hrubec 2010). Cf. (Brown 2000); (Angle 2002); (Bauer – Bell 1999); (Dussel 2009); (Fornet-Betancourt 2004); (Al-Jabri 2011); (Tehranian 2007); (Wiredu 1996).
developing countries, and social movements accompanied those dynamics, including everyday struggles for survival of the global poor. It is the reason why it is necessary to get at least the basic knowledge of alternative perspectives from other macroregions of the world in order to overcome the West-centric concepts of international relations which do not include the points of view of non-Western authors. The normative concepts of just international and global interactions cannot be formulated really universally without the inclusion of them.  

4. The Perspectives of Global State

Whereas Honneth works with a relatively modest surplus of normative validity which can go over the status quo of the contemporary reality, and, thus, reveals lesser emancipatory potential for the development of patterns of recognition, my own interpretation embraces a more demanding surplus of normative validity that contains a more forceful critique of the status quo and offers the opportunity for the further development of recognition. That is why I consider important to analyse also the ambivalences of global state as the limit point of the institutional global analyses. However, at the same time, I criticize the authors who anticipate very strong development of the normative potential of recognition in the absence of a sufficiently established relationship with the reality of social criticism and the associated articulation of normative requirements because they may be faced with speculative conclusions.

When considering various scenarios of global development, which have to be subsequently documented by more detailed investigation, we should pay attention to the analyses of global state and recognition made by Alexander Wendt. It is illuminating to see these analyses by the means of the texts on global reform and world government from the point

---

37 One of the main problems of the majority of Western theorists of international and global justice is that they know only Western languages and ignore mostly the perspectives formulated in the Slavic, Chinese, Arabic, and other languages. If they exceptionally read some of non-Western theorists, they read only the assimilated selection published in Western languages.

38 (Wendt 1999); (Wendt 2003); cf. (Shaw 2000); (Linklater 2010).
of view of progressive realism presented by William Scheuerman.\textsuperscript{39}

If we are to compare Honneth and Wendt’s theories of recognition, first, the concept of diachronic development needs to be specified because their reasoning on this point leads to very different outcomes. While a difference is readily noticeable between my interpretation above and Honneth’s opinion, the contrast between Honneth and Wendt is even more compelling. Honneth, building on his arguments of moral realism, contends that we need to move beyond the current state of development by forming normative requirements, assisted by immanent critique and subsequent quasi-transcendental steps steeping such critique in the contradictions of the societal structure. The point here is to find elements of facticity which extend beyond the status quo of the social set-up: according to Honneth, nationally, this concerns those three patterns of recognition to which people relate in the criticism of their misrecognition, whilst internationally this area is limited to recognition between states within the framework of existing interstate relationships. Unlike Honneth, Wendt defends the stronger historical principle of intentional teleology which delivers a faster dynamics to the development, specifically the establishment of a world state. However, Wendt also differs from realists in the practical-political sense, of course, who consider where we are headed in reductionist pursuit of security, because he believes that the pursuit of security – whether by individuals or entire states – can be included, once reformulated, in the more suitable category of the struggle for recognition.\textsuperscript{40}

Wendt argues that, although contemporary nations in themselves may seem relatively stable, in a global era, given their interconnections, this is not so. He thinks that the current international order of nation states is unsustainable and, therefore, we need to consider what system can replace it. He claims that the dynamics of current and near-future developments will result in a world state: “I argue that a world of territorial states is not stable in the long run. They may be local equilibria, but they inhabit a world system that is in disequilibrium, the resolution of which leads to a world state. The mechanism that generates this end-directedness is an interaction between ‘struggles for recognition’ at the micro-level and ‘cultures of anarchy’ at the macro” (Wendt 2003, 507).

\textsuperscript{39} (Scheuerman 2011).
\textsuperscript{40} (Wendt 2003, 493ff, and esp. 507ff.)
Like Honneth, Wendt views the struggle for recognition as an effort to form individual and group identities, that is, as an effort focused on ideas, but realised through material disputes. Let’s take a look at this position more closely. First, Wendt contends that it may be enough to complete the current internationalisation of political authority and arrive at a global state by reforming the United Nations, the European Union, the International Criminal Court, the World Trade Organisation and other institutions, and continue a situation where no institution has a global monopoly on the use of force. In contrast, in terms of a concept of the state in the form of a “peaceful federation”, that situation would only constitute a transitional stage, because in the long run the system monopolises power at a global level.41

A fundamental argument here is that the transformation of the current form of the state into a global state will require three major changes (Wendt 2003, 505 ff.). Firstly, the world state will require the creation of a “universal security community”. A community of this type is based on the peaceful rather than military handling of disputes. This anticipates that states will be able to abandon the idea of other countries as an existential threat. Secondly, the idea of a universal security community is associated with “universal collective security”, which is impossible unless members of the security community identify threats as common threats and share in the provision of security. Thirdly, a world state requires a “universal supranational authority”, which should be based on safeguarding a globally legitimate method of decision-making with respect to organised violence. The implementation of a universal supranational authority is contingent on states’ relinquishment of their sovereignty in the field of violence.

This three-point approach to the transformation of the current form of the state into a global state is essentially a two-point concept. The first and second points, i.e. the universal security community and universal collective security, together actually form a “global common power”. The understanding of the global state, as a whole, on a basic security level here is derived from the definition of a state whose essential characteristics comprise Weberian and – in keeping with Honneth – Hegelian features, namely the disposition of a monopoly on the use of organised violence in

41 (Higgott – Brasset 2004); (Higgott – Ougaard 2002).
a state and equal recognition of all its members. As this does not entail a transition to an entirely new kind of organisation, but only to another version of the same, the main emphasis should be placed on the issue of a new level of state, i.e. the global characteristics of a state, and on the transition from the national to the global level.

If we focus, in this framework, on the form of the global state, there is no need to consider its most advanced variants. Rather, it suffices to delineate its realistically achievable form in the near term. The global state may be decentralised and consist of individual elements comprising the transformation of the current form of the state and its international integration. The autonomy of a political community’s national or local units, i.e. states or other entities, need not be surrendered. Autonomy may remain in place and help to shape the existence of the global community. Autonomous national politics and culture can continue to develop, although organised violence will no longer fall under the jurisdiction of the national community. Secondly, not only autonomy, but also the army of national communities may remain unaffected, as there is no need to create a global army. The global community would engage in military interventions in the form of pre-contracted joint operations by the armed forces of individual states, or by units of their armies, as is the case for regional and macro-regional events today. However, a fundamental element here would be the subordination of the individual armies to global intervention derived from the global monopoly on organised violence. This does not mean that a global government, akin to national governments, would have to exist. Thirdly, a global government should not have leadership in the hands of a single person, in the manner of a national government. The government could be made up of a collective, more comprehensive structure, with debate in the global public sphere. If the European Union were to actually complete the process of its integration based on legitimate and participatory politics and transpose its structure to a global plane, we could think of it as a world state, for example.

Wendt also builds on Deudney’s argument about the movement towards a global state based on the tenet of the extent to which national security is safeguarded. Whereas states could previously exist over a limited territory, developments in law enforcement technologies have

---

42 Cf. (Haigh 2003); (Jones 1999); (Nielsen 1987).
43 (Deudneym 2000); cf. (Deudney 1995).
given rise to a situation where states are no longer able to guarantee their own security. The technologies have become destructive to such a degree that individual states are no longer able to control them. Generally speaking, if the extent of the use of violence exceeds existing boundaries, thus increasing conflictual interaction between states in the long run, the state will have to enlarge its territorial scope by merging with or absorbing another state. At present, this tenet can be instantiated by Deudney’s concepts of a “nuclear one-worldism” or “nuclear globalism”. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have built stairways to the expansion of a state’s territorial scope. Just as, in the Middle Ages, Western states expanded due to the invention and use of gunpowder and related technologies, today the scale of current law enforcement technologies enables them to move beyond the existing territorial scope of the state.\(^{44}\)

This theoretical interpretation makes new technologies an external condition for the possibility of ambivalent territorial integration, and technological advances here play the role of a driving principle guiding the integration telos. Nevertheless, it remains a mere external possibility, and does not explain the internal conditions of the possibility and their dynamism in the integrational evolution of society. These are added by Wendt when he considers two aspects of his teleological clarification of developments in a world state: the first is on a micro-level, the second on a macro-level. Here, the aspect having a bottom-up effect on movement takes the form of the self-organising process of the struggle for recognition, which is implemented in response to technological change. The aspect having the opposite – top-down – effect is the structural logic of disorder in an international arena.\(^{45}\) In connection with this argument, Wendt also incorporates the security-based driving force behind developments into his theoretical explanation and, as such, specifies the internal telos thereof. As individual territorial units are no longer able to cope with the military threat of new technologies capable of affecting larger areas, and to guarantee security in their territory, they must redefine their borders and move beyond them towards greater integration. Naturally, other issues associated with technological advances remain, but the basic historical force driving forward the material shaping of the

\(^{44}\) (Deudney 1999).

\(^{45}\) (Wendt 2003, 498ff); cf. (Wendt 1999).
global state is clarified. Nevertheless, it must be accompanied by a specification of the identity of the new territorial entity. If a new, larger territorial unit — in our case the global state — is to have its own identity rather than consist solely of the separate identities of existing entities, the inhabitants or citizens of individual states must gradually become global citizens, cosmopolitans, and shape — step by step — the identity of the global state.

We could ask whether Wendt’s concept of historical development anticipates overly fast and smooth advances in tendencies geared towards the global state. While he seems to correct in his long-term normative analysis of the selected aspects of the establishment of global state, his concept of the global state in relation to his interpretation of recognition should be examined in a more precise analysis of complex short-term and long-term historical trends of the development of recognition. In my concept of extraterritorial re-cognition, as discussed above, I have attempted to convey such an analysis of the historical transition from an international structure to a transnational and global set-up. The more detailed treatment of these analysis and other similar oriented explorations of international, transnational, macroregional and global developmental trends of social, political, legal and other kinds of recognition could help to identify the strengths and limits of the concept of global state, and offer a more fitting comparative approach to Honneth’s position.

5. Conclusion

In summary, Honneth’s essay on a transboundary arrangement focuses on interstate recognition. Honneth’s basis is a position on moral realism, and, drawing on his analysis of interactions between states, he concludes that the legal recognition of a state requires the constant assumption of the political recognition of the collective identity of the state. The recognition of a state is based on the legitimacy of citizens within the state and the legitimacy of the representatives of other states. As this kind of recognition is not an eternal given, all states, including those already recognised, must constantly seek it in the historical development of the struggle for recognition.
Problems associated with Honneth’s concept of recognition mainly stem from the problem to analyse transnational and global interactions in economics, politics, law and other spheres. Underestimating these problematic interactions of global capitalism and related arrangement leads to partial reification of the nation state, and impedes an understanding of the development of the state and both negative and positive national, transnational, macroregional and global trends towards the global state and the formation of critiques of them. This deficit held Honneth back from sufficiently developing his concept of social recognition beyond the boundaries of the nation state and critically reflecting on the dominant role of the Western economy, politics, and culture and of the Western proposals for a global arrangement. Therefore, his theory of recognition remained largely unused here, despite offering excellent potential for elaboration of the category of recognition in this new context.

Developing Honneth’s concept of patterns of recognition from a national plane to international and transnational levels and developing his theory in relation to the establishment of a global state requires assessment drawing on more detailed analyses than that offered by the authors mentioned in this article. The assessment should be derived from a historically-based concept of recognition taking into account the need for analysis of the transition from an international structure to a transnational and global set-up, as demonstrated by the important concept of the contemporary transition phenomenon of extraterritorial recognition, which is able to connect social and legal justice. Behind the dynamic of extra-territorial recognition, there are the social struggles of the misrecognized. It is a model concept of the contemporary analyses which correspond to the current stage of economic, social, political, and legal historical developments of the struggles for recognition.

Moreover, all of these analyses require an intercultural approach that clarifies developments in the international, transnational, macroregional and global orders, bearing in mind the various forms of recognition in different cultural circles, e.g. Western, Confucian, or Islamic, which could demonstrate the possibilities and potential starting points for the articulation of such an arrangement beyond state borders by means of comparative intercultural analysis.
References


PhDr. Marek Hrubec, PhD.
Centre of Global Studies
Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
Jilská 1, 110 00 Prague 1
Czech Republic
hrubec@ff.cuni.cz
**HISTORICALITY OF DASEIN BY MARTIN HEIDEGGER**

*Andrea Javorská*

The aim of this paper is to clarify Heidegger's question of temporality and historicality of Dasein which in his conception resulted into the problem of conception of Being to be interpreted out of an authentically understood time. Heidegger understood time as the horizon of understanding Being. Time understood this way is original in a sense of its ecstatic-horizontal structure which clarifies the totality of authentic care as Being-towards-death and at the same time the most original basis of beings which is Being.

Key words: Heidegger – Being – Dasein – time – temporality – historicality

Martin Heidegger and his fundamental ontology shows that the question of history belongs among the most fundamental questions of human existence and is closely bound to the relationship between Being and time. This problem appears on the background of revealing dynamic structure of historicality and temporality of Dasein. Thus he opens an ontological sense of the question of time that enables him to distinguish between the “ordinary” conception of time and original temporality, the sense of being which is rooted in time and which together with its modes is called a temporal interpretation.

According to Heidegger, existence has an open character, and therefore is always a part of the world, i.e. it is in the world. Such openness is an ontological meaning of “there”, the Dasein (da, there – here, the being-da, das Da-sein), it is a constitutive moment of one’s own ecstatic structure. A man is the only being open to the world; he does not accept his world passively, but actively influences and changes it. Based on the openness, the Dasein can keep distance from the world, can come to itself and can be free in utilizing its own potential. Being an open existence, the Dasein has an understanding relationship to the world and to the original openness of being Heidegger in
his later work, after “turnover”, calls “unhideness of being”. The term “sense of being” will be replaced by the “truth of being”, that will be articulated as the place for being, the purpose of which is to prevent the possible confusion of the term “truth” and the traditional conception of rightness. The most original horizon revealing the meaning of Being and everything that exists and at the same time articulating the answer to the question of Being is time. The condition of a possible comprehension of time and hence being-in-time, is temporality.

**Historicality and Understanding**

Heidegger articulated his approach towards Being as such already in his work *Being and Time* from the point of view of an authentic and non-authentic understanding of Dasein. The original structure of temporality was manifested as being the original condition of possibility of care as well as the ontological problem of Dasein’s happening. Hediegger reveals an ontological conception of historicality as the foundation of the structure of happening, as the existential-temporal condition of its possibility. Heidegger had worked out the ontological conception of historicality to be able to reveal the structure of happening and gain access to its existential-temporal condition of its possibility. In this context he aimed to elaborate the Being of the historical, historicality as the ontological structure, yet as nothing historical, no beings to be deal with “historically”. Heidegger was trying to thematize the original time as the sense of Being and later he also stressed that the structures of understanding, he had analyzed in *Being and Time*, are the structures of understanding of Being at all. Thanks to practical handling with beings we are being left to encounter beings in situation of openness. And just due to tentative practical Being-in-the-world there is also a secondary possibility – the dimension of the knowledge of “objects”.

The knowledge of objects is the matter of various specialized sciences, which based on various criteria had divided themselves specific beings. Their task is to recognize these beings, categorize and classify them. Aristotle had already enabled and encouraged the division of all knowledge into various scientific fields but at the same time he underlined that the question of what beings are as beings, the question of Being is not the matter of research of any special positive science. Hiedegger, often turning back to Aristotle, indicates the question of the sense of Being, Being of beings, as well as the question of history and historicality itself, that would not be accessible in the context of a
systematic, scientific, objective, ontical research, but in the context of a thinker’s role, who embodies a possibility to ask relevant questions concerning the ontological assumptions of a science. He tries to get this assumption from the structure of being Dasein. “It is essential to search for the ontological possibility of the origin of science in the basic structure of Being Dasein” (Heidegger 1996, 408). He focuses his attention especially on uncovering the assumptions of history as the science that assumes historicality of Dasein and its rooting in temporality: “history still assumes historicality of Dasein in a totally specific and significant way” (Ibid., 425). Heidegger in fact seeks for the existential origin of history in order to be able to analyse Dasein’s historicality and its rooting in temporality. How does historiology assume historicality of Dasein? How does Heidegger’s topical distinguishing of historiology, history and historicality depend on the so called Being of history? Where in fact lies the fundamental structure of history?

Historical Dasein grasps beings by existing as the Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is a specific meaningful structure which is ontologically typical for human existence. Human existence, as being overthrown into the world and being towards the death, is unanimously a final existence and also, what Heidegger calls it, an “ecstatic temporality” as the final temporality. Precisely this final temporality constitutes an original time and it is the basis of what Heidegger called historicality of Dasein, “i.e. not of the fact, that it can be the subject of a historical science, but of the fact, that it exists in fact historically, giving oneself possibilities” (Dastur 1996, 29).

In his Being and Time he was concerned with the existential analysis of historicality: “Our next target is to find the solution to the original question of Being of history, that means of the existential construction of historicality. This solution is something that is historical by its original means” (Heidegger 1996, 411). Historical knowledge is, according to Heidegger, thus possible only on the basis of historicality of Dasein.

To be able to explain that history cannot be understood as a thing, object standing in front of us, he speaks about various meanings of understanding of the history. He focuses his explanation on a general distinction between something historical, the past beings, in a sense of no longer occurring as well as the beings that exist but no longer influence the present. Furthermore, from his point of view, history is normally understood either as some origin of the past corresponding with the category of evolution, or as the unity of beings that changes in time. In this connection Heidegger points out the change and
human fate, human societies and their cultures, as well as the tradition which is either historically researched or is accepted by some societies as something natural while its origin remains hidden. History is conceptualized as historiology: the science about the past or a historical science. As we can see, an obvious connection with temporal characteristics and almost unanimous priority of the past topicality corresponds to the outlined meanings of ordinary conception of history. What topicality of the past does Heidegger mean? How can history become a possible object of historiology?

In his interpretation Heidegger will outline the way of being of what itself is historical, its historicality and its rooting in temporality. Which beings are historical? Is it only the Dasein or are there non-human beings as well? Do the beings have to occur first to be able to get into history later on? According to Heidegger, the Dasein does not become historical via joining and entering various circumstances and events.

On the contrary, it is by events themselves the Being of the Dasein is formed, so only “just because Dasein is in its Being historical, circumstances, events and fates are ontologically possible” (Heidegger 1996, 411). The Dasein does not have its historicality at its own disposal; we cannot decide for it, neither can deserve it for no matter what good reasons. The structure of Being in Heidegger’s conception is projected in the relation of time to being. And that is why the historicality and its existential analytic have a temporal meaning.

Besides Dasein, innerwordly beings are historical as well, but secondarily. This does not mean that they would be historical only due to the historical objectification. Can they become objects of the historical research just because they are historical? Ordinary objects, such as hand tools or even antiques, which belong to the past, belong to it for reasons different than for not being used any longer. They still do occur at present! If we have accepted an unambiguous conception of history as something past then we, together with Heidegger, ask “in what sense are these hand tools historical, though not yet being past?” (Ibid.). No matter if we do or do not use these hand tools, they are obviously not what they used to be. In what context do we talk then about something past, about what no longer exists?

In Heidegger’s existential analytic, innerwordly beings do meaningfully belong into a unit of tools, into the world where Dasein concerns and uses them in some reasonable circumstances. But the world of these reasonable circumstances where we used to concern about or use that tool, no longer exists. In spite of that innerwordly beings can still occur. Does this mean that before – in the past – there used to be a world that no longer exists and the
innerworldly beings occur now in the world that exists? The world, according to Heidegger, is not a set of single things somewhere in the space, is not a total sum of the objects known. The world belongs to the way the Dasein is, and it conditions its basic comprehension, basic definition of Dasein as a certain way of openness. That is why the world is only “in the way of an existing Dasein, that ‘as being in the world’ in fact exists” (Ibid., 414). In this connection people of various periods live, setting their approach to what exists, as well as their self-conception. Historicality of innerworldly beings that still occurs but meaningfully belongs into the past, thus according to Heidegger does not depend on historical objectification, but rests in a pre-thematic relationship of the Dasein to innerworldly beings, that had belonged to the world of the “having-been” Dasein. Heidegger considers this also in his *The Origin of the Work of Art* and says we do not understand the specificity of some era by naming the objects which had belonged to that time. Our understanding of the world is set by clarifying, revealing accessibility of beings to the Dasein.

We are coming to the sphere of openness. The way we meet and understand beings depends on what kind of openness we occur in. The specific type of openness, as Heidegger claims, differentiates also historical worlds. The openness itself is not material, touchable; it cannot be a topic of any positive science. The openness is not only the matter of the non-human beings, which is encountered by human beings, but also the matter of the (Dasein’s) self-conception, conception of the others as well as spiritual comprehension. The circle movement of Hiedegger’s comprehension aims at openness as something unhidden in sense of *alétheia*. Just because the thing shows itself, that its being is manifested, we can articulate openness of beings in what and how it is. That means that beings become accessible in their own essentia. In this manner Heidegger talks about *alétheia* as to “let-beings-become-accessible in their essentia” (Biemel 1995, 108).

While all the effort of Heidegger’s existential analytic aims at finding the possibilities to answer the question of sense of being as such, the analysis first needs to focus on understanding of Being. Understanding being happens in the horizon of time. Heidegger interprets the understanding of being from temporality, from the primordial time. Temporality (Zeitlichkeit) has in the plan of Dasein analysis developed into the basic dimension of human being as an original condition of possibility of the care. It was explicated in relation to the authentic “potentiality-for-being-a-whole” Dasein. Since “temporality enables the unity of existence, factuality and falling and originally constitutes
the unity of the structure of care” (Heidegger 1996, 360), the totality of Dasein is determined by the ecstatico-horizontal structure of temporality.

Temporality and Historicality

Heidegger comprehended time as the horizon of understanding Being. Interpreted this way, time is original in sense of its ecstatico-horizontal structure which explains the totality of authentic care as “being towards death” and at the same time also the most original and deepest basis of beings: being. Time does not characterize Dasein as temporal but Dasein is interpreted as temporal. It does not mean “existing in time” but “existing temporally” as a temporal being. Being can be distinguished through time, i.e. it can be interpreted as temporal. Distinguishing the being means that it can be interpreted in its sense, that something like a sense enables its explanation. This temporal interpretation is possible only because Dasein understands its own being from time.

The being of temporality lies in timing the unity of time ecstasies, phenomena of the future, “having been” and present, and it enables the unity of existence, factuality and falling. Specific constellation of connection between the meanings of “was”, “is” and “will be” creates a specific negative bound of access to time and being. If this access is meant correctly, there must be something like an open dimension, an open area from which Being can be disclosed at all, accessible and present in and by its means also possibly understood. Understanding this specific mutual bound based on unhiddenness of being and time and self-hiddenness of the unity of “was”, “is” and “will be” (till unhiddenness of being of beings lasts), requires the investigation into the inner structure of these temporal ecstasies, i.e. ecstatic temporality. This structure that articulates parting or span of Dasein in timing temporality and appears as the “sense of authentic care” (Ibid., 358), refers to its original ecstatic unity of “having-been” (das Gewesen) as over-throwness of Dasein into the world, the moment Being-always-already-in; present (Gegenwart) as being alongside this or that beings; future (Zukunft) as self – projection of Dasein, being kept in opportunities of coming to itself, as moment of Being-always-ahead-of-oneself-in.

The sentence from §65 of Heidegger’s Being and Time becomes the starting point of our further analysis. Dasein can exist like an over-throwness being only because the care itself is based in “having-been” (Ibid.).
Let us remind that Dasein is the being which in its being cares for the being itself. Its own being is assigned to it. It means that Dasein has opened itself into “there” (da) to access its own Being. “There” suggests something like an open space of some possible region, stretched out area of a possible world – thus Being of that “Being here” (das Da-sein) is from the outset a Being-in-the-world. That means Dasein is always assigned to be this “here” of its own Being as Being-in-the-world. Heidegger writes about factuality of an assignment of our own Being and calls it “over-thrownness” of being Dasein. An “over-thrownness” means that the being of Dasein (as Being-in-the-world) is for it itself “always already” thrown into openness, into the “there”. Because of that, Dasein has “always already” found itself standing in front of its factuality of Being-in-the-world, in a certain state of mood, “state-of-mind” (Befindlichkeit). The state-of-mind is a way by which it has “always already” opened into the “there” of one’s own over-thrownness of Being-in-the-world. It precedes all possible reflexion or comprehension. That is why it “always already” is concerned with one’s own Being. How do these short reflections correspond with our topic? How can the above described structures of Being be possible?

In *Being and Time* Heidegger makes a distinction between “having-been-Being” and “past-Being”. In the horizon of Heidegger’s analysis, the past (die Vergangenheit) does not indicate something datable that was exhausted, and so remains exhausted “now”, something that we refer to as existing “then”. Heidegger does neither come out from the idea of time as the sequence of the past, present and future, nor from the idea of being associated with the present as “still being” or with future or past as “already not-being”. Such definition of time belongs, according to him, to the ordinary conception of time.\(^1\) Heidegger’s conception of time explicated within confines of the existential analytic of the Dasein is not an objective frame of happening, it does not occur somewhere “outside” or somewhere “inside”, e.g. in consciousness.\(^2\) Time is not a being that appears or disappears, that can be measured, defined through terms, or something that would be everlasting.

---

\(^1\) Heidegger took a critical approach towards traditional conception of time that was typical e.g. for Aristotle because it was not sufficient to articulate the relationship between Being and time. See: (Mitterpach 2007, 65 – 66).

\(^2\) He diverts also from Husserl’s conception of time which is according to him not determined by the question of Being: “My question of time was determined by the question of Being. It was taking the direction which remains to Husserl’s investigation of inner conscience of time permanently unfamiliar.” In: (Heidegger 1993c, 53).
Heidegger writes about the past with regard to “non-human” beings that appear and take place “in time”. The way Dasein projects oneself into this Being is called existentially. That is why Dasein, besides being the over-thrown Being-in-the-world, is also an understanding self-projection into one’s own potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. This way of Dasein’s being Heidegger calls an “over-thrown projection”. According to Heidegger, Dasein as existence cannot be past (die Vergangenheit) because it can never essentially occur. “Dasein can obviously never be as past, not because it would be not disappearing, but because it can never occur essentially. As far as it is, it exists. And Dasein which no longer exists, is not past in ontological sense, but is this having-been-here.” (Heidegger 1996, 414)

That is why he uses the term “having been” (das Gewesen) as a meaningful term signifying one of the temporal constituents which cannot be analyzed as isolated or alternately opposite to other remaining constituents of the complete structure of care. Having-been, Present and even Future as well are always in mutual inter-connection, which creates an integrated and own phenomenon, the sense of Dasein.

The phenomenological analysis of the appearance of a being, described as arriving into presence from hiddenness and non-presence, enabled to distinguish the sensual present as appearance from enpresenting in a sense of “coming out”, “rising up” into unhidden, or as standing up into openness. Enpresenting enables “being at” (concern, within-the-world beings) hand in hand with the fallenness of Dasein. Fallenness means to get lost in present. Presence does not represent a moment, “now” as some point in a specific temporal order. Presence as the moment “now” would be a temporal phenomenon corresponding to time in sense of within-time-ness. In time as within-time-ness, there always occurs something. But Dasein is not an occurrant being, that is why one’s own “Being-alongside” cannot be explained from the “now”. Different from beings that appear “in” the present, the Dasein is ecstatic. Regarding to this ecstatic character of Dasein, the past does not mean “being no longer”, but it means a “having-been” of Dasein itself. Neither presence means “now”, but is an access to Being in its unhiddenness. Present as an ecstatic modus is the one which enables “meeting with what can be” in a certain time “ready-to-hand” or “present-at-hand beings” (Ibid., 370). That is why Dasein can be nearby within-the-world beings only when it is open for the possible “present enpresenting” (gegenwertiges Anwesen) of this beings, and thus even or itself. By this “Being alongside” Dasein is extracted so that it can be present (Gegen-wart). Present means enpresenting of beings in its unhiddenness.
It is likewise also with the analysis of the third temporal ecstasis, the future. If we allowed a vulgar interpretation of time, than the future would stand for the upcoming, something that has not been before, i.e. is not, but will be – will become present. If the future was only to come then it would be able to appear as the future because it would permanently keep distant (Das Abwesende). To this upcoming future Hidegger assigns a non-authentic understanding of temporality. The future (die Zukunft) in the original horizon of time (in original horizontal temporality) always already is, never upcomes. In *Being and Time* it is interpreted as self-projection of Dasein, as Being-ahead-of-oneself. Dasein projects oneself according to its own possibilities of Being and Heidegger understands this self-projection “into” one’s own possibilities as a temporaling of future. Future enables to understand something like ahead-of-itself. That is why Dasein is as ahead-of-itself futurally. Futurally means Dasein's coming-towards-oneself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Ahead-of-itself points out to authentic future which enables Dasein to be the way that it cares for one’s own potentiality-for-Being. A phenomenal feature of the future is “coming-towards-oneself” (from some specific possibility), is the “Being-towards”. The future understood like this, in a specific way still concerns the man. Heidegger's interpretation of original temporality keeps accenting a dynamic structure of the unit of original temporality. But since Dasein as Being-in-the-world exists in two basic modules of Being Dasein, and gets to one’s own potentiality-for-Being through concern with beings, it cannot see that the unity of temporality does not pay attention to it, misses it. If Dasein is concerned “with its Being”, then it also takes care of its own ecstaticness either non-authentically in a way of fallenness, or authentically. Temporality temporalizes either as forgetting-enpresenting expecting, i.e. non-authentically from intra-temporal beings, or as continuous renewal of the moment, i.e. authentically from one’s own temporality itself.

Apparently, certain moments of the structure of Being Dasein are possible only under the condition that Dasein is in its diversification always at the same time upcoming – future (Zukunft), “already” – “having-been” (Gewesen) and enpresenting-present (Gegenwart). From phenomenological perspective these three temporal ecstases create a unit and that means they are temporalizing the original temporality. This unit, according to Heidegger, takes place in the world.

---

3 The analysis of sensual determination of Anwesen and Abwesen we meet especially in the works after turnover, e.g. *Die Geschichte des Seyns, Was heisst Denken?*
World is the space for beings, which can be investigated by man just because he always already understood what Being. The world belongs to existence and indicates the way how beings can be manifested to man who lives it as a whole. In phenomenology manifestation means to be somehow here. As being present in the “place” where meeting occurs. But this “place” must be somehow understood: non-authentically, model of which is materiality, occurrence in present; and authentically, for which each present is accessible from future, each understanding is a projection but an overthrown projection, since every present is at the same time determined by past. Having understood “the-step-out” that enables the presence in specific situation, always steps out from somewhere, out of some determination, dependence on what used to be. Both in authenticity and non-authenticity it appears in a relation to oneself. In first case we come to ourselves, in second one we do not. But in both cases there has to be some structure that enables things become clear and accessible to us and us to ourselves. For understanding of what being Dasein is, Heidegger reveals a crucial modality Eigentlichkiet des Desiens we usually translate by perhaps ethically not appropriate term – Dasein's authenticity. The authenticity makes the finality of Being Dasein understandable. In this context Heidegger finds for his expression the phenomenon of Being-towards-death, which becomes significant in one’s confrontation with finality as an authentic comprehension of human Being.

Temporalizing of the time which is characteristic for an authentic existence is in modus of historicality. Heidegger, analyzing temporal character of historical beings at all stresses the fact that we cannot come out from “Being-in-time” in a way of entity present-at-hand. Yet entity does not become “more historical by stepping back into more and more distant past, so that the oldest would be historical in the most actual sense” (Heidegger, 1996, 415). Dasein, according to Heidegger, is not historical because it is not here but only in temporalizing one’s own temporality which has esctatic-horizontal structure we can talk about historicality as essential structure of Dasein.

Heidegger discusses historicality as an ontological problem which he analyzes through existential analytic of Being Dasein. He points out a meaningful structure of temporalizing temporality which is represented by the historicality of Dasein. Heidegger considered existential construction of historicality; historicality in this analysis “is not only a simple ontical statement of the fact that Dasein acts in ‘world history’. Historicality of Dasein is the basis for possible historical comprehension which brings along the possibility to keep history explicit as a science” (Ibid., 364). Heidegger was trying to explain historicality from the point of view of temporality,
originally from authentic temporality.

References


The contribution is a partial presentation of the outcomes of the research project VEGA No. 2/0175/12 From Phenomenology to Metaphysics and to Reflection of the Contemporary Crisis of Society and Art which has been pursued at the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra.
Andrea Javorská, Ph.D.
Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra
Hodžova 1
949 74 Nitra
Slovak Republic
ajavorska@ukf.sk
CHANGING THE CONCEPTS OF THE DEBATE. ŽIŽEK HELPING HEIDEGGER FAIL BETTER

Klement Mitterpach

The paper focuses on Slavoj Žižek’s re-appropriation of Heideggerian ontological background and analyses the position Heidegger occupies when viewed from the point of Kant-Hegel shift Žižek elevates as the central to understanding the idea of philosophy and its post-Hegelian development. The framework serves us to indicate the meaning of ontological speculation within contemporary debates challenging philosophy to deliver understanding of the ongoing debate on mainly social and political issues of the day. It shows that the idea of failure of understanding to be enacted on the ontological level – counterintuitively rendered by Žižek on the issue of the failure of the role of understanding being in Heidegger’s thinking – is seminal to understanding the expected role as well as possible performance of philosophy within contemporary debates.

Keywords: Understanding – Failure – Kant-Hegel shift – Heidegger – Dialectics of Debate

Heidegger did not Understand Anyone at All

In a short written record of what was supposed to be a dialogue between Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek published in 2007 under the title Philosophy in the Present, Slavoj Žižek started his speech by an overt rejection of any philosophy which would try to appear or introduce itself as a dialogue: “Philosophy is not a dialogue. Name me a single example of a successful philosophical dialogue, that wasn’t a dreadful misunderstanding. This is true also of the most prominent cases: Aristotle didn’t understand Plato correctly; Hegel who might have been pleased by the fact – of course didn’t understand Kant. And Heidegger fundamentally didn’t understand anyone at all. So no dialogue” (Badiou – Žižek 2007, 50). The statement could be read with respect to the opportunity which
was arranged to suggest the form of a dialogue between philosophers which, as both declared, are “to a large extent in agreement”. Obviously, commenting upon “wrong” choice of partakers who display no dialogue-promoting discord, Žižek does not only count on a simple effect of rhetorical exaggeration and over-generalization because his rebuff of the dialogue in philosophy is followed by an even more resolute refusal – literally “fleeing from” anyone suggesting a discussion or philosophy in a dialogue. Far from simply showing disregard for the communication-oriented philosophical space today, Žižek from the very start follows his sentence upon a dialogue running even between philosophers who would be considered essentially in need of dialogical mediation or critical articulation of their mutual discord. Žižek’s brief and fierce account of the dialogue and philosophy eventually focuses on undermining almost self-evident expectations philosophers are supposed to share with those who challenge them to explain or at least to analyse the possibility of mutual understanding upon the issues of the day. What seems to be an over-stated postmodern attitude is, however, its contrary, for Žižek directly confirms Badiou’s thesis that philosophy is axiomatic.

Žižek, however, does not exaggerate an autonomy of philosopher’s theoretical space here but points to an implicitly shared belief in commonsensical autonomy of our everyday beliefs which nonetheless often demands a “philosophical” confirmation and for this reason counts on philosophy “providing public opinion with some orientation in problematic situation” (Badiou – Žižek 2007, 51). The line of the “philosophical pairs” to provide for a brief examples of most flagrant intra-philosophical “misunderstandings” to be chosen purely randomly, nevertheless betrays arranged positions, where Heidegger’s case seems to represent the apex of misunderstanding. He no longer stands out as the one who misunderstood Husserl but as someone to misunderstand “anyone at all”. The philosopher of “understanding“, having rendered understanding as a fundamental phenomenal feature of Dasein, that means, his own being and meaning of being as such, however, might not appear in this position solely as the ultimate case of the desperate lack of understanding but more likely as philosophically most trenchant example of the failure “in” the philosophical comprehension of the concept of understanding as well as probably the failure “of” the concept itself in regard to the (commonsensically often ironical) idea of philosophy as its
general provider. With respect to Žižek’s claim about the even philosophically often misunderstood public role of philosophy, we could hardly declare misunderstanding a failure without considering the misunderstanding of failure.

Even at the level of introductory apprehension to Heidegger’s philosophical enterprise Heidegger obviously represents a philosopher who deliberately exemplifies an explicit attempt at radical displacement of the meaning of the term from its commonsensical/ontical use in order to work out what he calls “ontological” sense of understanding and make it appear in course of explication of the ontologically oriented human practice itself. One could say Heidegger is the philosopher of understanding to the extent he succeeds to displace the implicit meaning of understanding as a practice within its quotidian context by the practice which transforms its own commonsensically rendered relata and ultimately changes the horizon, which supports the ordinary meaning of the word, as well as the practice it describes. The philosopher’s practice therefore signifies a philosophy which seems to combine incomprehensible tendencies: reading other philosophers as the authentic procedure of pursuing philosophical practice itself and at the same time promoting a strictly ontological philosophical approach, that means, practicing understanding which has no intention to emphatically adhere to any of the philosophical “positions” in author’s philosophical development, but displaying their ontological failure as the proper way of re-opening “the question of being”.

Heidegger seen as an example of the most extensive misunderstanding therefore does not seem to work as the example of some profound confusion, but as an example of an intentional refusal to subject philosophy to an ontologically misconceived claim (not rendered ontologically yet) on understanding itself. However, we could ask: Is not Heidegger precisely a case of losing the prospect of the real problem of understanding under the flag of strictly ontologically conceived notion of understanding? We should not forget that the ambiguity of Žižek’s list and Heidegger’s position is strictly intentional and congruent to Žižek’s reformulating the whole issue of the “philosophy in the present”. Žižek’s “we must change the concepts of the debate” (Badiou – Žižek 2007, 51) therefore represents an account directly enacted by the number of exemplary examples of philosophical topoi he provides just in order to
face the alternatives we “spontaneously” collectively share when discussing the pressing up-to-date problems as false ones.

**Heidegger Trauma. Demands on Philosophy or Just Philosophical Demands?**

Does one not expect philosophy to provide understanding? Or does one expect philosophy to appear once again as a misunderstanding, just to prove again that the understanding we already possess has nothing to do with philosophizing about the circumstances, which despite all the attempts taken by philosophers very soon turn into the self-enclosed structuring of a purely notional philosophical practice? Žižek starts with the question he from the very outset declares as “approaching the problem the usual way”, that is, describing the situation as that of philosopher “being addressed, questioned and challenged to intervene into the European public sphere” (Badiou – Žižek 2007, 50). The point is he addresses precisely this idea of “philosophy being asked to intervene”, no matter whether shared by philosophers too eagerly demanding to be publicly recognized as useful and actual, or only the idea “inauthentically” shared by the public, who fantasizes about a “subject supposed to know”. Does Žižek propose an arrogant division between philosophy which “heroically” faces the inevitable inauthenticity of the crowd and the public indifference which despite naively demands someone to provide answers? Žižek’s point, however, leads beyond the choice of authentic philosophical aims and inauthentic pragmatism of a crowd, and the idea of philosopher’s changing concepts of the debate pertains primarily to the false alternatives assigned to the issue of an engaged philosophy, that is, philosophy in current situation as either being engaged or none. To render it differently, it is a concern which confronts philosophers with the choice either to call for the democratic civic vigilance or to publicly confess that any other philosophical intervention into the public attitude is incongruent with the idea of publicly acceptable and practicable proposal. Žižek’s well-known reaction basically changes the idea of philosophy being responsive by answering the given questions in favour of philosophy responding by positing the new questions, which introduce the possibility of radical choice against the false, fake possibility of alternatives usually publically
shared even by philosophers themselves. Žižek’s answer thus turns to
philosopher’s ideas about philosophy and its public engagement, in order
to show, how what philosophers themselves demonstrate as a political
complement to their philosophical work, reveals their unconscious
philosophical affinities even among those who are believed (and who
themselves believe) to hold on totally opposite philosophical stances.

The idea of the common but hidden ground is certainly not new.
However, Žižek basically shows that the ground itself is in fact not
hidden, but rather disclosed, revealed as philosophical precisely
politically. What one does not usually expect to see politically is the very
own core of the otherwise opposite philosophical enterprises. One
therefore does not usually expect to see the properly philosophical via
political, even though we got used to expect to see philosophical as
political. Žižek’s example is well-known Derrida–Habermas debate about
the future of Europe. This point leads further than we would expect, if we
take ourselves to be experienced in cases among which Heidegger is
interestingly again one of the exemplary cases of our times – if not the
single example of the philosopher of philosophical autonomy
exemplifying the paradoxical radically pursued authenticity of the
philosophical stance which is said to convert into an ambiguously radical
political engagement. Political naivety or philosophical irresponsibility of
the philosopher will have to appear as false alternatives, if philosophers
after Heidegger attempt to follow the public claims not only on
philosophical responsibility, but also adopt the role of compulsory
criticism which attempts to follow the trace political coding in the fissure
of philosophically proclaimed political neutrality of the ontological
thinking. The fact is, they should rather follow the ontological trace in
otherwise utterly politically correct thinking, or spot the unexpected
sameness of political ontologies of the declarations of the current
challenges which attempt to identify the core critical issue of the day.

The idea of the engaged philosophy is therefore from this point not a
matter of occasion, of the turbulent times to come philosophers are
waiting for to get into use again. The fact is, the ontological substance of
their thought is sought to succumb totally to this fundamental claim of
responsibility which has been confronted with the trauma of counter-
enlightenment thought, which gets unleashed the moment one takes the
modern subjectivity into a question, that means, the moment one takes
ontological neutrality of the political into question. However, the moment such a demand was internalized by philosophers themselves, we face the fact that all the philosophizing along the lines of the public or political recognition of philosophy finally does not get enough recognition, or perhaps, that all the demands pressing upon philosophy are a philosophical fantasy responsible philosophers have made up themselves to revive from the trauma of the Heideggerian philosophico-political (in-)experience.

Is not Žižek’s stating the fact itself, the fact of philosophy being publicly addressed this way, a total mis-perception of the situation philosophy finds itself in? Should we not therefore ask if the way Žižek starts about the situation of philosophy being asked and challenged by public demands is not also only part of his philosophical fantasy, fantasy about the event taking place to cover the fact there is none? Would it not be all the more appropriate to confess, there is no such spontaneous necessity to address philosophers? Finally, is Žižek not wrong about facts even though we might have found his answers “stimulating”¹ when we read him contra-factually? However, what if the only fact that is missed by such to-be-realist cynical stance is that the politically responsive philosophy faces the situation marked by false alternatives of pleading for recognition or directly attempting to integrate the demands into the pragmatico-political process and become a Staatsphilosophie, philosophy which by overtly declaring its demands actually performs the task of (even critical) legitimizing not the role of the philosophical-political thinking, but the particular state apparatus instead.

What if what seems to be an apparently final realist passion for the real of the situation – taking it as it is without any idealistic ballast, being true to rough facts – and a direct call to an active participation of the philosopher on the political agenda is itself just a reaction to the alternative of simple belief that there is finally, cynically, no such demand? Is this reading of the situation not itself correlative to the reading of the politically responsible philosophy which reactively clings to politico-pragmatic process which is believed to be true to facts,

¹ Peter Engelmann somewhat disappointedly finishes his editor’s preface: “Perhaps Žižek is right that philosophy is not a dialogue. Philosophical discussion is nevertheless always stimulating, as the presentation and now this book demonstrate” (Badiou – Žižek 2007, xii).
considering the realist account of the situation, the possibilities it offers, in order to escape the temptation of the irresponsible and non-responsive (to the realist account of the situation) philosophers, itself a fundamentally ontologically based claim?

**Ontology of the Failed Understanding**

Žižek’s rejection of a debate should be read precisely as an answer to this suspicion about philosophy rendered as from its very essence always coming short of facts or lacking the responsibility towards any normative challenge or request. What might have been considered typically philosophically elusive (reluctance to remain at the level of the shared identification of a problem), is itself the cure. A debate is therefore no longer starting by an empty gesture of invitation to an open space of communicative practice but more likely by the imposition of the failure of understanding.

Žižek’s answer does not only promote the idea of philosopher correcting the false illusions we share unless we do not render our situation philosophically. It rather shows that philosophy can respond only by the questions which we have not demanded. The falsity of our questions however can be articulated only on the background of the imposition of the new one, the falsity of our demand to appear at the background of the question which responds to the demand we are suddenly challenged to figure out and to formulate. Basically, the question is wherefrom does a philosopher come to his proposal, what kind of stance we encounter when being imposed with a question we cannot simple deduce from our attitudinal background, but from its very failure? It is the change which does not change our epistemological misconceptions or fills the lack of proper normatively based understanding, not even the change of the very epistemological standards

---

2 In July 2013 a debate had occurred between Žižek and Chomsky, including couple of reactions which followed Žižek’s comment he made on account of some of Chomsky’s rather disparaging comments on ignoring empirical facts in continental philosophy and Žižek’s pointing to the ideological nature of such reductive empirical strategy and its downplaying of the theoretical work indispensable of conceptualizing such ideological frameworks. See (Chomsky 2013) and (Žižek 2013).
we have already accepted although failed to follow. The conceptual intervention of the philosopher shows our knowledge to be sustained by illusions to be dissolved, but shows these precisely from the standpoint which first allows us to come into grips with what we believe retrospectively, from the point that has been enacted by the conceptual intervention itself. Therefore, it is not by means of direct normative imposition itself, or direct argumentative correcting of the inconsistency of our conceptions that the philosopher makes us confront the truth of the situation. The change in the concepts of the debate makes us face the consistency of our knowledge based on an indispensable illusion which makes our own demand appear a part of the illusion itself. To see the situation from this point means to stumble upon the philosophical stance which gives us as a result what can be understood only as a philosophical challenge which drags us not inside but outside the situation, to the point which is enacted as universal, even without support of philosophical articulation.

The conceptual shift therefore represents a shift from the epistemological framing of the problem to its ontology, to ontology of understanding, and as such reminds us of its historical philosophical exemplification in Kant-Hegel shift, which Žižek considers to constitute the philosophy proper. It represents a shift from knowledge of reality to the reality of our knowledge (Kant), or as would be accurately Hegelian, knowledge in reality, as the part of reality and therefore its own ontological inconsistency. We thus move from epistemological inconsistency or factual inaccuracy of our beliefs to the inconsistency of the missed opportunity of the philosophical questioning, which not only changes the view we understand our role, but also the status of understanding from epistemological to ontological, that is to an ontology of its failure. It is therefore not enough to admit the fact of the failure of “my” understanding, but to admit the failure of the ontological “facticity” of understanding, understanding failing to cope with itself as an ontological issue, as a part of reality, condition of possibility of acting – to show understanding in its productive mode. The shift from epistemology to ontology thus appears only if we assume that understanding as performative of the knowledge of reality we have. It fails precisely as this “performative” because it does not account for the ontology of the impossible it excludes as its own ontological condition of possibility, fails
to recognize it as its own condition of impossibility and as such the condition of the possibility of the ontological stance proper, which contains the exclusion of the impossible under the guise of its epistemological restriction which is said the only to be respected as properly philosophical one.

From this point it seems that the authentic philosophical position restricts us to reveal the hidden presuppositions we share, while the commonsensical criticism reminds us that such philosophical engagement is always already entangled into the same presuppositions and therefore cannot substantially render an explicit conceptual encounter with reality as such. However, what such commonsensical criticism posits as normative erasure of all philosophical attempts, is misrecognized by the philosophically authentic stance, which is restricted to revealing the presuppositions, as the step which philosophy has already enacted to accomplish the task of such restricted revelation: to reveal presuppositions, one has to posit them, that is, it must not only render ontical ontologically, but assume the non-mediated onticity of the ontologically posited.

The authentic thus lies in the fact that we authentically deserve philosophy to confirm the falsity as merely epistemological – we perceive it not as a confirmation of our views but as a confirmation that there is no such view as to move us into a position of ontological agents. Philosophy is in fact usually asked to engage to warning us against the change, to protecting us from the change and to supporting the protection by kind of explanatory reasoned negotiation, through which the philosopher is obliged to legitimize his position to prolong his patronizing advisorship till one finds it no longer necessary, till one gets the full satisfaction in “not having escaped the problem” precisely by entering into public debate which represents his attitudinal engagement and is believed to become a legitimization of his activist pursuance of particular normative proposals.

Žižek’s account of the changing of the concepts of debate shows that the shift from epistemological to ontological is not just a shift of the thematic domain, or a shift to a more basic, and therefore ontological questions or the meaning itself we have been conformed to. It rather shows that the concepts being changed make us fail at the more fundamental level – faces us with our fundamentally authentic conformist position of negotiating, tempting the philosopher to prove I am finally
right, or to level philosophy to a common view which “I have always already had anyway”. If we take notice of Žižek’s examples, we can see that the line does not divide the authentically philosophical from the commonsensical, and therefore, has no intention to prove neither philosophy an authentic reflection of the commonsensical presupposition nor have a common sense to prove the philosophical naivety residing in its proverbially philosophical inability to confront the facts. It is rather the idea of the inscription of the commonsensical into philosophical itself than the philosophical inscription into commonsensical that makes the difference in rendering the “philosophical debate” from a shifted perspective. Žižek’s examples focus on the philosophers’ thought to be identified according to beliefs the philosophers share and leave intact as precisely commonsensically shared from their own philosophical point of view and therefore nevertheless still move within confines of the alternatives they believe to be challenged to answer, alternatives they however share as the factual issues of the day. From his perspective they do not as much display their public responsibility and responsiveness, their honorable up-to-date public engagement, as they signify the limits of their concept of philosophy, of their engagement in philosophy, the absence of radicality of assuming their philosophical duty to enable the encounter with radical choice, that is, choice of the failure of the debate enhanced precisely philosophically.

Ontology of Historical Misunderstanding

The failure of understanding as demonstrated is a core figure of even another, historically “refined” version of Žižek’s account of the history of philosophy he pronounced in one of his interviews: “Philosophy is something which began with Kant and ended with Hegel (laughs). Before, there were very interesting things, like Plato, which announced it. Afterwards, it’s all one big misunderstanding. As a leftist I say this, Marx obviously didn’t understand Hegel and so on and so on” (Hauser – Žižek 2007, 2 – 3). For Žižek the shift from Kant to Hegel represents a paradigm of the philosophy proper, that is the Hegel’s speculative appropriation of understanding as it is represented within confines of Kantian account of the finitude of subjectivity. From this point Žižek interprets Kant as the
philosopher of finitude finally appropriated by Heidegger’s existential analytics of the Dasein, which he basically developed into a “historicized transcendentalism” (Ţiţek 2012, 890), while Hegel simply represents the step which has been thoroughly misunderstood after in the “post-metaphysical thought”. Ţiţek therefore perceives Hegel as the “vanishing mediator” between the traditional metaphysics and the post-metaphysical thought. Hegel thus represents the philosopher who made the account of (Kantian) understanding proper and precisely by doing this was doomed to be misunderstood after.

This time, Heidegger is apparently not on the list while from the new point of ordering, the one concerned with the positive meaning of understanding, the list is centered on the point of the Kant-Hegel shift Ţiţek identifies as crucial for understanding the “big misunderstanding” itself. Now, there is no need to account for the apex of its displacement but rather for its constitutive failure which is constitutive of the ontology conceived as understanding. We could say Heidegger stands in the list hidden in one of the following “so on-s”, which means, that from this point of view Heidegger’s attempt to overcome the limits, or being able to properly assume the end of metaphysic as a task, is itself a heir of the unresolved ambiguity of the shift which for Ţiţek contains the philosophy itself. We might expect then, that Ţiţek’s central position of the shift offers an ontological “Auseinandersetzung” with Heidegger’s final, not only ironical, position of a certain climax of misunderstanding. Would it appear to reside in Heidegger’s concept of ontology which appears “final” the moment we decide to consider ontology to overlap with understanding?

Ţiţek’s positive account of understanding is the anti-thesis which creates the position wherefrom understanding itself may become accessible by releasing it from the epistemological constraint to its ontology, that is, ontology of the failed understanding. In his *Less than nothing*, in the chapter named *In Praise of Understanding* he gives an account of Hegel’s praise of understanding as the “power of the Absolute” and at the same time as the exemplary theme for correcting interpretations of the step “beyond” Kant or of the step “back” to pre-Kantian metaphysics, both representing the alternatives philosophy has performed after. Therefore, the idea of the history of philosophy itself is articulated around the shift concerning understanding, that is, the shift we have
considered as “ontological”, and eventually represents a shift in understanding of the ontology itself, now considered “speculative”. The interpretation of the shift therefore contains the resolution about the difference of the possible ways of attaching ontology to understanding:

“There are thus two main versions of this passage: (1) Kant asserts the gap of finitude, transcendental schematism, the negative access to the Noumenal (via the Sublime) as the only one possible, and so forth, while Hegel’s absolute idealism closes the Kantian gap and returns to pre-critical metaphysics. (2) It is Kant who goes only half-way in his destruction of metaphysics, still maintaining the reference to the Thing-in-itself as an external inaccessible entity, and Hegel is merely a radicalized Kant, who moves from our negative access to the Absolute to the Absolute itself as negativity” (Ţiţek 2012, 266 – 267).

Simply put, the first alternative is the one of Hegel misunderstanding Kant while the other Hegel understanding Kant better than Kant himself. Ţiţek clearly opts for the second possibility although he mentions both interpretations in order to comment on their confusion when being translated into the terms of epistemological – ontological shift:

“Or, to put it in terms of the Hegelian shift from epistemological obstacle to positive ontological condition (our incomplete knowledge of the thing becomes a positive feature of the thing which is in itself incomplete, inconsistent): it is not that Hegel ‘ontologizes’ Kant; on the contrary, it is Kant who, insofar as he conceives the gap as merely epistemological, continues to presuppose a fully constituted noumenal realm existing out there, and it is Hegel who ‘deontologizes’ Kant, introducing a gap into the very texture of reality” (Ţiţek 2012, 267).

Ţiţek basically says, that if we understand ontology the way the positive pre-critical metaphysic does, as a thorough account of the ordered whole of the existent beings, we will not understand what it means to turn “an epistemological obstacle to positive ontological condition”. What he calls an “epistemological obstacle” is here precisely an obstacle to build ontology in the classical vein and epistemologically restricting the access to noumenal realm. The problem is that the classical ontology is restricted
precisely (only) epistemologically, which is why Kant still even though epistemologically negatively clings to idea of the fully-constituted although inaccessible reality. It follows, that Hegel’s ontological shift, shift to ontology of understanding proceeds precisely by “de-ontologization”, which means, by releasing even the negative (negatively accessible) presence of the noumenal (conditioned epistemologically) and taking a completely different stance of affirmation of the Kantian division itself to become the focus of our view. What does this “de-ontologization” mean? What “de-ontologized” ontology we come to, if we follow Žižek’s figure of “introducing a gap” into the reality, of introducing reality itself as inconsistent due to this gap? Perhaps it becomes more obvious due to its re-connection to the concept of understanding again.

Apparently, ontology to be de-ontologized is the classical ontology (as well as the ontology of understanding of Kantian critical philosophy, ontology pertaining to understanding as merely an epistemological issue), which means, the ontology that provides understanding the unity and structure of the world in its principles. The critical stance represented by Kant in fact keeps to this in a negative mode – there is the fully-constituted world but we only understand that the idea of the full constitution is antinomical unless we are no table to decide even the difference between this being a presupposition posited by the short-circuited reason and the fact of things existing out there although inaccessible to reason, always accompanying our synthetic activity of reason. So the confusion of the phenomenal and noumenal manifests itself as antinomical, and antinomies are basically the form of appearance of inability to make an account of the unsurpassable, incommensurable division of the objects of understanding and Things-in-themselves. It is nevertheless the theme of understanding, the problem of its status, which shows that Kant’s ontology is still classical although his concept of understanding does not provide access to the ontology but nevertheless sustains it in its simple negative refusal, in making it numb.

“This is the feature that Kant shares with pre-critical metaphysics: both positions remain in the domain of Understanding and its fixed determinations, and Kant’s critique of metaphysics spells out the final result of metaphysics: as long as we move in the domain of Understanding, Things-in-themselves are out of reach, our knowledge
The domain of Understanding is what pre-critical and critical ontology share. It seems however that it was Hegel’s task to infer conclusions of the critical-ontology in regard of Understanding itself. Therefore Žižek keeps to idea that Hegel simply gave understanding its proper place within the critical stance and did not attempt to go “beyond”, which also means he had not relied himself on any even more fundamental level which could be called ontological in the pre-critical manner. His move is precisely that of not missing, not mis-understanding what has been gained by Kant, or his mis-understanding of the Kant’s move beyond the restriction he himself imposed on understanding proper. The move beyond Hegel’s “deontologization” would therefore pertain to the pre-critical sense of ontology, which in Kant is discovered to fail to cover the domain of understanding proper and is thus reserved for the noumenal realm as the negative notion of all that is inaccesible to understanding. For Hegel, to gain access to the understanding itself, he has to “deontologize” it, to understand it positively as far as it has become obvious that Kant’s “positive” thematic approach to understanding itself has character of the critique, that means, it delineates what pertains to understanding from the point of its impossibility. The noumenal, the realm of ontologically positive, must therefore be identified not only as the unknown but ontologically as principally unknowable. Therefore, we could infer that the role the noumenal methodologically plays in Kant’s critique is no way just a residual thing we do not know, but is identified by Kant himself as the thing-in-itself, nevertheless only to be treated as merely a residue of understanding (the *noumenon* characterized by Kant as a negative notion). The problem is, how to treat understanding from the point of the ontology of the Thing-in-itself, however, ontology no longer sustained by understanding which treats ontology only residually as the remainder that causes troubles to insufficiently critical reason and as a rule results in the misapplication of the categories of understanding?

The idea of limiting the phenomenal, of understanding having nothing to do with things-in-themselves but their appearance, simply proposes the noumenal as the limitation of the phenomenal. The point is, understanding as the criterion sustains what it considers a neccessary illusion of the old ontology (Žižek 2012, 279 – 281), although it has imposed the idea of
proper self-restriction on itself. Therefore, to understand noumena we have to think about the presupposition of the phenomenal which is constitutive of our idea of the noumenal, the reality in itself:

“In other words, we should never forget that what we know (as phenomena) is not separated from things-in-themselves by a dividing line, but is constitutive of them: phenomena do not form a special ontological domain, they are simply part of reality” (Ţiţek 2012, 283).

The idea of “inserting a gap” in reality itself therefore depends on “de-ontologizing” the role of understanding in order to introduce understanding as an ontological constituent of the reality itself. However, it is constitutive of the real precisely as the gap within reality, a gap which in its thorough negativity eventually represents the “wholeness” itself. There is no gap between two ontological domains, the so called things-in-themselves are only a constitutive illusion of the phenomenal as mere appearances. Problem is that neither are appearances mere appearances nor noumena ontologically independent self-sufficient things. Therefore the idea of fully ontological but nevertheless unknown still deserves to be reminded that the fully constituted is constituted by this unknown as an inevitable part to complete as well as irrefutably keep its “fullness” open, never to fully overlap with itself. The idea of the fully constituted although “unknowable” rests on the presupposition of the division which inserts understanding into reality but precisely as the part which divides what it pertains to as much as itself from its own divisive pertaining to reality. It is this division from the division between understanding and reality that is at play anytime we attempt to follow the fundamental divisions at all. Therefore reality itself does not only arise due to the action of divisive understanding, but as a result, it appears as that which to be conceived as reality must contain the dividing force, which is what we call understanding, rather than understanding conceived as a capture of the primordial, pre-reflective unity “out there”. Understanding therefore appears as de-ontologized, because it is free from the role of that, which fails to grasp the real. At the same time, this freeing itself “ontologizes” understanding as the gap itself, which precisely can never (ontologically) stand on its own, but gains its ontological reality in being the negative rupture itself as always already contained within something, which can
present itself ontologically positive only due to its containment of this irreplaceable negativity. So, to have reality, we have it as incomplete, precisely because the incompleteness itself is its part. To de-ontologize Kant’s ontology nevertheless does not mean to return to any epistemologically independent stance proper, but it means inserting the gap into reality which means, asserting the ontology of the incompleteness itself. It follows that understanding as a part of things-in-themselves is precisely not viewed from the neutral standpoint outside of both (subject and reality), but as being a part of reality, the part which containing the necessary illusion at the same time enacts a gap towards the reality itself as well as to its illusion, and therefore can and must in fact deal with these differences whenever it reflects on itself. From this point of self-reflecting negativity it can “understand”, therefore: speculatively render reality as incomplete and its own understanding as the gap. It means rendering the negative positively as subject and the reality as incomplete due to its own presence there, being itself the gap and constitutively (productively) inscribing the gap into what it thematically confronts with. Žižek sees this as Hegelian step of dialectical appropriation of the problem of understanding and at the same time as Hegel’s answer to the idea of Understanding as the Absolute force which like Spirit itself has the power to “tear things apart”.

The Absolute Power of Understanding

Žižek referring to Hegel’s Foreword to Phenomenology of Spirit refers to Hegel’s rendition of the concept of understanding which always already is an analysis, the act of separating elements which no longer keep the form of the idea to be “understood”. So, it means understanding the concrete, the “concrete itself”, which can be said to divide itself, to “move by itself”. The philosophical does not in fact lie in a special level of “philosophical analysis” but rather at the level of focusing on understanding itself, which no longer acts from the point outside reality, but in fact works as the power of negativity, by separation letting the elements gain their own reality. Therefore with concern for what has been remarked about Žižek’s treatment of the debate challenging philosophy, we could quote at full what from the point of the focus of this text seems
to be the apex of the useful necessary minimum:

“Understanding is not too abstract or violent, it is, on the contrary, as Hegel remarked of Kant, too soft towards things, too afraid to locate its violent movement of tearing things apart in the things themselves. In a way, it is epistemology versus ontology: the illusion of Understanding is that its own analytical power, the power to make ‘an accident as such ... obtain an existence all its own, gain freedom and independence on its own account’ – is only an ‘abstraction’: something external to ‘true reality’ which persists out there intact in its inaccessible wholeness. In other words, it is the standard critical view of Understanding and its power of abstraction (that it is just an impotent intellectual exercise which misses the wealth of reality) which contains the core illusion of Understanding. To put it in yet another way, the mistake of Understanding is to perceive its own negative activity (of separating, tearing things apart) only in its negative aspect, ignoring its ‘positive’ (productive) aspect – Reason is Understanding itself in its productive aspect!” (Ţiţek 2012, 277)

This minimal analytical potency of understanding indicates reason why it not always already conforms to the ontological background of the historically, commonsensically shared constellation, disclosure of being (Heidegger), but also a feature of already cutting out which rendered positively is to be conceived as “productive”. Ţiţek chooses the word to denote what Hegel directly states even more surprisingly: „Aber ein wesentliches Moment ist dies Geschiedene, Unwirkliche selbst; denn nur darum, daß das Konkrete sich scheidet und zum Unwirklichen macht, ist es das sich Bewegende” (Hegel 1970, 35 – 36). Not only is understanding a performance of the “tearing things apart” but the “essential” seems to be the “separated itself”, which stands as unreal and precisely as unreal it becomes self-moving by the very act of separation of the concrete. Thanks to its, “illegitimate” separation performed by understanding the accidental becomes “separated” and therefore can appear and be captured at its own being, which appears as no longer mediated by understanding from the outside, but it itself is the mediation, the subject (Hegel 1970, 36). To discover understanding in itself, one stumbles upon features which are no longer correlative to the Kantian transcendental scheme. Understanding
proper must be torn out of the automatic immediacy in order to perceive this immediacy as a product, that is, it perceives itself on its own as subject substantially, as the mediation, the negativity itself. The understand understanding means to discover it as mediation by separation which no longer pertains to the mediating self-transparency of reality which would be automatically expected to provide us with the knowable part of reality. Understanding is therefore “inserted” into reality not only as its merely subjective mediation but also as the mediating principle which makes it move, a principle of its life.

Understanding could be therefore understood as an “unhistorical spontaneous ideology of everyday life” which Žižek ascribes to Frederick Jameson’s interpretations:

“Jameson seems to imply that there are two modes of ideology, a historical one (forms linked to specific historical conditions which disappear when these conditions are abolished, like traditional patriarchy) and an a priori transcendental one (a kind of spontaneous tendency to identitarian thinking, to reification, etc., which is co-substantial with language as such, and which, for this reason, can be assimilated to the illusion of the big Other as the ‘subject supposed to know’)” (Žižek 2012, 269 – 270).

Jameson’s line of division therefore follows historical/unhistorical division which makes understanding spontaneously identitarian and show reason as the historical correction making these identities fluid and “apt” to historical correction. Žižek however demonstrates that Jameson loses the line with Hegelian procedure. The problem is that understanding is never simply automatically unhistorical and identitarian, it only can be rendered this way, unless we do not recognize that the everyday automatic naive ontology we automatically share, itself changes. There are different commonsensical backgrounds and at the same time the historical reason posits not only new presuppositions of the new world, but also its own version of the old, which does not overlap with any eternal background, which would resist the historical impositions of the new (Žižek 2012, 272 – 273).
Heidegger Again. Where does He Stand Now?

What is the difference between the positions assigned to Heidegger in Žižek’s brief accounts of philosophical historicity? Once viewed from the point of universalized inter-philosophical misunderstanding, Heidegger represents its most prominent case. In case of history of philosophy rendered with respect to the occurrence of the philosophical event proper (philosophy from Kant to Hegel), Heidegger plays an anonymous role of one of the post-philosophical misunderstandings inscribed into every philosophy which comes after Hegel and does not decide to repeat him. It is notable that Heidegger’s position becomes conspicuous once we adopt the view concerning the role of mis-/understanding in the philosophy while it disappears when we confront Žižek’s idea of philosophy proper. Although this time representing just one of the misconceptions of Hegelian legacy, Heidegger’s account of the key issue of the Kant-Hegelian shift is an outstanding one. Without pursuing Heidegger’s interpretations of Hegel we should notice that Žižek does not drive as much at the extensity of Heidegger’s misunderstanding other philosophers as on its intensity. Heidegger seems to exemplify a standard misunderstanding of Hegel but, nevertheless, misunderstanding which deliberately attempted to misunderstand any of the philosophers he appealed to within the frame of Heidegger’s reference to an “ontological” understanding, that is, to the point of philosophers having missed the question of being itself. The criterion comes to the fore once the philosophy qua metaphysics is finally said to end (gather in its end), which although historically spotted as the question to be confronted by philosophy must respond to the fact of understanding having always seemed to be succumbed to the “ontological”. So is Heidegger not just another version of Jameson’s misconception of the Hegelian concept of understanding?

Hegel for Heidegger was the last of Greeks, Heidegger seen by Žižek from the point of Hegel rather the one who radicalized transcendental subjectivist finitude of Kant into what Žižek calls “historicized transcendentalism”. Once we adopt and focus on this Heidegger example, we can notice that one of his positions cannot be simply read as the opposition of the a-historical to historical (Jameson). They rather rely on different concepts of historicity – one on event which is central to
distinguishing “before” and “after”, the anticipating and miscomprehending views of philosophy. The other culminates in Heidegger’s principally posited misunderstanding. They propose different connection of the historical and un-historical – one placing precisely the philosophical as an example of an event that can be only repeated by actualizing the potentiality which has not been realized, opening the past of what Žižek calls “lost causes”. The other, however, is itself rather Heideggerian, outlining the history of philosophy along the lines of having always already misunderstood the fundamental question of philosophy, which is nothing but the positive expression of repeating the misunderstanding itself, the failure in its final “gathering” which Heidegger declares to mark our presence.

It seems that Žižek’s objection toward Jameson’s idea of the historical vs. eternally commonsensical being cannot be applied to Heidegger. Heidegger’s account of historicity is one of the themes Žižek dedicates one of his last chapters of his Less than Nothing in order to show that Heidegger’s late thinking represents the very idea of historicizing what Heidegger analytically called “everyday understanding”. Žižek therefore refers to such historization as to a deadlock which appears once we try to “go beyond” metaphysical thinking, although we are definitely committed to it: the unresolved deadlock of the dwelling in the end of metaphysics without a chance of confronting the failure of the desire to overcome metaphysics, “to endorse the containment itself”. Žižek considers Heidegger’s Gelassenheit is only a half-way position which fails to enact the failure of the concept of a technologically ruled world. Gelassenheit therefore appears as a gesture which results from the unresolved “immanent failure or inconsistency” of Heidegger’s thought (Žižek 2012, 882). The unresolved deadlock resorts in the problem Heidegger occupied himself in thirties, the problem of will and non-willing. Žižek shows that precisely at this point, the problem of will displays its double positioning, as the individual-historical existential willing to be deconstructed to confront oneself with the withdrawal of being in Ereignis. However, such radically historicized non-willing always already stumbles upon the persistence of “Ur-willing”, kind of “stuckness”, which “derails the natural flow” (Žižek 2012, 884). Gelassenheit therefore appears as a way to avoid this presupposition, to cover it and to arrange oneself at “safe distance” towards what there is. Žižek therefore repeats his well-known
figure of “inserting a gap” not between Heidegger himself and his thought, but inside this thought itself “to demonstrate how the space for the Nazi engagement was opened up by an immanent failure or inconsistence of his thought” (Ţiţek 2012, 882), that his Nazi commitment was the question “of an inherent theoretical deadlock (which in itself has nothing to do with Nazism), and the violent passage as the only way of escaping it” (Ţiţek 2008, 153).

Alain Badiou says Heidegger has become a common sense and it seems he has become a philosophical “must do” – what escapes us is that Heidegger does not promote ethical ideas purely because believes they are precisely ontological ones – not that they should be derived from the ontology itself. So his grip of the ethical (Plato’s agathon interpreted ontologically) is showing that ethical is basically a certain type of reduction of ontological rather than its extension. Heidegger, however, can serve even as a subtle background for more or less variable philosophical “interests”, a position which in a liberal way points to particular problems of the present day in order to promote certain message which, however, relies on “kind of Heideggerian”, even though rather non-political, ontology in the background. However, the problem is that Heidegger is not treated the way he treated his “philosophers worthy of reading” or rather worthy of “repeating”. In his In Defence of Lost Causes Ţiţek points out that to repeat Heidegger means something else than to subject his thought to “immanent criticism”, which in Heidegger’s case would be not be enough. Even avowed Heideggerians or orthodox interpreters do not meet the idea of repeating Heidegger, not primarily because of the lack of accepting any “external” position to be derived or proven right from the point of their reading Heidegger or because not willing to succumb to the idea of searching for inconsistencies in his thought, but mainly because they rely too much on the persistence (if not merely a resistance) of the thought, that is, on the ontological relevance, which is generally accepted as Heideggerian instruction for preserving the idea of difference, the space of soliciting the philosophical meaning per se. However, the persistence of the ontological itself is simply indifferent to the fact that it repeats the commonsensical everyday immersion into the indifference towards the ontological, which itself relies on the background of the discourse about meaning, no matter whether of a religious, spiritualist, naturalist, scientific kind. Doing this it sustains the everyday
practice of lives which indeed must have their share of “philosophical” attitudes as well as commonsensical cynicism which proves their everyday practice even ironically as “philosophically” self-sufficient. What both lack is the total derailment of the reliance on the ontological as the agency, which in a way persists to rely on the presence of meaning, which does not have to be revealed to be shared, no matter whether as a claim or a fact. The ontological is thus shared inauthentically as the proper background on condition that it remains concealed the way it is and due to that preserves its “redeeming” status (Heidegger’s proverbial quote from Hölderlin: “Wo aber das Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende aus.”).

There lies the Badiouan thesis that the commonsensical today is Heideggerian (Badiou 1999, 47), irrespective of any of Heidegger’s claims, last but not least of a Gelassenheit having turned into a “fact”, precisely when it has been ignored as an ontological claim. Therefore, the claim towards ontology, the ontological analytic that is expected to perform the shift in the position we share beyond the decision about the difference between facts and claims. In this respect the dubitation about Žižek’s misperception of the facts (Is philosophy really called to the debate or not?) is a false one as much as would be the appeal to true, authentic philosophy against the inauthentic one. Philosophy is really called to debate, however, it is called as something which can eventually appear itself in its difference to what it can contrive to become, despite and in contrast with the standards at first unacknowledged by the audience. It is generally expected as the background philosophical discourse, is supposed to publicly prove that our background beliefs are just realist enough to go as far as ontology itself, that is, sufficiently realistic to cover the ontology by the realistic commonsense. The fact is, the public claim is put on philosophy, in order just to confirm there still is the claim to be put and to be reassuringly repeated.

Žižek therefore repeats Heidegger without himself being a Heideggerian, although he is not Heideggerian precisely in a non-Heideggerian manner, which, in fact, is the one that happened to change the concepts moving in between the authentic Heideggerian and the inauthentic, identified as also Heideggerian. Heidegger can be repeated precisely due to separating the Heideggrianism itself as the authentic mode of the inauthentic ontology. It does not mean to separate the inauthentic in order to preserve the original purity of Heidegger’s
intentions, or the unrecognized reserves of his texts, but to see it precisely not in cultural, scientific, poetic or epistemological but, again, and paradoxically the hardest to meet, ontological measures.\(^3\) These were the measures Heidegger attempted to meet and promoted to be met by anyone having understood the idea of philosophy. However, the matter with understanding philosophy is not ontological when being left on its own, preserving the ground open exclusively to philosophical insights, but when performing the cut into the ontological to make it reappear as the case of a failed understanding. Only the failed understanding can no longer be attached to the ontological form which cannot be understood, but performed. Žižek’s performance therefore enacts the imposition of the standard, not of truth or reality, but standard of ontology, which to appear as a standard in a non-Heideggerian way must exemplify one exemplary failure of not committing to the separation of being and understanding, which can, however, be done, once the Parmenidean idea has been brought to its own meaning by Heideggerian repetition of the beginning of philosophy. Žižek is not Heideggerian in a non-Heideggerian way, as far as, despite Heidegger’s political case, it is precisely Heidegger’s ontology which he turns to become “the case”. However, he is not prone to avoid the political but, on the contrary initiates the stance, which allows identifying the meaning of Heidegger’s politics from the failure of his ontology, that is, the failure of the claim to ontology.

Heidegger for this reason, that is, for the sake of ontology itself, appears as the prominent case—as the exemplary failure, because it is the ontological failure of the present day. In this manner Heidegger is made to enact the failure of the disapproving reactions as well as indifferent ones his thought itself, as the sole example of their ontological indifference. Heidegger made himself the example of the deadlock of the understanding

\(^3\) In his posthumously published work E. Bondy has made a remark about Heidegger’s Dasein and the Fourfold as conceptions to be considered within Bondy’s transhumanist discourse as ontological articulations of once perhaps “the future ones” to transcend the “all too human” by technological advancement. Interestingly, Bondy unlike most of Heidegger interpreters, does not automatically delve into a purely “poetic” reading of the late Heidegger’s Fourfold, which perhaps makes him an example of rare understanding which prevents Heidegger’s articulation from its perhaps all too early ontological marginalization into “poetic” thinking in its contemporaly reception (Bondy 2013, 53 – 54).
that was revealed as pertaining to being, which although it has been articulated along the lines of disclosure and hiddenness, could not figure out the division, the separation or gap which occurs when understanding seems to be always already opened as the milieu to be discovered by overcoming false (subjective-objective) gaps. Such ontological role of understanding however cannot fully accomplish the ontological meaning of the indifference towards understanding itself, as far as it precisely can never ontologically render that which gets separated by its indifference towards something it has not the slightest idea about, or even no reason to figure it out. This happens mainly in cases we stubbornly refuse to confront the indifference when accepting it, and accept it when confronting it.

**Dialectics of the Debate?**

Žižek identifying Heidegger as the most pertinent philosopher of understanding, reveals Heidegger’s reliance on Kantian solution, and his ordinary misconception of the Hegelian one as. Without risking violent or too eccentric transpositions, we could say that the Kant-Hegel shift serves as a model of the philosophical intervention into a debate to interrupt the expectation of understanding ourselves about matters of a common interest or emergency (Heidegger’s reading of Aristotelian *phronesis*) an unable to allow the performative identification of not only the core, but also the transformative, shifting issue, which never appears as epistemological, but points to the ontologically excluded. It means, that it is not the issue itself, but the very standards of the ontological which are at stake.

“In case of Understanding and Reason, the whole problem has been exemplified in terms that might serve us quite well: Everything turns on how we are to understand this identity-and-difference between Understanding and Reason: it is not that Reason adds something to the separating power of Understanding, reestablishing (at some ‘higher level’) the organic unity of what Understanding has sundered, supplementing analysis with synthesis; Reason is, in a way, not more but less than Understanding, it is – to put it in the well-known terms of
Hegel’s opposition between what one wants to say and what one actually says – what Understanding, in its activity, really does, in contrast to what it wants or means to do” (Ţiţek 2012, 276).

To enact this “less” does not mean to fulfil our intentions, or any other way of life to be negotiated, „reasoned” by philosopher, as we could expect according to the rather usual use of the word. Ţiţek has shown that understanding can be seen precisely as the activity, in its performativity as reason, which means, that it can be affirmed precisely as the separating, disjunctive force. The separation itself is not only a simple negation, while being active, it never covers with the act itself. Hegelian proverbial: “Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen” (Hegel 1970, 24) separates the “development”, which is to be seen precisely on its own as the whole of the development and the development itself as nothing but the ontological standard of the wholeness. In fact, it means not only the failure of the idea of the ontology of the whole separated from its development, but the failure of the idea of “the whole” development, which now consists of the repetition of its failure to spontaneously accomplish itself as the whole, and contains this impossibility as its part, as the transformative issue to be encountered no other way than ontologically. With respect to the debate, a repetition of the failure of the debate itself has to be enacted by the active understanding, conceived now as “reason”.

This precisely is not the model of passing to another position, of adapting to one’s opinion. On a different place Ţiţek again, in order to exemplify the idea of self-relating negation, negation of the negation, the process of reason itself, quite colloquially reminds us: “There is always the opportunity that the flow of the debate will get stucked, not even due to lack of understanding, but precisely due to ones sticking to one’s position” (Ţiţek 2012, 294). The standard criticism of the philosophical debate imagined as a pure diffusive flow moving away all determinations or the stubborn persistence on one’s own. Neither is the rule to prove an inconsistency of such position:

“‘OK, I am inconsistent with myself; but so what? I prefer to stay where I am ...’ The mistake of this criticism is that it misses the point: far from being a threatening abnormality, an exception to the ‘normal’
dialectical movement, this – the refusal of a moment to become caught in a movement, its sticking to its particular identity-is precisely what happens as a rule. A moment turns into its opposite precisely by way of sticking to what it is, by refusing to recognize its truth in its opposite” (Ţiţek 2012, 294).

The change of the concepts thus confronts us with our “stuckness”, which is not to be “derailed”, but supported in order to enact the loss itself, that is, not only the loss of one’s position, but the loss of the relevance of the opposition for that what has been excluded. The identification of the excluded, however, does not happen due to expert knowledge of inaccessible or expert facts, but by separating the enunciated from the enunciation, which means, that philosophy has become the refusal to recognize its truth in the opposite and therefore to separate it from what it really does.

The failure of understanding is thus precisely an indispensable condition of making an account of and getting rid of the idea of exchange of attitudes, opinions, even of expecting minimum of the basic orientation in the problem. More than that, philosophy plays the role of dropping the illusion by means of conceptual change which delivers my concept of understanding, my attitude to its demand and my reliance on its legitimacy as illegitimate. The legitimacy of the philosopher to intervene is not the one of the all-informed, factually saturated approach coloured by a proverbial spec of wisdom and detachment from socio-political reality. In fact, the intervention itself shows that it has been us who meet the description of what we expected to be precisely philosophical attitude. The picture we had about our non-philosophical real problems and even about our modest asking philosophers for the advisory attunement to our opinions, or critical examinations of our views, is shattered the moment we discover that the idea of realistic moderate people willing to be rational are facing precisely themselves as the only proper exemplifications of those “wisely” detached philosophers. The point is a (misperception of) failure of our previous identification, as far as it was philosopher’s task to make it fail in a new division. This then would change the idea of understanding itself, now being confronted with the radical choice between the sustained belief in the role of moderately negotiating understanding or the imposing a concrete negativity. This is
supposed to break the form of our attitudinal acceptation of the mediative function of understanding and face understanding in its real, illegitimate, imposition of the power of the negative (reasoning). A simple change of the concepts makes us unwillingly participate at the edge of our beliefs and no longer discuss the legitimacy of a certain particular understanding. However, such “unrealistic” position of the philosopher has always already been precisely the condition of the failure-engaged individual who embodies universal in making the particular effectively fail.

In this sense, philosophy should be there to make the philosophy fail, to get loose of the philosophy, when it is demanded. Not by finding rational reason, but by the desire for the loss of particular identity as well as enacting the loss of this loss itself (Žižek 2012, 497), which would be felt as an absence to produce the desire for reconstitution of some particular identity.

It leaves one to a particular understanding for the thing to be cut off from the task it displayed, task of sustaining the order even in cases it is asked to deliver a fundamental criticism. This also includes the failure of the communicative function of philosophy, which withdraws once we are subject to philosophical choice. The failure of its communicative function does not prove philosophy a monologic esoteric wisdom. It rather makes understanding to be free for the difference between particular and its loss, enacted by the demand for philosophy itself. To identify the topic in order to let the debate fail effectively, the choice of the failure itself, is to be provided precisely philosophically, not simply by declaring it, but by identifying the shared understanding of the task even between philosophically different standpoints, alternatives. This cannot be done simply reflectively. It can be done by positing the question, concept, which, driven to repeat the act of failure of understanding, is to become the leading force of ontological affirmation of the excluded.

References

The contribution is a partial presentation of the outcomes of the research project VEGA No. 2/0175/12 From Phenomenology to Metaphysics and to Reflection of the Contemporary Crisis of Society and Art which has been pursued at the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra.
THE CITIZEN BY HUSSERL  
AND THE POSTMODERN CITIZENSHIP

Jozef Sivák

There is the political problem in Husserl and his successors that the phenomenologists committed the second generation (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others) should remember. This problem occurs in the last period of Husserl's philosophy in the context of its historical considerations resulting in a cultural phenomenology. But political philosophers like Hobbes, Schopenhauer and others are present and already discussed in his lectures on ethics. Husserl's notion of politics is based on his conception of intersubjectivity. On the other hand, the state is of the order of facticity, that is, a person in the sense of an association (contract) with the individual person is the member functioning as a citizen. The author tries to finally answer the question of what the world cultural man should live by while taking into account the current crisis of citizenship which hides behind the expression “postmodern citizenship”

Keywords: Political Philosophy – German Phenomenology – Intersubjectivity – Citizenship – Postmodernity – E. Husserl

1. Introduction

There are political problems by Husserl and his successors, problems that committed phenomenologists of the second generation as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and more recently J. Patočka should not have not left forgotten. In effect, already in the 20s, in proportion to the progress of crisis in Germany, Husserl had started to look more and more into the history and politics. In the 30s, his interest was manifested by a tour of conferences across Europe, beginning in Vienna¹ and followed by Prague. Even in his

¹ He will speak on the theme “Philosophy and the crisis of European humanity.” The conference will be published under the title “The crisis of European humanity and
lectures on ethics he starts to discuss political philosophers like Hobbes, Schopenhauer and others.

Husserl was blamed for his europocentrism and his ignorance of globalization in the 20th century. It should be noted that his view of Europe is spiritual, transcendental; he himself spoke about the “spirit of Europe”, which is not limited to geographical Europe but it goes beyond the Atlantic (USA, Canada) and the Pacific (Australia and New Zealand) by the way of the then colonized Africa. It moves this way in a phenomenological vein: all objects although incorporated into reality also have a transcendental “meaning”.

Political and social considerations of this “spirit” will also lead to a cultural phenomenology, the last stage of Husserl’s philosophical itinerary.

2. The intersubjective and the constitution of the pure political

Talking about politics and policy, we are in phenomenological terminology, in the intersubjective. Husserl’s notion of politics is based on his conception of intersubjectivity. Although the transition from subjectivity to others requires, according to Husserl, a method known as the intersubjective reduction, the founder of phenomenology understood that subjectivity is already intersubjectivity, thanks to its (reflexive) capacity to refer to itself. But an intersubjective community is something else: it is unified by intersubjectivity in the sense of spiritual unity comprising all the subjects, a “subjective universe” including the surrounding world and finally being of the world. This community is open indefinitely and its social form is an “open indeterminate multiplicity”.

Even if we talk about the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, in the strict sense, it is a part of the phenomenology of sociality. The fact remains, however, that the phenomenology of society as a social philosophy” in the “Krisis” and is considered as the “manifesto” of Husserl. He established there a link between the crises of a society plunged into irrationalism, absurdity and that of sciences which although successful in the mastery of nature, fell into positivism in its extreme form what’s known as scientism. The scientism transforms man into a positivist man for whom a fact is a fetish asking about the origin of this fact. It is in the endless task of reason and the unifying sense of history that Husserl sees the outcome of this situation.
philosophy is possible thanks to the intersubjectivity based on “organic corporeality” (Leiblichkeit). Because of bodies, such expressions of the spirit, are porters of meaning, which makes the social life as life of a community possible.

The intentionality, the fundamental trait of subjectivity, is also transmitted to the community and is realized in the socialities in varying degrees. Not every community relationship is social, e.g., in “symbiotic communities” (parent-child, family), the social acts are absent. The constitution of sociality is based on the being of the person, who supposes personal acts such willing, evaluating, etc., which are addressed to other man. Only when they receive the form of a communication one can speak about sociality. At the same time, it is a formed “communicative community” (Mitteilungsgemeinchaft) based on spoken genres (question-answer, address, etc…). The intersubjectivity thus exceeds into a social bond, the basic form of which is being one-with-the-other (Miteinander), in a word, being together. The manifestation of the individual will must vent into a common will, the will of the community. The will as vital interest of the individual is accomplished in a community. Any community or union has its historical character, its traditionality and its culture which objectifies in its performances. Another social phenomenon: the usual customs, standards of conduct. The performers of these manners are the people.

What constitutes as the unity of a people or a nation is an awareness of belonging to this nation. But the opportunity to say “we” is not enough to constitute sustainable units. Only units composed of communitarian persons can make an object of science, of knowledge of the community on itself. Correlatively, a sustainable and specific unit is formed around a common goal.

Community persons or socialities are divided into socialities of coordination and those of subordination. The first is based on cooperation and partnership, such as commercial companies, companies of construction, economic companies (artisans and its customers), associations, etc. One is a communitarian person on the basis of a community memory, namely a historical tradition. Time is the form of the genesis of a community, more precisely “the immanent intersubjective time of coexistence according to subjective temporal modes and then, according to the time intervals and identifiable temporal places” (Husserl
1973b, 360). These temporal relations rest in foundation of a “spiritual causality” between monads at all levels (“I-Thou”, “we”). In this intersubjective exchange, thoughts are not in conflict, unlike goals, the achievement of which is related to a project. On the other hand, there is an internationality as something that is not yet specifically a state.²

By contrast, in societies of subordination, it is an order which reigns the order of organization of power.³ In this way it can be administered a village, a religious community, a city (-state). The state is on the side of such companies.⁴ However, the state is independent of determined persons. It has its own personality and at the same time, it is an open society.

If Husserl’s philosophy of the state is less elaborate⁵ than his social philosophy, the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, together with the “intentional sociology” provides concepts and problems which are common in the political philosophy: the socio-political problems of “leadership”, those relations between the condition of “master and servant”. The intersubjectivity resulting in objectivity enables a communitarian constitution of an objective world. The first stage of this objective world represents, according to Husserl, “the world of the fatherland”. Other degrees are superposed on it, depending on temporality or on historicity, and on the other hand the area or terrestrability. These views can be further developed depending on the periodicity or significant events (death of a relative, wars, etc.), on oppositions (near – distant, land – heaven, etc.)⁶

The state is therefore rooted in the social. In this sense, its origin is “natural”, it comes from a “natural tribal community” and it began as a

---

² We know that since the time of Husserl the role of international organizations and even supranational ones acting as subjects of international law has increased considerably, to the extent of competing and even surpassing states. Today, the expression “international community wants this or that” is used to justify various interventions on international level.

³ The inequality of subjects can exist even within a family, e.g., in the relationship “adult-child” where the child enters as “pre-personality” only.

⁴ The analogue of the state, for Husserl, was the society or union (Verein).

⁵ Although Husserl deplored the absence of a “political phenomenology”, he nonetheless left enough outlines for that matter for K. Schuhmann to pull a political philosophy out of it (Schuhmann 1988).

⁶ These oppositions, including that of the country and abroad, are insurmountable while allowing orientation.
“community of people”. As the state is an intersubjective phenomenon of facticity and as such it is part of social ontology. In its essence as the pure political, it is part of the inexact morphological essences, and as such accessible to a phenomenological description. The phenomenologist is only concerned with politics and the state indirectly. That means, he uses the concept of a self-exceeding monad, whose temporal form of (naturalized) consciousness changes into historicity and from the ontical point of view is recognized as the man.

The state is even, according to Husserl, a “hard reality”. It deals with destiny and with historical necessity. Its structure is also historical. The state would not be necessary if an ethical and authentic humanity was present. The state is, however, necessary to prevent the destruction of the teleological movement, e.g. during terrestrial and cosmic catastrophes. The constitution of the state is not a case of spontaneous activity of individuals or groups, but rather it is the state which makes possible these activities. An autonomous monadic body is its substrate. The state is neither an end in itself, nor is it an absolute, even though its role rests in denying: to prevent, to avoid. Husserl, concerning the instruments which the state may have to perform this task, is conservative.

What matters to Husserl, by contrast, is the law as an essential attribute of the state, which can exist in its proper condition only in case it is not an organization of robbers of great style. In addition, Husserl submits the state and the right to a higher ideal of the intermonadic telos of the developed rationality. The denying role of the state is also transmitted to the right as of a prohibited sphere. The legal rules are binding (Zwangsregel) and the penalty is part of the unity of the state.

The total disappearance of the state is possible, but it could only be done by means of the state, state that no longer uses force but

---

7 Moreover, Husserl identifies the people with the “people of state” (Staatsvolk) as a person of a higher degree, of a “community of life of generations” (Lebensgemeinschaft). Nevertheless, the relation between the state and the people is that of indifference. It follows a separation of ethics and politics. It is often confirmed even by a rare successful reconciliation of man of reflection with the man of action occurring in the same individual.

8 This facticity is distinct from the empirical as the contrary of the (eidetic) essential, because it is the basis for the rational.

9 This can be explained by the fact that Husserl considered his work apolitical; not that he wanted to avoid politics, but he wanted to avoid misunderstandings due to politicking.
phenomenological means of reason. The phenomenology is, in fact, called
to change the world because it is able to change the bare facts in eternal
essences. Husserl was aware of the power of ideas and it is appropriate to
speak of a sovereignty of thought, sovereignty that he believed to be
embodied in the German nation (Sivák 2005). In this sense, we understand
its delimitation with respect to the “raison d’être” of the state: “The
transcendental philosophy, a very useless art that does not help to the
masters and rulers of this world, to politicians, engineers and to
industrists” (Husserl 1956, 283).

Husserl does not stop at the dimension of a nation. The world of our
life, which the constitution would lead to, may have a national or
supranational dimension.\textsuperscript{10} It is a paradox that the development of
sciences in the interwar years was contemporary to European crisis and
even to a global crisis Husserl interpreted as a crisis of sense. The truth is
that these sciences elaborated no scientific “medicine” for nations and
national communities. The “supranationality” (Übernationalität) is not
only the highest level of the community but it also has some essential
“style” principle to be applied to the sick Europe.\textsuperscript{11} With the ideal of
“federalism”, European nations could correspond with new relations
inside the community of philosophers and researchers. Philosophizing
finally means co-philosophizing. Husserl’s views of coexistence and
cooperation among nations, scientists, artists, philosophers, may seem too
optimistic or utopian without losing their actuality. For a committed
philosopher that Husserl finally became, it was worthy to be opposed to
fate and pessimism, to the Realpolitik of his time. The constitution itself
as a donation of sense to the world is, however, a “political” act in the
Platonic sense.

But Husserl does not merely repeat the tradition. His notion of reason
does not represent something complete, a pure thought nor a technique,
but a “constant movement of self-clarification” passing from one

\textsuperscript{10} Husserl, unlike Kant, prefers speaking about links between nations than between states,
so he sets limits to cosmopolitanism. We must reach the global community through
communication.

\textsuperscript{11} Husserl could not predict the fate of this notion in the current European integration
where it is still not admitted because it evokes a limited sovereignty and we prefer the
notion of subsidiarity. However, it comes back with the actual European crisis that some
think would be solved by closer integration or federalization.
generation to another. The reign of reason is not a pre-programmed “ideocracy”, but a teleology that transverses all being; its action thus leads individuals as the whole of humanity to a consciousness of itself, to self-responsibility and ultimately to autonomy. It is the coming of “archontic” role of phenomenology and of phenomenologists as “public servants of humanity” starting with “archontic” individual monads to the “phenomenological community” (Husserl 1976, 15; Husserl 1973c, 669). This community would still be above the community of love representing a (non-violent) synthesis of community and state. The result of it would be the “universal humanity” or the “world state”, though not in sense of a superstate but that of unified and self-organized subjectivity.

The supranational community of philosophers has already been called to act in an educative manner and mutually in the direction of a non-philosophical community where philosophy, or other knowledge, will not be foreign to anyone – in accord with the intersubjective experience of the other who is not radically different from me but looks like me. In the reform advocated by Husserl, the largest role should rest with rationalism enabling the elucidation of the concept of society, concept distorted by a violent ideology. Such rationalism should be based on a “feasible method”. Then, we are connected to the idea of reason, that the ethical personality must assume acting in a surrounding world. As the acting contains evaluation and logical acts, it is the ethical component which should prevail in a philosopher. “The philosopher is an ethical personality or anything”, wrote Husserl to Ingarden. The ethical life, which makes life reasonable for all people, is “social-ethical life” to the highest degree possible.

3. The private man and the citizen

To define state by the law is not enough. Its effectiveness and its implementation presuppose an original power. In this sense, state is an organized power and this power is rational on the one hand and adequate to its purpose on the other. So, the organic nature of power presupposes an incessant activity which organizes and maintains it. This activity is politics. By this the state gives to individuals the means, particularly those of acting and of deciding, because laws without sanction remain a dead
letter. Husserl and Rousseau would agree upon this.

Yet the individual person escapes the state. It has concern for this relation only insofar as it performs a function. The state being in the order of facticity is itself a person in the sense of a (contractual) association of which the individual person is a member, functioning therefore as a citizen. In other words, the person becomes a citizen as a member of a state in order to operate in a political community of law. In this sense, it is the person who calls the state into question and not the opposite.

The state and the citizen are correlative notions. The function occurs in a person and the state, in its turn, is embodied in the individuals who represent it. In that, Husserl seems to profess classical doctrine: the state does not act; only individuals act. However, the state as a will, more concretely, as “sustainable social direction of the will” is distinguished from the individual will of the citizen\(^{12}\) (Husserl 1973b, 405 – 406). Nevertheless, citizens, together with civil servants, are two fundamental pillars of the state, unequal pillars, second depending upon the first. Thus, the civil servant actualizes the citizen, who feeds him through taxes. In this sense, the state consists of the activity of citizens, ranging from a simple citizen to a servant of the state (Husserl 1973a, 110). We can think here of P. Ricoeour: according to him “the citizen is a sovereign in miniature” (Ricoeur 1990, 54).

Husserl, in the footsteps of Hegel, still makes the distinction between the individual and the function and by that, between the private man and the citizen. The private man does not escape the jurisdiction of the state, e.g. as an elector or tax payer, but he is a citizen only as the member of the state community only (Husserl 1973c, 409 sq). Normally, the social life of a community state or of a national community proceeds in accordance with the habits and customs of everyday life. And the private is what is left to the individual’s freedom, which does not mean that the private man would be powerless: he has his rights and therefore a power too.\(^{13}\) This difference between the citizen and the private man is overcome at the level of the personality of the state.

---

\(^{12}\) Husserl will even say, by analogy to one’s self, that “the state is somehow ‘me of state’” (Staats-Ich), but he would not say in the style of Louis XIV, that “the state – that is me”.

\(^{13}\) But he does not share a common right as a trader: buying entails no legal thought, unlike the selling. The private man opposes even more to the statesman, the military and to the civil servant.
The citizen conditions changes, however, depending on the degree of development of the state. In a developed state the “state order” is no longer limited to transparent and known customs, rights and politeness. When we add a conflict of interests between his state and some other, conflict which even may acquire a form of peaceful coexistence or hostility. A citizen is supposed to be interested not only in the history of his country, but also in foreign countries, as well as the history of the “community of states”.

The horizon of the state, which temporal mode is that of a presence, is for “everyone”, however, it remains unknown or mysterious. It is a task for professionals to educate, to manage, to make politics, in a word, specialists who can quickly become bureaucrats.

In the same sense, it is preventing a reduction of the state and the right to a rigid doctrine, that is, we repeat their historic character. The fact remains that concerning history as a science which is aiming at the general, it is the political which comes first in the order of this generality.

Another topic to appear within the story, in this sense, is the new universality that represents the cultural (Husserl 1973c, 411).

4. The man and his cultural world

Culture is also one of the stages of the constitution of the being-for-us or the life-world, thanks to its historical and cultural dimension. Culture and history, although broadly synonymous, do not overlap in the strict sense. The history concerns the “bringing into community” or “communification” (Vergemeinschaftung) of humanity. Culture, it is the

14 Husserl lists the disciplines of a “universal knowledge” that is provided to “everyone” and in particular to a citizen: history, including the science of state and law, namely the political science as it looks today, geography or geopolitics, history of law and “political” history. The state is, moreover, according to Husserl, “the first theme of universal historiography”.

15 According to Husserl, the philosophy either, as it has become an academic specialty, did not escape the danger of specialization that he wanted to avoid in his way of philosophizing.

16 By culture Husserl seems to understand what others would call “civilization” (Husserl 1973b, 206).
matter of the creative life of humanity and it objectivizes itself in doing, in the performances of communities (Husserl 1973b, 207). History is also the history of the culture to the extent that it is culture which makes humanity a concrete being.

This “enculturation”\(^{17}\), as we would say today, of the life-world is possible in principle with the case of a “world of a pre-given experience”, a world of a pre-predicative experience. This world of experience is already impregnated with logical activity, tradition and education. Even pre-scientific myths are included. The life would, however, be unable to create spiritual formations without a concourse of thought and even without a symbiosis with thought.

The culture has a gradation beginning with the fatherland, of which reference was already made, and should be identified more closely. Every man has, first, his home, his family, his birthplace and then his village or town. With these everyday “internal environments” they oppose the “outer worlds” devoid of everyday nature: the external life-world, the horizon of most external and the farthest world (Sivák, ibid.).\(^{18}\)

The people composing the communities have their vital interests which they perform in practical life. As well as the state, the culture is an intersubjective phenomenon, of intersubjective provenance.\(^{19}\) The culture blends with the historic character of the community, namely its tradition

---

\(^{17}\) For more details, cf. our work (Sivák 1998).

\(^{18}\) Husserl still carries a double distinction: homeland – abroad. First, man lives in a community of pre-given origin whose “foreign” environment is no less human. Where we act, we exchange and we suffer in a horizon more or less known and having the form of being-together. Thus, the distinction between these “fatherlands” and state domain that unifies and dominates them through a “government”. These distinctions are for Husserl, if we need reminding, insurmountable.

\(^{19}\) In fact, Husserl combines the notions of culture and of civilization. Let us judge: “Unter Kultur verstehen wir ja nichts anderes als den Inbegriff der Leistungen, die in den Menschen fortlaufenden Tätigkeiten vergemeinschafteter zustande kommen und die in der Einheit des Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein und seine vorerhaltenden Tradition haben ihr bleibendes geistiges Dasein. Aufgrund ihrer physischen Verleiblichung, ihres sie dem ursprünglichen Schöpfer entäußernden Ausdrucks sind sie in ihrem Sinn für jeden geistigen zum Nachverstehen Befähigten erfahbar. Können Sie in der immer wieder zu Folgezeit Ausstrahlungspunkten geistiger Wirkungen werden auf neue immer im Rahmen Generationen historischer Kontinuität. Und eben darin hat alles, was Titel der Kultur befasst, seine weseneigentümliche Art objektiver Existenz und fungiert andererseits als eine beständige Quelle der Vergemeinschaftung” (Husserl 1988, 21 – 22).
unified through community souvenir. Culture and history are inseparable.\textsuperscript{20}

At the lowest of this sociality (cultural) level is a culture associated with the standards of behavior that are still prejuridical. The culture is also a “self-cultivation” (Selbstkultur). The “being of self” is standard and ideal at the same time; being and duty here are inseparable. The authentic life is an autonomous life. This “self” does not relate to the individual only because this “self-formation to authenticity” should be accomplished according to the “Idea of a philosophical culture”.\textsuperscript{21} The same applies to self-responsibility which is not limited to the “responsibility for” (something) but responsibility to others while being aware that others may be responsible for me.\textsuperscript{22}

Not all cultures are equal. There is number of different cultures, but the idea of philosophy lives in European humanity as an absolute idea without a link with any anthropological type, for example China or India. Phenomenology also refers to the whole of subjectivity and not to a contingent existence or an empirical person. It contains the to-be-realized telos of all cultural creation. Moreover, the phenomenological education should be part of the culture, including political education. This is the finality of knowledge, as well as of the domination of men and humanity: to educate the man so that he could determine for himself on grounds of reason. What still belongs to the culture (scientific and phenomenological) is its purpose of “self-deployment” of subjectivity and of the world included in it.

This passage to the phenomenology of culture is linked with the series of articles written for the Japanese magazine Kaizo, another demonstration of Husserl’s commitment, titled “On the renewal of man and culture”. By

\textsuperscript{20} This historical dimension consists of the fact that the development of the culture is historical and after that it is transmitted from one generation to another.

\textsuperscript{21} The passage from me to self proceeds within another identity, one that answers the question “Who am I?” It is the identity of the person as unique, different from others, dynamic and even historical identity.

\textsuperscript{22} “Selbstverantwortung, Sein Leben aus Selbstverantwortung in einem Leben, das von Selbstverantwortung durchsetzt ist in der Einheit einer Habitualität universaler Selbstverantwortung. Aber Selbstverantwortung ist für den Menschen, der Mensch ist im gemeinschaftlichen Sein und vergemeinschafteten Leben, eins mit der Verantwortung vor Anderen und mit dem Verantwortlichmachen der Anderen” (Husserl 1973c, 422).
the revival he meant an “ethical conversion” and “formation of a universal ethical culture of humanity” (Husserl 1988, XI.). Husserl saw the cause of the misery after the Great War in impotence and inauthenticity of ideas valid so far.

This renewal should ensure a strong literary organization supported by the highest ethical ideals in order to teach and educate the humanity. As a member of the life of community, everyone should be concerned. The main question of the articles addressed to Japanese, who felt the same need to think about themselves and on their post-war years, was: how to rationalize the spiritual? The rationalization would make “eidetic science of reasonable humanity” possible, i.e. an ethics of rationality. This revival will not only happen on a rational but also on a volitional level.

Husserl finds a lacunal imbalance in the development of science, concretely, the absence of a science of man, science which would introduce the rational on the social and political levels, where the idea of man would be parallel to the idea of nature that stands in focus of the pure mathematics of nature. More concretely, it should be opposed to the “universitas” of natural sciences, the “universitas” of all the sciences, the social sciences of the mind in particular. Human sciences are no less empirical, but they lack a link in form of a principled rationality, or the “mathesis of spirit and of humanity” that would thematize the “a priori” of truth, rooted in man as “logos of the method”.

In this sense, while the mathematics of nature “explains” the empirical natural science, the science of the spirit is not sufficiently explanatory. The normative judgment must be associated to it according to the “general standards” that characterize the “reasonable” humanity and should help this humanity on a practical level.

The reality of nature differs essentially from that of the mind. The analysis of the phenomenon of renewal must avoid naturalistic prejudices. While the naturalistic reasoning leads to a rationality of externality, that is ordered causally, the forms and essential determinations of the spiritual are different, where even the spatiotemporal form receives a different meaning. The essential difference lies in the fact that each spiritual reality

23 Moreover, the magazine seems to have been founded precisely for this purpose; the title means exactly “renewal”.

24 Husserl diagnosed his time using these words: infamy, skeptical pessimism, political sophistry.
contains the “inner”; its “enclosed” conscious life is related to an “I”, the central hub of acts, linked not causally but motivationally (Husserl 1988, 8).

Husserl can be blamed for addressing Japanese without having knowledge of their (East) way of philosophizing. But he believed in the universality of Greek philosophy, thanks to the autonomy and independence of mind, which could not let the Japanese and other Orientals indifferent. The philosophy in this sense, is a “proto-phenomenon”, thus it is not focused exclusively on Europe and its culture. For Husserl distinguishes between “empirical Europe” and Europe in the “spiritual sense”, he is convinced that his philosophical-anthropological attitude is valid for everyone, without favoring any particular culture, with regard to a framework common to various cultures.

Husserlian theme of the renewal represents an ethical-cultural problem and at the same time it is a principle. In this sense, it means two things: it is a reaction to a crisis on one hand and an ongoing requirement directed toward the future on the other. This revival had been radicalized by Husserl under the headwords like review, change or revision.

Although Husserl admits that there are many cultures, he does not deal with interculturalism, but moves within a single culture only, the European one. E. W. Orth proposes another terminology that he deems it most appropriate to cultural phenomena: the inter-intentionality. It means that in the world of culture various intentionalities, implicit as explicit, are intertwined. Thus, culture is no less accessible to intentional

25 According to the commentary of articles for the review Kaizo, one no longer has the feeling Europe would enjoy such a privilege today; strictly speaking one could rather speak about a “heritage” (Orth 1993, 334). However, are Europeans themselves familiar with that legacy?
26 The articles for Kaizo announce the issue of the Crisis.
27 According to the commentator, the interpretation of Husserl is placed between two synonymys for the word “kaizo”: “kuakoushin” change, revision and “saishin”, survey.
28 This inter-intentionality proposed to enrich the meaning of the “internationality” means that every man and every community are configurations of intentionalities. More specifically, it concerns the (intentional) relations of a subject-subject type on the one hand and those of a subject-thing type on the other. This internationality is not imposed by force but is instituted in the spirit of autonomy. However, it would be unrealistic to seek to completely eliminate the force at the international level.
A critique of culture as before that of reason presupposes the freedom which is also inherent in the culture. And the capacity, the power to criticize is essential to man. The culture allows, however, criticism, a shading of the truth geared to the membership in a cultural circle. The culture, area of freedom, also offers the matter of freedom as a field of application to the phenomenological reduction. The culture, a complex phenomenon, admits and even requires several pathways.

Finally, the expressions with reflexive pronouns as “self” or “auto” indicate the presence of another method or rather technique, that of the imaginary variation, basis of ideation or eidetic intuition. They relate ultimately to all culture, forming the “technique of self-realization of humanity” (Husserl 1988, 56).

The relations at the level of inter-internationality and within the whole of phenomenology of the culture, by which Husserlian noematics culminates, are real, their holders are practical men: “... we cannot drop man as concrete man of a culture” (Orth 1993, 351). If in framework of a

29 Accordingly Orth proposed the concrete material relations would represent the hyletic component, the mutual spiritual understanding would correspond to the noetic direction and the active participation in common goods and values would correspond to the noematic direction.
30 Is it a coincidence that the first two volumes of the First Philosophy (Husserl 1956 and Husserl 1959), one subtitled “A critical history of ideas” and the other, titled “The theory of the phenomenological reduction”, combine to show a close connection between the historical-cultural reality and the epistemological problem of knowledge.
31 E. W. Roth distinguishes three approaches to culture in Husserl:
1. by the intentionality, culture as the set of concrete intentional sequences;
2. by the problem of historicity where the history of philosophy is replaced by a "poem of the history of philosophy", and to be composed by independent thinkers although in conjunction with the philosophies of the past;
3. approach which passes through the idea of humanity and its ethos, two inseparable components of Husserl’s ideal of rigorous science, that recalls the “epistemology” of M. Foucault. According to the foregoing, we could add to these approaches the knowledge of literature, of political history and of geography from the local to the global level.
32 The list of these expressions which become phenomenological terms does not appear to be complete: Selbsterneurung, self-evaluation, Selbstgestaltung, self-formation, Selbstbetrachtung, consideration of self, Selbststudium, self-learning, Selbstregulierung, self-regulation, etc. These are also the cultural phenomena that at the individual level more precisely represent the essential forms of “self-renewal” (Selbsterneurung), forms of becoming.
constitutive or pure phenomenology Husserl could not avoid talking about (possible) essences, in this last stage of the route he could not avoid talking about the effective and practical reality. “In respect of I and of the world, the reality (Wirklichkeit) precedes any possibility!”33

But the last word of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity would not be that of the state but that of the phenomenology gifted by its own teleology and striving to become the hidden desire of all philosophy. The evolutionary teleology of the monadic universe is moving towards the practical idea of “true humanity” and of “ethical” ideas belonging thereto. It should be added that it is as new way of “communification” and a new form of durable maintainable community whose spiritual life rests within a horizon of infinite future, the horizon of infinite generations renovating themselves the spirit of ideas. The sequence of generations motivated accordingly exemplifies the reflection of an infinite chain of philosophical and scientific idealities. The same goes for any culture pointing to a “true” culture, “full of value” and so far as the culture is the product of the cultural life of humanity it converges to phenomenology.

In this sense, phenomenology is in an antagonistic relationship to the state which does not relate to humanity as a whole but to the plurality of interests on an internal as well as on an external level in defending the interests of a given political community against other states. Every state has its government, it is unified by the power and it remains in constant disputation with other nations. The supranational law which rests on various international treaties, treaties of peace, of trade, etc., can provide only a relative peace. As an ethical instance based on ideal standards, the phenomenology is, however, above the state. On the other side, the state compared to the phenomenology, has the advantage of preexistence of a factual field, and in this sense, since its birth phenomenology has been

33 “… The knowledge of the 'possible' must precede that of the actual (der Wirklichkeiten) ...” (Husserl 1950, 209). “Hinsichtlich meiner und der Welt geht die jeder Wirklichkeit Möglichkeit vorher” (Husserl 1973c, 519). The title of the supplement (XXXIII), the quotation is taken from, announces it expressly: “Zur Umlungierung des Ich und der Welt: das Primat der Wirklichkeit gegenüber der Möglichkeit. Das Ich in der Selbstgemeinschaft und Selbstverhaltung.” This formulation does not contradict Husserl’s theory of knowledge; it does not entail a revision thereof, as Orth wrote, but we must realize that the two seemingly contradictory formulations proceed from different registers.
subjected to the state although always in relation of an ever increasing competition.

But the final victory is reserved for phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. Husserl believes that the ethical development will result in the dismantling of the state organization of power. Provided that this process is not limited in time and that we will strive unceasingly to raise the political culture. The “overshoot” of the state by phenomenology does not, however, mean a complete disappearance of the state, but it can happen again only through the state, which will not use repressive means, but the phenomenological means of reason.

5. In conclusion: towards a citizenship without borders?

Husserl, starting from a critique of modern reason, comes to results quite opposed to the current postmodernism, which believes to inaugurate a new era, a new period in the history of philosophy. With his rehabilitation of reason and culture, he has been subjected to the postmodern critique. This critique, reversing the relationship between philosophy and science in favor of the latter, hardly accepts the results of the enculturation of the life-world: homo theoretics and homo culturalis. Husserl, in his turn, would not have accepted the concepts of “radical pluralism” and “pure difference”, which he would consider to be “monsters” deficient in unity and preventing unification.

The postmodernist critics’ denouncing the so-called “tyranny of reason” and the “temple of reason”, which pertain to a strong and domineering subject, fall into the illusion of a defeat of reason instead of translating the current cultural malaise, including the philosophical culture, into terms of ethics and thought. On the other hand, the postmodern ideology seems easily to put up with the thesis of globalism and the process of a globalization proceeding before our eyes, a process

34 In this sense, the diagnosis of the actual situation that the abbot E. Barbotin had given me one day, still seems to be accurate and valid: “the flat ideas and weak wills”. Before him, J. Patočka denounced the existence of ideologies and of violence which prevent us from “living in the Idea”, and the radicalism of some thinkers disintegrating great patterns and spiritual initiatives of the past.
considered as irreversible and imposing itself with the force of law.\textsuperscript{35} The concept of citizenship is no less, if not more, concerned with such a process. What is citizenship in a world without borders and shores? The citizenship, having been defined only recently and understood accordingly by Husserl himself – would it become obsolete today?\textsuperscript{36} And taking into consideration the current crisis of citizenship, would a global “citizenship” be the remedy for this crisis?

Burying – perhaps too soon – the classical notion of citizenship, there have been proposals to different ways of pulling it out from the state or national framework, to different notions of citizenship corresponding to these ways: “nomadic” or “shared” citizenship (Etienne Balibar) (Tassin – Karul 2011, 31) the “cosmopolitan” citizenship of migrants (Etienne Tassin)\textsuperscript{37} (Tassin – Karul 2011, 9), citizenship of the cultural man or the question in what world should such a man live (Françoise Bonardel) (Tassin – Karul 2011, 63). Ironically, all these authors come from a country that considers itself a “fatherland” of all men.

Husserl, as we have seen, had not remained trapped within confines of a state or a community, but he aimed at the whole humanity \textit{sub specie aeternitatis}, while considering the difference “home – abroad” as insurmountable and renewable in another part of the world.\textsuperscript{38} He admitted

\textsuperscript{35} Nearly the same used to be said about the former (socialist) internationalism which was neither eternal nor legal. Similarly, it is often forgotten today that particular interests lurk behind globalization too.

\textsuperscript{36} E. Tassin, for example, believes it, when he speaks about a form of “traditional, conventional and sterile” citizenship which should be uplifted to a new dimension, global dimension (Tassin – Karul 2011, 10).

\textsuperscript{37} According to this author, “deterritorialization” causing “disidentification” can be transformed to a new form and more active way of political subjectivation only by “a stranger”. Only those who dare to break the links with their nearly related ones as also with their ancestors, will try the vagabondage, will face all kinds of danger and of suffering, those would become the true “subjects” of the modern cosmopolitan society (Tassin – Karul 2011, 61). Is such a “citizenship”, however, worth the effort, not to mention the fact that we presume that the uprooting might result in alienation or a personality change? E.g., a forced exile may be accompanied by an adaptation syndrome which can last for years. This is also the case of unstable societies, unstable politically, socially, legally, where instability can become the source of other psychical disorders, suicides.

\textsuperscript{38} Even if the individual or a population is of an adventurous nature – man is also a world animal – he is able to relocate and create a new appurtenance to a middle, his new family
that overcoming the state and the consideration of the transition to the supranational are necessary, providing that this passage is not accompanied by violence, something we cannot say about the current globalization. He preferred non-violent enculturation to violent acculturation.  

The “no-frontierism” is not without negative consequences, considered in terms of mental and physical health of men. In addition, there is an imbalance between the two identities in question, imbalance in favor of the one that emphasizes the peculiarity, originality.

The life of a society then moves between two extremes: a (massive) excessive adaptation on one side and an excessive maladjustment, an uprooting on the other side. In the first case, one is open to otherness while the other prevents us from “living together”. Such a man lives only for himself in a war with the others. What is even worse, this happens in ignorance towards the first identity and, as a result, specific dissimilarities dominate the collective similarities, making the access to others, to the fellow, difficult or impossible. Putting ourselves in place of the other, we

world, but not a new fatherland as the Chinese proverb says: “On the road to exile you will clothe good mandarin dresses, but you will not find another fatherland”.

While the enculturation represents adaptation to the culture one is born into, the acculturation is an adaptation to another culture. Entire so-called “primitive” populations became victims of an acculturation as a violent change of culture, which has gradually lost its vital energy and finally succumbs to a desire of death in its own right.

Current statistics show a rapid growth of disorders and mental illnesses throughout Europe and whose origin is perhaps not without relation to the current state of societies. A Slovak doctor psychiatrist P. Černák, recently interviewed, did not mince matters: “For a long time now, a generation of children has grown up before our eyes, generation so disharmonious and bearing signs of narcissism and a border personality disorder. It has been two decades, some explain, during which both democracy and the notion of democracy have been – maybe intentionally – harmed. As if there were only rights and freedoms and no discipline and responsibility. The parents and even schools do not set clear boundaries to children. Society offers anything except visions which would have a spiritual value and would give people a sense and a direction to their lives. It is not only the fetishization of the matter. It has been offered (alas!) a distorted moral instead: the greatest evils remain unpunished, the lie is taken for truth, selfishness wins over tolerance and altruism. ... One of the key moments in psychotherapy is the definition of boundaries to patients or to clients. Entire society, especially those who form it, are in need of such boundaries. No doubt, the non-frontierism is slowly killing us” (Uličianska 2012).

An excessive maladjustment leads to an excessive homogeneity, to the dependence due to which the man becomes the toy of the social strengths or of his own inclinations.
are striving to understand, is the only possibility of breaking this vicious circle.

References


The contribution is a partial presentation of the outcomes of the research project VEGA No. 2/0175/12 From Phenomenology to Metaphysics and to Reflection of the Contemporary Crisis of Society and Art which has been pursued at the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra.

Mgr. Jozef Sivák, CSc.
Institute of Philosophy
Slovak Academy of Sciences
Klemensova 19
811 09 Bratislava
Slovak Republic
filosiva@savba.sk
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES TENDENCIES OF GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION

Richard St’ahel

This paper analyzes the current crisis of the global industrial civilization as a coincidence of external and internal reasons, mainly as a coincidence of economic and environmental crises tendencies. The analysis is based on Habermas’ distinction between four types of social formation, and according to their internal organizational principles and an extent of their social and system integration, also types of crises that can occur in the given type of the social formation. The paper shows that the common reason of economic and environmental crises which are a part of system crisis of industrial civilization is an imperative of growth. This imperative, as Habermas points out, is the immanent principle of institutions and systems of capitalism. Economic and demographic growth of industrial civilization based on capitalism principles has reached its limits. However, all types of social formation, institutions and civilizations are also determined by the imperative of sustainability. The current crisis is then characterized as a display of antagonism between the imperative of growth and imperative of sustainability. This antagonism creates a new category of transformation for sustainable societies or revolution conflicts in states that break environmental and economic limits of growth. These conflicts result from food and water shortages and could bring a growing instability into the world or lead into the collapse of the industrial civilization.

Keywords: globalization – industrial civilization – economic crisis tendencies – environmental crisis tendencies – imperative of growth – imperative of sustainability

A crisis could be defined as a situation in which it has become clear that the existing ways of addressing problems and institutions have failed. It is also a situation requiring prompt decisions. Identifying the crisis tendencies enables transformation of the society and its institutions; without transformation the

---

See (St’ahel 2005a) and also (St’ahel 2008), (St’ahel 2010c).
development can lead to a revolution which will interrupt the continuity of the development or will threaten the identity of the political-economic system. It could lead also to the collapse of civilization as well.

The economic crisis of 2007 – 2008 is the fourth big crisis in the last two centuries. However, it is apparent that it is not only an economic crisis or, regarding the following social and political crises, only a crisis of capitalism. At the same time, facing deepening environmental crisis, we have to think about crisis of the industrial civilization.

Industrial civilization is the first truly global civilization, firstly, for a global application of the same theoretical and technological principles into all areas of life and reproduction of the society and, secondly, for the consequences of applying these principles – positive or negative. Legitimacy of the term “industrial civilization” results from the fact that it was industrial technology and organization which for the first time in human history allowed more than half of the human population of the world to live in cities at the end of the 20th century. Life in cities, industrial production and distribution of products and services in such an extent creates unprecedented economic, social, political and environmental problems, which are very similar, if not identical, in all parts of the world. The current crisis is thus unparalleled not only in its global extent but also in deepening the material, food and environmental crises which threaten not only the identity but also the existence of the current global political-economic system. When reflecting on the causes and possible consequences of the crisis of the global industrial civilization we must take all these aspects into consideration and pay attention to their reciprocal conditionality and synergy.

However, more attention is paid to the reflection of economic, social and political aspects of the crisis of the global industrial civilization than to the reflection of its material, food and environmental aspects. The reason is that economic, social and political aspects of the crisis seem more acute and their theoretical reflection has a longer tradition than reflection of material, food and environmental aspects of the crisis. These have been systematically reflected only in the last fifty years. Despite the extent and argumentation

---

2 See (Hauser 2012).
3 See (Stáhel 2005b).
4 See (Stáhel 2005b).
5 And this despite the fact, that the problem was addressed by T. R. Malthus in his famous essay. See (Malthus1998). One of the possible explanations points to a different time frame of economic, social and political crises on one hand and the environmental crisis on the other, what significantly influences the ability to critically reflect on these phenomena.
accuracy of results of the scientific research on the causes and possible solution of the environmental crisis, no changes that would at least reduce the exploitation and devastation of the environment took place within the global or domestic economic, social or political systems. On the contrary, the population of the planet has almost doubled and the consumer expectations have increased. Therefore, the number of cattle or fish, the amount of fresh water for agricultural and industrial production as well as for human consumption including production of all kinds of products has far exceeded even the rise of human population. In regard to growing population the total consumption of the products, services and energy has been increasing despite the rise of effectiveness and implementation of more environmentally considerate technologies, moreover, despite the decrease of economic activities induced by the economic crisis. The concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere\(^6\) and chemism of the oceans\(^7\), the speed of extinction of animal species and plants, deforestation, reduction of arable land and the decrease of fresh water supplies should be added to the list of consequences. The growth of production and consumption as well as the growth of population are always related to the increased exploitation of natural resources and pollution\(^8\).

The imperative of growth as the immanent part of the majority of systems and institutions of the industrial civilization can be considered the common denominator of these crisis phenomena. The globalization process\(^9\) allowed for the application of the imperative of growth in the areas and sectors that thirty or forty years ago were arranged on the basis of different imperatives while the process even eliminated or at least weakened the influence of the traditional cultural and political tools which used to regulate the growth itself as well as its side effects.

The extent and the potential of economic, ecological, social, political and cultural consequences of the environmental aspect of the global crisis make it

---

\(^6\) Despite the Kyoto Protocol, the goal of which was to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 5% regarding the level in 1990, their concentration in the atmosphere has since the year 2000 increased by 20%.

\(^7\) Emission of greenhouse gases increased acidity of the oceans in last two centuries by 25%. In consequence, it could start mass extinction of the sea animals. See also (Lovelock 2012, 174).

\(^8\) See (Naess 1996, 301).

\(^9\) See (Šťahel 2013a).
then historically and by extent such a unique phenomenon that it „is not possible to formulate traditional philosophical questions without regard to the fact of the current ecological crisis anymore” (Kolářský 2011, 30). We can only agree with R. Kolářský’s statement that the task of the current philosophy is to rethink the philosophical concepts of the past and the present (Kolářský 2011, 130) from the aspect of the environmental global crisis. When reflecting economic, social and political crises we have to take the phenomenon of the environmental crisis into account and study their interaction. This attitude enables one to think of the current crisis as the system crisis of the industrial civilization and economic, social, political, demographic, food and environmental crises to understand them as individual manifestations or aspects of this system crisis.10

1. Habermas’s Crisis Theory

All these phenomena could be interpreted by a coherent crisis theory which was formulated by J. Habermas in the early 1970s in his Legitimation Crisis.11 This theory, connected with some kind of philosophy of history, has also offered the basis for reflection on the current crisis. However, as R. Plant reminds, the “Legitimation Crisis is a research programme, not a final report” (Plant 1982, 346). But this fact enables the application of the Habermas’ approach to the reflection of the current civilization crisis.

According to Habermas, “only when members of a society experience structural alterations as critical for continued existence and feel their social identity threatened can we speak of crises” (Habermas 2005, 3). He based this on the assertion that also “social systems have identities and can lose them” (Habermas 2005, 3). It is an open question then, if the global industrial civilization can be perceived as an analogical social system. Since the scientific and publicistic discourses work with the term “civilization crisis” even in case of the current global crisis, and many economic, demographic and environmental phenomena are reflected on in global connections, the answer is tentatively positive.

In general, according to Habermas, “crisis occurrences owe their

10 See also (Šťahel 2013b).
11 (Habermas 2005). Legitimation Crisis was first published as Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus in 1973 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag) and in English translation in 1976.
objectivity to the fact that they issue from unresolved steering problems” (Habermas 2005, 4). However, Habermas “distinguishes four social formations: primitive [vorhochkulturelle], traditional, capitalist, post-capitalist” (Habermas 2005, 17). Each of them faces different problems of governance and the failure to manage them or to solve them can lead to a crisis. According to the inner organizational principle and the extent of the social and system integration of these types of the social formation, Habermas distinguishes types of crises that can occur.

Primitive Social Formations are organized on the basis of the age and gender principles which are institutionalized in a kinship system. Usual source of social crises are contradictory imperatives of socio-economical system, but “no contradictory imperatives follow from this principle of organization” (Habermas 2005, 18). Therefore such societies, states Habermas, are largely affected by external identity crises where “the usual source of change is demographic growth in connection with ecological factors” (Habermas 2005, 18). According to Habermas only primitive or archaic social formations can face an external cased crises, all others faces mainly internal cased crises.

Traditional Social Formations are created on the civilizational level of development. Their basic “principle of organization is class domination in political form” (Habermas 2005, 18). These are socially and by class divided societies which need to pay attention to justifying and legitimizing this division because they bring internal contradictions. Traditional societies are then threatened by internal identity crises as Habermas states: “In traditional societies the type of the crisis that arises proceeds from internal contradictions” (Habermas 2005, 20). Relations of production are then at the same time political relations, owners of means of production, primarily of the land, are owners of the political power; in other words, the political and economic powers are the same. According to Habermas “in traditional societies, crises appear when, and only when, steering problems cannot be resolved within the possibility space circumscribed by the principle of organization and therefore produce dangers to system integration that threaten

---

12 By the term post-capitalist social formation Habermas „designates state-socialist societies“ (Habermas 1980, 17), which are in his view also class societies, the difference is that production means are handled by political elites.

13 In other text coming from the first half of 1970s Habermas differentiates societies according to the level of social integration. He differentiates Neolithic societies, Archaic civilizations and Developed premodern civilizations (Habermas 1975, 295).
the identity of the society” (Habermas 1980, 25).

Liberal-capitalist societies are organized around the relations of capital and wage labour. Relations of production are differentiated from the political relations, from which also the “civil society” is differentiated. Economic system is thus free from limitations of the socially integrative subsystems. It enables the state to intensify the dynamics of growth and with it also crises that are manifested mainly as economic crises. However, these crises finally affect the whole social system. Liberal capitalism is thus affected by system crises. Habermas can therefore emphasize that “in liberal-capitalist societies ... crises become endemic because temporarily unresolved steering problems, which the process of economic growth produces at more or less regular intervals, as such endanger social integration” (Habermas 2005, 25). A crisis is then a recurrent phenomenon, a cyclic phenomenon and in its occurrence specific general signs can be identified. It is then not an accidental, one-time occurrence, but it is connected with its growth, it is its accompaniment and one of its unwanted consequences. “No previous social formation lived so much in fear and expectation of sudden system change, even though the idea of a temporally condensed transformation – that is, of a revolutionary leap – is oddly in contrast to the form of motion of system crisis as a permanent crisis” (Habermas 2005, 25). At least the threat of the return of the crisis has become a permanent part of the social system, together with revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements and their conflicts. “Economic growth takes place through periodically recurring crises because the class structure, transplanted into the economic steering system, has transformed the contradiction of class interests into a contradiction of system imperatives” (Habermas 2005, 26). We can therefore talk about a crisis cycle or cyclic crises which affect not only the economic subsystem of the society. Moreover, according to Habermas, the economic crisis in liberal-capitalist systems is specific and historically unique in that that it is a consequence of contradictions of system imperatives which cannot be structurally solved because its source is the structure of the society organized on the basis of certain rationality. Systems crises then “have the appearance of natural catastrophes that break forth from the center of a system of purposive rational action” (Habermas 2005, 30). In other words, a crisis arises because the society and its subjects perform strictly “rationally”, i.e. under the system imperatives and these imperatives are contradictory. Finally, Habermas asks, if in the organized capitalism the so outlined logic of the crisis has preserved or changed, i.e. if capitalism has “been fully transformed into a post-capitalist social formation that has overcome the crisis-ridden form of an economic
growth?” (Habermas 2005, 31) The development of (at least) the last decade has answered this question – the economic growth has been constantly interrupted by acute crises, appearing because economic subjects are trying to achieve the highest-possible economic growth in accordance with the basic system imperative.

Organized or advanced capitalist social formation (state-regulated capitalism) appears after World War II as a reaction to the fail of the liberal capitalism in the crisis of 1930s which led to a world conflict. According to Habermas “the state intervenes in the market as functional gaps developed” (Habermas 2005, 33), so as to at least reduce the conflict potential of system imperative intensified by acute crises. The economic and social politics of the Western European countries in the first three decades after World War II can be regarded as a reaction to the phenomenon of the economic crisis. “The structures of advanced capitalism can be understood as reaction formations to endemic crisis. To ward off system crisis, advanced capitalist societies focus all forces of social integration at the point of structurally most probable conflict – in order all the more effectively to keep it latent” (Habermas 2005, 37 – 38). Habermas at the same time points out that state intervention to the economic sphere, which in liberal capitalism is differentiated from the politics, brings new types of problems in the organized capitalism. “Recoupling the economic system to the political – which in a way repoliticizes the relations of production – creates an increased need for legitimation” (Habermas 2005, 36). An effort of the political sphere to ease the conflict potential of cyclic crises arising as a consequence of the unregulated economic growth leads not only to an increase of the influence of the political system on the economic one, but also to a transfer of steering problems from the economic to the political sphere.

“In decades since World War II the most advanced capitalist countries have succeeded (the May 1968 events in Paris notwithstanding) in keeping class conflict latent in its decisive areas; in extending the business cycle and transforming periodic phases of capital devaluation into a permanent inflationary crisis with milder business fluctuations” (Habermas 2005, 38). A state has taken a role of a partaker and a regulator of the market and simultaneously a compensator of its negative social, cultural and later also ecologic consequences so as to prevent a breakout of acute crises. The price we pay is a systematic overload of public budgets in the form of long-term deficits.

Moreover, in 1970s the western countries were hit by some acute crises
caused by the stop in an oil supply. These could be called externally produced crises. The Western European countries thus faced other type of crisis, different to what their institutions were prepared for. However, Habermas points out that, “If governmental crisis management fails, it lags behind programmatic demands that it has placed on itself. The penalty for this failure is withdrawal of legitimation. Thus, the scope for action contracts precisely at those moments in which it needs to drastically expand” (Habermas 2005, 69).

At the same time, it seems there is no difference if it concerns crises caused primarily externally or internally. Trustworthiness of the state as an institution in the role of a protector against crises as well as the legitimacy of the political elites has considerably suffered. As J. Habermas states, one of the features and conditions of the postwar class compromise was “civic privatism – that is, political abstinence combined with an orientation to career, leisure, and consumption”, which “promotes the expectation of suitable rewards within the system (money, leisure time, and security)” (Habermas 2005, 37).

By the end of the 1970s it became clear that the state, as in the pre-war period, is again not able to give the chance for career and employment to all and is certainly not able to provide a steady growth in consumption. All this happens despite the steady increase of the tax burden and despite the broadening of the areas over which the state is trying to gain bureaucratic or legislative control. As R. Plant reminds us, “capitalism has built up expectations about consumption, and these have increased pressures on governments to steer the economy to produce more goods. The non-provision of goods to meet expectations becomes a dysfunctional feature of market which it has become a task of government to correct” (Plant 1982, 343).

However, the development over the last decade has clearly shown that governments must also intervene when production is growing faster than possibilities of consumption of what has been produced. The support of consumerism, regardless of its social, cultural and environmental consequences, is a problem of producers as well as governments.

2. The return of the acute crisis phenomenon

The process of economic globalization can be understood as the result of an effort to support further growth of production and consumption which was limited by resources and capacities of national markets. The result of globalization of the preceding three decades has been expressed in the industrially developed countries in the form of liberalization and privatization
not only of productive capacities but also of infrastructure and public services, including health and welfare system, education, science and culture, so we can talk about the dismantling, twilight or progressive reduction of a social state.\(^{14}\) A considerable part of regulation mechanisms, which were meant to prevent a formation of acute crises or to reduce their possible consequences, was eliminated. To describe the social formation of the current industrial civilization it is better to take Habermas’ characteristics of the classic liberal capitalism than to adopt the characteristics of a so-called late or regulated capitalism of 1970s. With liberalization, deregulation (desocialization)\(^{15}\) of the economic-political system in 1990s the acute economic crises returned, which corresponds with Habermas’ characteristics of a crisis that affects the liberal capitalism: “The economic crisis results from contradictory system imperatives and threatens social integration. It is, \textit{at the same time}, a social crisis, in which the interests of groups collide and place in question the social integration of the society” (Habermas 2005, 29 – 30). These words also characterize the crisis of 2008. In the euphoria of 1989 Habermas warned in his essay \textit{Die Nachholende Revolution}\(^{16}\) that the fall of the Berlin Wall did not solve any of the system problems which have specifically arisen. Habermas states: “The indifference of a market economy to its external costs, which it off-loads on to the social and natural environment, is sowing the path of a crisis-prone economic growth with the familiar disparities and marginalizations on the inside; with economic backwardness, if not regression, and consequently with barbaric living conditions, cultural expropriation and catastrophic famines in the Third World; not to mention the worldwide risk caused by disrupting the balance of nature” (Habermas 1990, 17). All these problems are still unsolved and even more complex in today’s global civilization. Two decades later, reflecting the 2008 crisis Habermas points out its historical uniqueness when he writes: “In autumn 2008, for the first time in the history of capitalism, the backbone of the financial market-driven global economic system could be rescued from the brink of collapse only by the guarantees of the taxpayers” (Habermas 2012, 125). Contradiction of system imperatives didn’t disappear but they have become even deeper. According to Habermas it became obvious that “capitalism is no longer able to reproduce itself under its own steam”

\(^{14}\) See (Keller 2005).
\(^{15}\) Term used by P. Ricœur, see in (Ricœur 1992).
\(^{16}\) In English published under title \textit{What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New Thinking on the Left} (Habermas 1990).
(Habermas 2012, 125), so we can talk not only about “system crisis” but also about “system failure”. We can even suggest that the current managing structures cannot handle the consequent problems of the growth identified in 1970s by Habermas as the crisis tendencies of the late-capitalist system, although they make every effort and use all means.

The lack of resources of growth became evident before 2008. As P. Staněk states, growth of production, consumption and profit was to a great extent possible only by growth of indebtedness of individuals, businesses and countries. This indebtedness is one of the main reasons of the current economic crisis (Staněk 2012, 36). Indebtedness as one of the by-products of the process of polarization of income has been accelerating since 1970s.

While the income of most of the population stagnates or even decreases, income of the most rich multiplies. This has led, aside from the growth of the social tension, to a global decrease of consumption which could be saturated for a short period of time only by credit expansion (Staněk 2012, 61 – 62). Despite this fact, many attempts to overcome the current crisis focus on stimulation of consumption. The attempts of governments to save the financial system and support consumption have only led to steep growth of national debts. One of the main system conflicts has been accentuated – on one hand, the governments try to persuade their citizens that they need to economize, which legitimizes the elimination of the social state institutes, on the other hand they encourage the citizens not to limit their consumption and keep buying all sorts of products and services. It means that the system faces also the crisis of rationality, as Habermas had anticipated.

3. The Environmental Aspect of Crisis

However, artificially stimulated consumption also means acceleration of exploiting natural resources and pollution of environment which intensifies the environmental aspect of the crisis. In 1990s this connection was pointed out by L. Hohoš when he observed that “ecologic and economic systems are closely connected and therefore we are confronted with different aspects of one and the same crisis; after all, the degradation of the environment directly endangers economic systems” (Hohoš 1993, 120). Today even economists admit that the economic damages caused by climate changes and extreme weather along with expenses necessitated by the need to adapt the

---

17 See (Stăhel 2010a).
infrastructure to the climate changes will intensify the economic, social and political aspects of the crisis (Staněk 2012, 64 – 65).

As Habermas states the crisis threatens the identity of a social formation. The failure to control crisis can then lead to a transformational or revolutionary change of the political-economic system.\(^\text{18}\) This conclusion can be accepted provided that reflection will focus mainly on economic, social and political aspects of the current crisis, i.e. on those aspects causes of which are considered internal. In words of I. Dubnička: “History has often confirmed that revolutions and destabilization of an established system happen in the moment when the extent of unequally redistributed property (accumulated overproduction) becomes unacceptable by the majority of the society” (Dubnička 2007, 418). The political-economic system can collapse in a dramatic form of revolution, an international or even global conflict or internal conflict; however, the form and extent of the current threats shows that reflection on the crisis of the global industrial civilization which focuses only on the economic, social, and political level is insufficient. It does not consider the existential threat for the civilization as a whole. This threat will become apparent in its full extent when reflection on the global industrial civilization covers material, food and environmental aspects, i.e. aspects the causes of which can be called mainly external. Habermas regards these as relevant mainly for archaic societies, but at the same time he identifies them as possible consequent problems of the growth (Habermas 2005, 41 – 43).\(^\text{19}\)

Environmental and demographic threats produce those types of crises which, Habermas says, were faced mainly by archaic or traditional social formations, meaning agrarian or rural societies. Capitalist societies are industrial and urban. In the preceding century the environmental problems were marginalized or partly resolved by technological development or by exporting environmentally demanding productions and waste to distant areas. The resulting demographic and social problems were solved by mass displacement, lack of soil and food by territorial, mainly colonial expansion\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{18}\) The change can have a character of a revolution, transformation or a collapse of a political-economic system.

\(^{19}\) But also French revolution in 1789 could be interpreted as at least co-caused by external causes, mainly environmental. See (Gore 2000, 57 – 58). It means that this kind of threats (climate fluctuation) could destabilize not only archaic social formations, as Habermas claims.

\(^{20}\) Following up T. R. Malthus J. S. Mill in his *Principles of Political Economy*, first published in 1848, where he states, that due to the growing population and a need to feed it, Great Britain “no longer depends on the fertility of her own soil ... but on the soil of the
Richard Ståhle

and also by business, which owing to development of transportation and storage technologies allowed import of food and other resources from the other side of the world\textsuperscript{21}. However, this process has only put off – in time and space – the recognition that environmental and demographic crisis tendencies threaten also societies of the industrial civilization and that they have the same conflict potential as other types of threats\textsuperscript{22}.

whole world” (Mill 1994, 114). That is why: “This limited source of supply, unless great improvements take place in agriculture, cannot be expected to keep pace with the growing demand of so rapidly increasing a population as that of Great Britain; and if our population and capital continue to increase with their present rapidity, the only mode in which food can continue to be supplied cheaply to the one, is by sending the other abroad to produce it” (Mill 1994, 115). Not every European country could solve these problems by the “export of the poor” to their colonies, by the import of food and other resources from them. In this connection we need to point out that the fascist movements in Italy and Germany began to have the support of the masses shortly after the USA in the early 1920s limited immigration and these and other countries couldn’t reduce their social tension by emigration.

\textsuperscript{21} Trade accelerates processes of the division of labour and deepening of the social differences, but it also enables man as a biological species to circumvent limits resulting from the climate conditions and material resources of specific areas. Men could then populate and live in areas that have not offered a possibility to produce sufficient renewable and unrenewable sources necessary for the life of human communities. Since the prehistoric times the trade has helped to at least reduce immediate determination of specific natural conditions.

\textsuperscript{22} At least in some regions of the world these threats have specific consequences. One of the main causes of series of revolutions and conflicts in the countries of North Africa and Middle East is the depletion of raw materials and exceeding environmental limits of population growth and its consumption and subsequent long-term inability of these countries to supply the population with food and drinking water from their own reserves. This was most vividly expressed in the key country of the region – Egypt, the world’s top wheat importer. “The Egyptian authorities have been wary of touching food subsidies since rioting swept Egyptian cities in 1977 after government decided to raise the prices of staples. The authorities were forced to rescind their decision to restore order. During the food crisis of 2007-08, which pushed the cost of wheat to an all-time high, many families became reliant on subsidised bread, with long queues in front of bakeries and frequent scuffles breaking out. Army bakeries were drafted in to augment the supply” (Terazono – Saleh 2013, 2). The situation worsened when Russia in 2010 due to the drought and extensive fires banned export of wheat and its prices increased to such an amount that due to the increase in basic food prices riots broke out not only in Egypt but also in other North African countries reliant on its import. These riots destabilized the whole region and in many areas grew into a real war of all against all. The subsequent regime change in Egypt has not improved the situation because the oil production and its sale, which has been the source of foreign exchange used for purchase of wheat, are decreasing and therefore the
All the aspects of the current crisis (economic, social, political, material, food, demographic and environmental) have a conflict potential that was manifested many times in the past. Due to growth of the population we can assert that their conflict potential has also grown. As one recent study shows: “If future populations respond similarly to past populations, then anthropogenic climate change has the potential to substantially increase conflicts around the world, relative to a world without climate change” (Hsiang 2013). This study summarizes results of many previous researches and has pointed out causal connections between the climate variability and human conflicts in the past.23 The climate changes caused by the industrial civilization will very probably be faster and more extensive than those in the past. The environmental crisis caused by climate variations or by other causes will be expressed primarily as a food or humanitarian crisis24 which can quite rapidly turn into a social or political crisis. The analysis of the past crises, but especially of this current one, will have to cover the climate and environmental aspects more extensively. It is becoming more and more evident that the collapse of the social system can result not only from internal conflicts or conflicts of the system imperatives but also from external crises or their combination, which can happen also in complex societies. However, the question remains, if overpopulation or climate changes can be regarded as external or internal causes of the crisis phenomena.25

Potential solutions of the global economic crisis must have a character of riots continue. Since 2010 Egypt has spent most of its foreign reserves on wheat import which it is not able to grow for its population because of the lack of suitable farmland and water for irrigation. See also (Cílek 2012).

23 As an example we can take the consequences of the typhoon Haiyan from November 2013. Only in Philippines thousands of people died. The consequent lack of drinking water, food and medicines led to looting and attacks on convoys with humanitarian help.

24 The first consequence of floods, earthquakes or tornados are many people being hurt or losing their homes. Devastated sources of drinking water, food reserves or a loss of harvest will come later. If the administration of the affected country is not able to deal with the humanitarian crisis in time, the consequences will probably influence also the stability of the social and political system. Crisis management in Pakistan after the floods in 2010 was not managed well and it deepened the political crisis in the country. The response of Barack Obama Administration to Hurricane Sandy in October 2012 influenced many voters in the US presidential elections.

25 The need of philosophical reflection on economic, social and political consequences of climate changes would be topical even if there was no anthropogenic reason. From this point of view, the discussion about its origins, be they anthropic or cosmic, i.e. from the viewpoint of civilization, be they internal or external causes, is irrelevant.
internal system changes, e.g. in a form suggested by J. Lovelock, who states: “Maybe we will have to accept certain limits, ration system and compulsory military service like in periods of war and moreover, give up our freedom for a certain time” (Lovelock 2008, 179). These changes could have a character of Hobbes's limit of freedom in the name of security or survival. If these were not only short-term limits, it would be such a significant change of political, economic and legal subsystems that we could talk about threatening the identity of the social formation. A. Palazzo states that the “climate change is a further amplification of the coming Revolution of Limits” (Palazzo 2014) by which the period of growth ends. The signs of “the age of resource limits” have already become apparent and they will bring not only new types of conflicts for the reducing resources but also another Military Revolution. Today’s military and civil infrastructure and technologies are based mainly on finite resources. Pressure of populations’ growth and in the same time growth of consumption expectations will tone up existing contradictions and conflicts within and between societies. “Preparing for a most hostile world in which war is more common is also a necessity” (Palazzo 2014). According to Palazzo the question is not if the coming Revolution of Limits and climate change will influence economic-political systems but how will these systems be able to deal with them on the theoretical and practical level.

Environmental crisis can be regarded then as a consequence of conflicting system imperatives threatening the system integration. The interests of acting groups collide alike as by social crisis (Habermas 2005, 29 – 30) and this can result not only in disintegration of the society it but can also endanger its potential to reproduce. Moreover, this does not entail only the reproduction of an economic-political and cultural system but also the biological reproduction of a society, as far as the environmental crisis threatens also the ecosystem

---

26 When at the end of October 2012 the storm Sandy hit the U.S. East and Canada, it killed several dozens of people, caused flooding over wide areas and other damages exceeding 50 billion US dollars. As a result a supply system of wide areas collapsed, so for example rationing of fuel and several other commodities was introduced in New York temporarily and some rights and freedoms were restricted. It is clear that Lovelock’s vision is more real than it would seem several years ago.

27 “The supply of all resources is finite. Yet, the expectation of governments, and their citizens, is that growth is required and desirable. Growth is the norm” (Pallazo 2014).

28 Also Pallazo used the example of Egypt “there is some suggestion that rising food prices are a factor of growing instability in Egypt” (Pallazo 2014). Rising food prices as a consequence of climate fluctuation, which lead to decrease in food production, were some of the reasons of French royal regime collapse at the end of 18th century, as far as the response of political elites to this situation was inadequate.
4. The imperative of growth vs. the limits of growth

In connection with the imperative of growth in capitalist social formations Habermas in 1970s stated that: “Ecological balance designates an absolute limit to growth” (Habermas 2005, 41). Many things suggest that one of the causes of the current crisis is that growth of population, production and productivity – hits this absolute limit line. As Habermas points out, “with capital accumulation, economic growth is institutionalized in an unplanned, nature like way, so that no option for self-conscious control of this process exists. Growth imperatives originally followed by capitalism have meanwhile achieved global validity through system competition and worldwide diffusion... The established mechanisms of growth are forcing an increase in both population and production on worldwide scale.” (Habermas 1980, 41) These established mechanisms of growth are so characteristic of the capitalist social formation, that: “Capitalist societies cannot follow imperatives of growth limitation without abandoning their principle of organization” (Habermas 1980, 42). However, if they do not limit them, not only their identity but also forms of social integration or forms of organized mass loyalty but also their basic external requirements of the system reproduction and maybe even life in any human society or the reproduction of human species itself will be threatened. This is the key contradiction and the main reason of current civilization crisis.

Habermas suggests the basic system imperative of capitalism which should differentiate this social formation from traditional and especially archaic societies as systems, in which “no systematic motive for producing more goods then are necessary to satisfy basic needs, even though the state of the productive forces may permit a surplus” (Habermas 2005, 18). We can object that the cause of not producing an overproduction is more due to low productivity of work or available technologies and limited possibilities of storage and conserving the overproduction. I. Dubnička’s hypothesis brings convincing arguments: the production of overproduction is the primary conditions of the civilization existence. The revolution of limits and climate change require in extent quite revolutionary transformation of basic imperatives of the economic-political system. Habermas’ concept of crisis can thus be applied also to the environmental crisis as a display of antagonism between imperatives of growth and sustainability.
evolution strategy of homo sapiens and “does not depend on time and space of the level of cultural development nor on its consumption” (Dubnička 2009, 86), which is documented by different forms of destruction of possession, i.e. overproduction in the cultures of the Native Americans. At the same time, according to I. Dubnička, “the production of overproduction, its accumulation and its consumption, are the main causal phenomena of the global environmental crisis” (Dubnička 2007, 20). The global environmental crisis is then a consequence of this human strategy, application of which at present hits the limits of natural resources and the ability of nature to absorb pollution created by production and consumption of overproduction. This would support the thesis that environmental crises threaten all kinds of social formations, primarily as a result of the population growth, which in itself leads to a necessity of production growth and by this to exploitation of natural resources as well as pollution of the environment.

The growth of human population is a key factor which every type of social formation needs to deal with. Apart from several, short and rare periods in history, Malthus’s perception holds true – population grows more quickly than its ability to secure enough food. For thousands of years, territorial expansion, i.e. colonizing the uninhabited areas used to be the human solution to population excess pressure. Populating of the world, except for the remote islands, was completed in prehistoric times and due to the population growth it was a necessity. In most of the newly populated areas people were able to produce more food than necessary for the basic reproduction of the human population or other commodities that could be exchanged for food. This helped them survive in times of poor harvest but in a good year it led to the growth of the population. This led to populating of the new areas. In the antiquity, the territorial expansion was possible only at the expense of other human communities, so the indigenous people were driven out or eliminated by more successful societies. D. Šmihula points out that for most of the history the ability to keep high reproduction potential was the key ability for the survival of the society. Societies that were not successful almost always became extinct, because they were not able to protect themselves (Šmihula 2010, 42). The population growth then had proved to be existential. On the other hand, the growth itself caused a necessity for territorial expansion as a way of gaining the space needed for life and production of food for the growing population.

In modern times the population growth intensified and the period after the

---

29 See (Malthus 1998).
Napoleonic Wars is commonly referred to as the population explosion. Its results were reduced by mass emigration, often even forced one (at the expense of indigenous inhabitants in America, Africa and Australia and New Zealand) and by fertilizing till then untouched biotopes as well as more intensive exploitation of all kinds of renewable and unrenewable resources. More colonies were built because the overpopulated European countries needed food and territory to which they could relocate at least a part of their own population. Despite the fact, many conflicts came up due to these resources alone, including the two world wars. In the second half of the 20th century the environmental consequences of continuous population growth and intensified exploitation of this planet had become evident and for neither side of the so-called Iron Curtain it was possible to ignore or trivialize them anymore. As P. Jemelka states, “the truly essential problems are universal (to a certain extent independent from a specific social-economic formation)” (Jemelka 2009, 345). This also means that the growth of production, productivity and population is not only a basic system imperative of capitalism but eventually of all social formations. In capitalism, it is only more intensive.

The imperative of population growth is then eventually a prerequisite of reproduction (in competition with other societies – clan, tribes), a prerequisite of social sustainability, a system imperative in archaic and traditional societies. Therefore, already in preindustrial societies the growth of production, especially of the agricultural production realized by territorial expansion, becomes an imperative, too. The territorial expansion was in the long run possible only with relatively low world population. By the end of the 19th century territorial expansion was no longer a legitimate tool of dealing with the population growth and the related growth of resource needs. The efforts to hold on to it led to local and global conflicts.

Another possibility are innovations of agrotechologies (creativity,
development of production forces or an ability to learn\textsuperscript{31}), which in the 20th century led to intensification and industrialization of the agricultural production, which is at present the only possibility of increasing the food production since there are no unused arable lands, pastures, or fisheries anymore (Cílek 2012, 783). On the contrary, because of the expansion of the transport, residential, and energy infrastructure as well as the consequences of erosion, desert expansion and rise in the level of oceans the arable land is diminishing. Its expansion by deforestation disrupts the water circulation in the global ecosystem and its ability to keep the planet’s climate. As V. Cílek reminds us, “the moment when we lose the land and water, no creativity will help” (Cílek 2012, 772). At present the “agriculture uses 70 – 75 % of the available fresh water” (Bajer 2011, 283). Moreover, “present-day agriculture uses up ten times more energy than it produces in the form of food” (Cílek 2012, 776) and at the same time it is an important source of greenhouse gases, so that: “Overall, the impact of agriculture on the climate is comparable to the burning of fossil fuels” (Lovelock 2012, 116).

Intensification and industrialization of the agricultural production has such devastating impact on the environment, that the ability of the civilization to produce food could later become considerably limited or even impossible due to climate changes and the change in the chemism of the atmosphere and oceans. It is still possible to increase the global food production, but only at the expense of biodiversity and quality of the environment which enables this production, and thus at the expense of the possibility to produce food in the future.

Besides, the growth of the population and production, the basic imperative of each social formation is to secure its own reproduction – biological and cultural – including the reproduction of economic-political system. All living things, living not only in biological but also in cultural, political and social meaning, strive to sustain or at least to survive. For many kinds of subjects and institutions it is, at the very least, a means to preserve existing conditions of life. The tendency to struggle for survival can be identified in all kinds of social formations and on all levels or stages of development. Actually, the origin of institutions like clans, tribes or states could be interpreted as a direct consequence of this tendency and as the main reason for legitimizing its further existence. I mean, this phenomenon could be described as an

\textsuperscript{31} (Habermas 1975, 297).
imperative of sustainability\textsuperscript{32}. Even the growth itself could be perceived as a strategy to fulfill this basic imperative. Surviving in biological and also in cultural and socio-political\textsuperscript{33} meaning is the consequence of self-preservative instinct but also the basic condition of all reproduction and growth. Long term sustainability is based on early identification of the real threat. If the growth itself (of population, production, consumption, pollution, etc.) appears to be the threat, its limitation could be a reasonable response. The limitation of population or consumption growth in favor of sustainability could therefore serve as an example. In the history of ancient world, many cultures learned the connection between possibility of food production and stability and sustainability of society and its political organization. As a consequence, often very severe institutes were developed for limitation of the population growth and they were consistently enforced. These kinds of rules and institutions are known also in preliterate tribes which live in limited areas (e.g. isles or infertile territories). By contrast, traditional and capitalist social formations used to prefer the imperative of growth and territorial and market expansion. Even market subjects themselves, mainly companies and corporations that are fully determined by growth imperative often collapse because they are forced to grow at any price. Imperative of sustainability can be easily identified on the stages of clan, tribe and also nation or state organization levels but in the global account it is still merely theoretically conceived. However, in general, one can say the imperative of sustainability is the first and immanent imperative which is incorporated in all social and cultural institutions.

This imperative is in conflict with the imperative of growth because of the limited resources\textsuperscript{34} as well as the limited ability of the environment to absorb

\textsuperscript{32} I prefer to use the term imperative of sustainability before the Jonas´ famous imperative of responsibility: “act in such a way that the effects of your action are compatible with permanency of an authentically human life on Earth” (Jonas 1997, 35), because the real aim is sustainability of conditions for life of mankind and civilization as well, and responsibility is only a tool how achieve it.

\textsuperscript{33} Take for instance the survival of society and its social and political organization or its political and cultural identity in the war. In the name of sustainability societies often agree with a sacrifice of many of its members and also in the extreme situations individuals sacrifice themselves on behalf of survival of community or society. In the same time in the name of collective egoism they do not hesitate to oppress and exploit or even eliminate other communities.

\textsuperscript{34} Sources are “basic material, energy and process conditions of life that are irretrievable” (Cílek 2012, 769). The sources include drinking water, unpolluted or at least breathable air, living space, working space, space for production of at least basic food and stable climate
the side effects of reproduction of numerous, more complex and more energy demanding social formations. The contradiction of the imperative of growth and imperative of sustainability can be found in all social formations; on the level of the civilization development the contradiction of system imperatives intensifies. It is fully manifested in the global society because none of the previous ways of overcoming it – territorial expansion, mass emigration, global trade – has ever, not at least temporarily, solved or reduced this contradiction, but on the contrary – they have only deepened it.

5. Conclusion

The industrial civilization faces threats that have a character of internally and externally induced crises and in connection with the current situation of the global parallel environmental and economic crisis we can also speak about a system crisis which threatens the very identity of the industrial civilization. The source of internally induced crises resides in the system of production and redistribution, the source of externally induced crisis rests in the finality of resources as a condition of all the production. The solution to economic and social crises introduced in the form of a production growth only deepens the environmental crisis. Growth of the global population only leads to a growth of food production but this production significantly contributes to the deepening of the environmental crisis; its consequences mainly in the form of climate changes threaten the sustainability of the global food production on the current level. These contradictions are insoluble within the existing social, economic and political possibilities of the industrial civilization. Two system imperatives collide – growth and sustainability of the possibility of reproduction. At the same time, this contradiction deepens the conflict potential of the past crisis tendencies present in different social formations. The basic source of conflicts rests in an unequal distribution of limited resources. The effort to solve these conflicts by production growth, that would conditions. The lack of these sources cannot be retrieved even by use of potential technologies that would allow us to mine minerals from the interplanetary space and transport them to Earth.

Accordingly it is needed to emphasize the need of spread the global education in order to present knowledge about the issue of global market and global economy in the context of sustainability of. One of the main goals of this new approach in the education is to lead young people to a sense of global responsibility in global society. See (Svitačova – Mravcová 2014, 43 – 61).
allow even the most poor to have enough for dignified life, which would not be reduced to everyday fight for basic survival, collides with the lack of resources. If the sources are depleted or devastated, it will endanger the possibilities of production and that will deepen the social and political conflicts even more.

References


The contribution is a partial presentation of the outcomes of the research project VEGA No. 2/0175/12 From Phenomenology to Metaphysics and to Reflection of the Contemporary Crisis of Society and Art which has been pursued at the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra.

Richard Šťahel, Ph.D.
Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra
Hodžova 1
949 74 Nitra
Slovak Republic
rstahel@ukf.sk
References


References


References


HRUBEC, M. (2013): An Articulation of Extra-Territorial Recognition:
References


References


References


(ed.): *Pojem krize v dnešním myšlení*. Praha: FLÚ ČSAV, s. 29 – 46.


References

Bratislava: Ekonomická univerzita.


References


VINCENT, A. (1983): The Hegelian State and International Politics. In:
References

Index

A
ARISTOTLE – 82, 93
AL-JABRI, M. A. – 68, 75
ANGLE, S. C. – 68, 75
AVILA, E. – 60, 77

B
BAADIOU, A. – 93-98, 112, 113, 118
BAI, T. – 13, 18
BAJER, I. – 159, 162
BALIBAR, E. – 137
BAUER, J. R. – 18, 68, 75
BAZIN, A. – 21, 23, 24, 25, 32
BECK, U. – 68, 75
BELL, D. A. – 13, 18, 68
BENJAMIN, W. – 21, 35, 40, 44-48
BERLIN, I. – 9
BIEMEL, W. – 85, 91
BONARDEL, F. – 137
BONDY, E. – 37, 38, 41, 47, 113, 114, 118
BRASSEET, J. – 70, 77
BROWN, C. – 68, 75
BUCHANAN, A. – 53, 75
BUCHWALTER, A. – 58, 75
BURNS, T. – 58, 75

C
CHAN, J. – 12, 18
CHOMSKY, N. – 99, 118
CÍLEK, V. – 153, 158-162
CLARK, C. – 46-48
CRAVEN, M. – 66, 75

D
DASTUR, F. – 83, 91
DELANTY, G. – 56, 58, 75
DELAROCHE’S, P. – 22
DERANTY, J.-P. – 11, 19
DERRIDA, J. – 97
DEUDNEY, D. – 72, 75, 76
DINUŠ, P. – 41, 47
DUBNIČKA, I. – 151, 156, 162
DUSSEL, E. – 68, 76

E
EHRENREICH, B. – 60, 76
EL-OJEILI, C. – 68, 76

F
FINE, R. – 58, 76
FLEISCHER, M. – 91
FLUSSE, V. – 21, 25-33
FORNET-BETANCOURT, R. – 68, 76
FORST, R. – 76
FOUCAULT, M. – 134
FRASER, N. – 11, 12, 19, 51, 53, 56, 61, 63, 76
FURET, F. – 42, 47, 48
Index

G
GORE, A. – 152, 162
GRAEBER, D. – 45, 47, 48

H
HABERMAS, J. – 11, 19, 97, 141, 144-149, 152, 155, 156, 158, 162
HAIGH, S. – 71, 76
HAUSER, M. – 118, 142
HAYDEN, P. – 68, 76
HEGEL, J. W. F. – 53, 57, 76, 100, 102-110, 115, 116, 118
HEIDEGGER, M. – 81-91, 93, 95-97, 102, 103, 108, 110-115, 118
HEINS, V. – 49, 51, 58-67, 76, 77
HIGGOTT, R. – 70, 77
HOBBES, T. – 121, 122, 154
HOCHSCHILD, A. R. – 60, 77
HOHOŠ, L. – 41, 151, 163
HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, P. – 60, 77
HONNETH, A. – 8-14, 19, 45, 47, 49-70, 73, 74, 77, 78
HRUBEC, M. – 41, 47, 50, 58, 65, 68, 78
HSIANG, S. M. – 153, 162
HUSSERL, E. – 88, 94, 121-136, 138, 139

J
JAEGGI, R. – 16, 19
JAVORSKÁ, A. – 91

JEMELKA, P. – 158, 163
JONAS, H. – 160, 163
JONES, C. – 58, 71, 78
JULLIEN, F. – 18, 19, 46, 47

K
KANT, I. – 93, 100, 102-106, 110, 115, 116
KARUL, R. – 136, 137, 140
KELLER, J. – 38, 47, 149, 163
KELSEN, H. – 53, 54, 78
KOLÁŘSKÝ, R. – 144, 163
KÖCHER, A. – 17
KUNDERA, M. – 12, 19

L
LINKLATER, A. – 56, 69, 78
LOVELOCK, J. – 154, 159, 163

M
MALTHUS, T. R. – 142, 152, 157, 163
MARX, K. – 12, 38, 102, 158, 163
MERLEAU-PONTY, M. – 121
MILL, J. S. – 152, 163
MITTERPACH, K. – 87, 91
MRAVCOVÁ, A. – 161, 164

N
NAESS, A. – 143, 163
NATICCHIA, C. – 53, 78
NIELSEN, K. – 71, 78
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUGAARD, M. – 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORTH, E.W. – 133, 134, 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALAZZO, A. – 154, 155, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARRENAS, R. S. – 60, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATOČKA, J. – 42, 47, 121, 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIKETTY, T. – 45, 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIŠŤÁNEK, P. – 15, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANT, R. – 144, 148, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLATO – 93, 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POGGE, T. – 49, 51, 59, 61, 63, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAWLS, J. – 50, 52, 57, 59, 63, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REICH, R. – 37, 42, 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REIMAN, M. – 42, 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICOEUR, P. – 128, 139, 149, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROBINSON, W. I. – 45, 48, 56, 68, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTH, E. W. – 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTHKOPF, D. – 37, 38, 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALEH, H. – 153, 164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARTRE, J.P. – 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAW, M. – 69, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHEUERMAN, W. – 49, 52, 69, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOPENHAUER, A. – 121, 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHUHMANN, K. – 124, 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHWEICKART, D. – 40, 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIVÁK, J. – 126, 129, 130, 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKLAIER, L. – 68, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANĚK, P. – 150, 151, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SŤAHEL, R. – 141-143, 150, 163, 164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVITAČOVÁ, E. – 161, 164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Š</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŠMIHULA, D. – 157, 164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASSIN, E. – 136, 137, 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAYLOR, C. – 13, 19, 57, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEHRANIAN, M. – 68, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERAZONO, E. – 153, 164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THOMPSON, S. – 54, 58, 59, 75, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOYNBEE, A. – 43, 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIČIANSKA, Z. – 138, 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VINCENT, A. – 58, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALLACE-BRUCE, N. L. – 56, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEI, X. – 68, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WENDT, A. – 49, 52, 69, 70, 72, 73, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIREDU, K. – 68, 79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index

Ž
ŽIŽEK, S. – 93-99, 101-118
About authors

Ľubomír Dunaj, Ph.D.
Studied History and Civics at the University of Prešov (M.A.) and Social and Political Philosophy at the Comenius University in Bratislava (Ph.D) and pursued research fellowships on Institute of Philosophy at the Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main in the summer semester 2011 and the academic year 2013-2014 under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Axel Honneth. Among his publications is the paper The Reflections on Justice under the Conditions of Globalisation published in Human Affairs 02/2010.

Tomáš Hauer, doc., Ph.D.
The Czech postmodern philosopher, who teaches at the Technical University of Ostrava, author of a number of books and studies on postmodern philosophy, contemporary philosophy and philosophy of technology. To main results of his work belong four titles: Přirozený svět a postmodernizmus, nebo-li, Toulání není bloumání (Natural World and Postmodernism or Wandering is not Beating Around), published in Ostrava: Aries, in 1995, Skrze postmoderní teorie (Through Postmodern Theory) in Prague: Karolinum in 2002, Napište si svoji knihovnu (Write Your Own Bookcase or Language Vagabonds and Postmodern Public Area), in Prague: ISV, 2002 and together with Jaromír Feber and Jelena Petrucijová, Ztraceni v terrapolis. Antropologie – Dromologie – Víra (Lost in Terrapolis. Anthropology – Dromology – Faith), in Kraków, 2012. These can be considered four different, but equally inspiring introductions to postmodernism. Published study is part of his forthcoming book called Paul Virilio: Empire of Speed and Philosophy of Technology.

Ladislav Hohoš, doc., CSc.
Ladislav Hohoš is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Arts, Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovak Republic. He works in collaboration with the Centre of Global Studies by Czech Academy of Sciences and Charles University in Prague as well as with the Institute of Political science of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. He is concerned with normative issues of

**Marek Hrubec, PhDr., Ph.D.**
Since 1996, Researcher in the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. Since the same year, he has also taught social and political philosophy and political sociology at Charles University in Prague. Since 2001, Head of the Department of Moral and Political Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy. Since 2006, Director of the Centre of Global Studies, a joint centre of the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and Charles University in Prague. Since 2014, Rector of East Africa Star University, a new university for students from post-conflict and conflict countries of East Africa. He has published on social and political justice, recognition, development and the poor in the global and inter-cultural context. His main publication is *Od zneuznání ke spravedlnosti. Kritická teorie globální společnosti a politiky* (From Misrecognition to Justice. A Critical Theory of Global Society and Politics). Prague: Filosofia, published in 2011.

**Andrea Javorská, Ph.D.**
A teacher at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra. She specializes on the phenomenology, philosophical anthropology and philosophy of M.
Heidegger, J. Patočka, H. Arendt and F. Nietzsche. She is an author of a number of works and studies on phenomenology and philosophical anthropology. Her publication contains a book *Dejiny a dejinnost’ v diele Martina Heideggera* (History and Historicality in the work of Martin Heidegger) Bratislava: Iris, published in 2013.

**Klement Mitterpach, Ph.D.**
Works at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Slovakia, where he teaches and writes mostly on Heidegger’s philosophy, with special concern for the nature of the philosophical explication, rhetorical situatedness, place, as well as prospects of the philosophical engagement in analyzing the ontological background of our beliefs and the purpose of their articulation. He published several studies and articles on different aspects of Heidegger’s thought as well as a book *Bytie, čas, priestor v myšlení Martina Heideggera* (Being, Time, Space in the Thought of Martin Heidegger) Bratislava: Iris, in 2007.

**Jozef Sivák, PhDr., CSc.**
Works at the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences (SAV) as a Researcher and Grant Director. He specializes in the history of contemporary philosophy, including the French philosophy and in Husserl's phenomenology as well as in social and political philosophy. He is the author of monographs *Husserl a Merleau-Ponty, Porovnanie dvoch fenome-nologických techník* (Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Comparison of two phenomenological techniques), VEDA: Bratislava, in 1996, *Dejiny filozofie 20. storočia. Niekoľko postáv súčasnej kontinentálnej filozofie* (The history of the Philosophy of the Twentieth Century. Some Figures in Contemporary Continental Philosophy), Aloisianum: Bratislava, in 1997, translator of Vol. 2 of Ricoeur’s *Temps et récit* (Time and Narrative) published in Slovak as *Čas a rozprávanie* in 2004. In addition, he published dozens of segments, studies and articles. Currently, he is completing the trilogy entitled *The Notion of Metaphysics by Husserl*, the Vol.1 (*Eidetic or existential ontology*) is prepared to be published in French in VEDA (SAV), Bratislava.
Richard St’ahel, Ph.D.
Head of the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Slovakia, where he teaches Philosophy of 20th Century, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law, Theory of State and Law and Rudiments of Politology. He has done research in political philosophy, philosophy of law, philosophy of state and environmental philosophy. His research is focused on the reciprocal conditionality of social, economic, political and environmental crises tendencies of the global industrial civilization, with dozens of studies and articles on these topics. As an author and co-editor he participated on publishing of international academic research volumes Historické a súčasné podoby myslenia a komunikácie (Historical and Contemporary Forms of Thinking and Communication), Bratislava: Iris, in 2008), Idenitita – Diferencia (Identity – Difference), Bratislava: SFZ by SAV, in 2010 and Filozofia a umenie žiť (Philosophy and the Art of Living), Bratislava/Nitra: SFZ by SAV/Iris, published in 2014.
PHILOSOPHICA 14
Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society

Authors: Ľubomír Dunaj, Tomáš Hauer, Ladislav Hohoš, Marek Hrubec, Andrea Javorská, Klement Mitterpach, Jozef Sivák, Richard Stťahel

Editors: Mgr. Andrea Javorská, PhD.
        Mgr. Klement Mitterpach, PhD.
        Mgr. Richard Stťahel, PhD.

Editorial Board:
PhDr. Marek Hrubec, PhD. (CGS pri FÚ AV ČR a FF UK Praha, Czech Republic)
Mgr. Andrea Javorská, PhD. (FF UKF v Nitre, Slovakia)
Doc. Erika Lalíková, PhD. (FF UK v Bratislave, Slovakia)
Doc. PhDr. Vladimír Manda, CSc. (FF UKF v Nitre, Slovakia)
Mgr. Klement Mitterpach, PhD. (FF UKF v Nitre, Slovakia)
Doc. PhDr. Peter Nezník, CSc. (FF UPJŠ v Košiciach, Slovakia)
Doc. PhDr. Jelena Petrucijová, CSc. (FSS OU v Ostrave, Czech Republic)
Mgr. Richard Stťahel, PhD. (FF UKF v Nitre, Slovakia)
Doc. PhDr. Dušan Špirko, PhD. (FF UKF v Nitre, Slovakia)
Lada V. Tsypina, PhD. (St. Petersburg State University, Russia)
Mgr. Martin Vašek, PhD. (FF UKF v Nitre, Slovakia)

Publisher: Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra (Slovakia)
Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy

Edition: first
Year of publication: 2014
Number of copies: 150
Number of pages: 190
Print: Equilibria, s.r.o.

ISBN 978-80-558-0714-0
EAN 9788055807140
Journal Philosophica is a reviewed international academic research volume. The contents is focused on expert and scholarly papers in philosophy and relative disciplines. Philosopica contains original contributions as results of authorial research or as contributions to proposed themes announced on the Philosophica webpage.

Papers are published in Slovak, Czech, Russian, Polish, English and German languages. The editors welcome papers send electronically, written in WORD to ajavorska@ukf.sk or rstahel@ukf.sk.

Journal Philosophica is published by Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra (Slovakia).

Journal Philosophica is freely available on the web at: http://katedrafilosofieffufk-eng.weebly.com/philosophica1.html